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A bstract
Governments around the world fund schools and are also involved in operating them. 
There is wide agreement that governments should be involved in provision of educa­
tion, but the appropriate level and form of their involvement is a subject of debate. 
The key justifications for government involvement are externalities and credit market 
imperfections, and this thesis examines these inefficiencies within the context of India’s 
education system.
Chapter 2 assesses human capital externalities in India. It demonstrates that living 
in a locality with educated individuals has a strong beneficial effect on wages over 
and above the effect of one’s own education. In line with theoretical predictions, the 
effect is strongest for small geographical areas. In contrast to a general equilibrium 
interpretation of the results, skilled labour also benefits from a better level of local 
education. Furthermore, human capital externalities are more pronounced in non­
primary industries.
Chapter 3 analyses the effect of credit constraints on education. The principal 
findings are that credit constraints significantly reduce school attendance and increase 
wealth inequalities in educational outcomes. Temporary income shocks reduce the 
probability of attending school, but access to credit mitigates this effect. Finally, the 
results are not limited to short-term outcomes, but are also seen to be present in 
long-term outcomes.
Chapter 4 studies how representation of teachers in India’s state Upper Houses 
affects the provision of education. The main results are that teacher representation 
increases employment of teachers in represented schools and reduces employment in 
unrepresented schools, with a corresponding effect on educational outcomes. Rather 
than achieving the intended objectives of teacher representation, teachers seem to have 
used their political power to shift resources in their favour.
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“A stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum degree of 
literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread 
acceptance of some common set of values. Education can contribute to 
both. In consequence, the gain from education of a child accrues not only 
to the child or to his parents but also to other members of the society. [. 
. .] Most of us would probably conclude th a t the gains are sufficiently 
important to justify some government subsidy.”
Milton Friedman, “Capitalism and Freedom”
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Inefficiencies in India’s education system are the focus of this thesis. They are examined 
from three different angles: the benefits to society, household decisions, and the supply 
side. The first part of the thesis (chapters 2 and 3) examines the existence of market 
failures, with chapter 2 assessing the existence of human capital externalities in India 
and chapter 3 analysing the effect of credit market constraints on educational outcomes 
in India. The second part of the thesis (chapter 4) studies the effect of political power 
on the supply of education.
1.1 Motivation
The provision of education is a major role of governments around the world. Govern­
ments not only provide most of the funding for schools but generally also operate the 
education sector. Although it is widely agreed that governments should be involved in 
the provision of education, the level and form of involvement is a subject of debate.
Economic theory views education as an investment decision (Becker (1964)). In­
dividuals bear the direct cost of tuition and other educational inputs, and also the 
indirect costs of forgoing income during their studies. In return their future income 
is significantly higher than the income of uneducated individuals. Micro-economic re­
search finds returns of around 6-12% per additional schooling year, albeit varying with 
time, with state, and with level of technology.1 Indeed, during the twentieth century 
education has been a good investment and the world has witnessed a large increase in 
the share of the educated population across the world.2
1See Card (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
2 For example, in the year 2000 OECD countries had an average secondary school completion rate
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However, even if we find clear evidence of large benefits to individuals from school­
ing, this does not in itself imply the need for large-scale government intervention. Large 
private returns mean that individuals have strong incentives to acquire schooling with­
out need for government intervention. The standard justifications given for the level 
of governmental involvement in education are externalities, economies of scale, mar­
ket failures mainly in the credit market, and redistributive motives. Because of these 
issues, uncoordinated private decisions are unlikely to lead to optimal social allocation.
Economic theory does not make clear whether externalities are larger in developing 
countries or developed countries. At low levels of education a single additional year of 
average schooling can have a dramatic effect on the political awareness of the population 
or the ability to adopt new technology. In theory however, externalities may only be 
present in countries above a certain threshold of development, or only at very high 
levels of education.
Credit constraints are likely to be present in developed countries as well as in 
developing countries, because human capital is embodied in individuals and cannot act 
as collateral, so lenders are reluctant to provide loans to finance education. However, 
given the existing subsidised loans and aids in place in the USA and the UK it seems 
that credit constraints are unlikely to be a significant barrier to education in those 
countries. In contrast, households in developing countries are more exposed to risk 
and official mechanisms to mitigate their risk are limited.
Redistribution motives view education as an important tool in acquiring future 
income. It is argued that by providing quality education to all citizens regardless 
of their wealth, the government grants them equal opportunities and enables wealth 
inequalities to shrink. However, in many countries especially in the developing world, 
rich students are over-represented in the education system, so education provision can 
actually be a regressive policy. Under those circumstances a better mechanism for 
redistribution might be to provide funds directly to poor citizens rather than to fund 
primarily rich citizens via the education system.
Regardless of the question about the level of government involvement, it is im­
portant to understand the governments’ incentives for providing education. Political 
economy literature makes it clear that governments are not always pursuing the best 
interests of society, with political motivation and institutional limitations sometimes 
leading to inefficiencies in the government provision of education.
of only 45% for 55-64 year olds, compared with an average of 72% for 25-34 year olds. (Hanushek
(2002))
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This thesis examines the effect of externalities, credit constraints, and political 
representation on education in a developing country, India. It takes advantage of the 
unique characteristics of this developing country to study market imperfections. Specif­
ically it examines the existence of human capital externalities where educational out­
comes are particularly low and therefore externalities might be of a different magnitude 
to those in developed countries. In addition, it takes advantage of well-documented 
credit constraints to study the effect of credit availability on education. It also makes 
use of the significant state variation in educational outcomes in India to study the 
effect of teachers’ political representation on the provision of education.
This introductory chapter begins by discussing the unique characteristics and dis­
tinctive problems of the education sector in developing countries, and then covers the 
specific features of education in India. Three sub-sections next provide a literature 
review: the first examines theory and evidence on human capital externalities, the 
second describes the literature on credit market failures in developing countries, and 
the third discusses the effect of political institutions on educational outcomes in devel­
oping countries. The chapter concludes by describing the layout of the thesis, its main 
results, and its contribution.
1.2 Background
Education in Developing Countries
Policymakers place immense importance on improving educational outcomes in the 
developing world. For example two out of the eight millennium goals adopted by the 
United Nations focus on education. One goal is for all children to attend and complete 
primary school by 2015, and the second goal is to achieve gender equality at all levels 
of education by 2005.
In fact, educational achievements have improved dramatically in almost all devel­
oping countries since 1960, but despite significant progress toward universal primary 
education and sharp increases in middle school and secondary school enrolment, there is 
still substantial room for improvement. In 2000, around 850 million adults (aged 15 or 
older) in developing countries, amounting to roughly a quarter of the adult population 
in those countries, were illiterate (UNESCO (2002)).
Educational achievements are highly uneven in developing countries, especially in 
South Asia. For example, although in 2000 South Asia had a relatively high 4.6 average 
years of schooling compared to just 3.4 years in Sub-Saharan Africa, it had a lower
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literacy rate than Sub-Saharan Africa (Glewwe and Kremer (2005)). This is caused 
by a small percentage of the population achieving high levels of education while others 
stay illiterate. Gender gap in educational achievements is also significant in many 
developing countries with 57% of children out of school being girls (UNESCO (2003)).
Government expenditure per primary school student in developing countries is 
about 7 percent of per capita GDP, compared with 18.8 percent in developed countries. 
In contrast, the gap is significantly narrower for spending per secondary school student: 
15 percent of per capita GDP for developing countries compared with 21 percent for 
developed countries. Governments in developing countries spend on average 34 times 
more on a student in university education than they spend on a student in primary 
education and 14 times more than on a student in secondary education. The equivalent 
figures for developed countries are 1.8 and 1.4 (UNESCO (2003)). These figures indi­
cate a very regressive spending structure in developing countries, as the richer children 
are those who typically attend universities.
Teachers’ salaries are by far the largest part of government spending on education, 
and in some countries these expenditures account for more than 90% of the total cost. 
The main reason for this is that teachers’ salaries in developing countries are very high 
relative to average salary and GDP per capita. This is due to limited availability of 
skilled labour, and also political considerations. The low investment in educational 
inputs mean that sometimes students learn outside in the open air, in many cases 
students share textbooks, and in some places parents must provide books and other 
facilities.
Apart from discrepancies in the financing of education, the education systems in 
developing countries differ in other ways from those in developed countries. In many 
countries teachers have weak incentives to perform their duties, due to a lack of appro­
priate supervision and accountability. In some countries teachers come from a higher 
social status than their students and parents cannot complain about their performance. 
As a result there can be a high incidence of teacher absence in developing countries.3In 
many countries, teachers coerce parents to pay for “extra lessons” after school or on 
weekends to prepare students for important examinations. In such situations, increased 
teaching effort at school could reduce the demand for such extra lessons, and thus re­
duce teachers’ income.
Following recommendations by the World Bank many countries decentralised the
3 For example Chaudhury etc. (2005) find that 25% of teachers in India were absent from school 
during an unannounced visit.
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delivery of public goods including education. The idea was to strengthen the relation­
ship between beneficiaries and providers of local public goods. It was believed that this 
arrangement would increase accountability of providers as the community could mon­
itor them more easily, and would also allow each community to adjust public goods to 
the specific needs of the community. On the other hand, decentralisation can damage 
weak minorities lacking political representation.
Education in India
The decentralisation and liberalisation processes in India of the last decade brought 
educational policy in India into the spotlight of public debate. Over the years there has 
been a substantial mismatch between goals and resource allocation, and although article 
45 of the constitution urged the Government of India to provide free and compulsory 
education up to the age of fourteen by 1960, universal education has not been achieved 
anywhere in India to date. However, India’s success with higher education has masked 
the enormity of the problem. Many opinions, including those of Dr&ze and Sen, make 
a case for a fundamental change in educational policy, and for massive action by the 
Government of India to achieve economic growth and eliminate poverty. To support 
his argument Dreze (1995) highlights India’s poor educational achievements compared 
with those of China, who had a similar problem of mass illiteracy and endemic poverty 
in the late 1940’s.
As further support for a change in educational policy, economists emphasise the 
poor educational achievements from an international perspective. India in the last 
three decades appeared to be in a difficult situation even compared with regions that 
are often considered as less developed. For instance female literacy rates were much 
lower in India than in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the Indian Census of 1991, the 
overall literacy rate in India was 50%.4Although the Census of 2001 indicates a large 
improvement in literacy rates, with an overall increase to 68%,5India is still ranked 
as low as 82nd out of 116 countries for which relevant data is available, in terms of 
proportion of public expenditure on education to  GNP.6
Although responsibility for school education is shared between the states and the 
central government, in practice states bear much more responsibility for education than 
the central government. Therefore, educational achievements in India are highly uneven
4Male literacy rate 64%, and female literacy rate just 39%.
5For males to 75%, and for females to 54%.
6 In 1990 the expenditure on education was around 3% of GNP. The percentages were supposed 
to increase after decentralisation to 6%, however, according to the World Development Report 2000 
educational expenditure was still only 3.4% of GNP in 1996.
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and there are striking contrasts in literacy levels between different states, different 
districts, different sectors (urban and rural), those with different social status levels 
(castes), and genders. For example, female literacy rates vary between 20 percent in 
Rajasthan and 86 percent in Kerala. Literacy is almost universal in urban Kerala, 
but particularly low among scheduled caste women in rural Rajasthan. Furthermore, 
the Gini coefficient for inequality in education is quite high in India with a value 
of 0.56.7Higher education, on the other hand, is a federal matter, with the central 
government bearing most of the responsibility and most of the financial costs.
India has one of the world’s largest gender gaps in education. According to the 
1998 Human Development Report only five countries have a greater gender gap than 
India: Bhutan, Syria, Togo, Malawi and Mozambique.8The reasons for this gender gap 
are partly related to economic reasons such as lower benefits from female education as 
females have lower participation in paid work, and partly related to the lower social 
status of females. In fact, Kingdon and Unni (2001) find that education has a U- 
shaped relationship with paid work participation and that only schooling beyond the 
junior/middle level enhances their paid work participation. Women who participate 
in the labour market appear to have higher returns to education than men, but in 
contrast Kingdon (1998) found that the returns to education for women are lower than 
those for men. However, this earlier study was based on a relatively small sample of 
around 200 women and 1000 men from a single city.
Education is divided into pre-primary, primary (children aged 6-11, in classes 1-5), 
middle or upper primary (children aged 11-14, in classes 6-8), and high school (children 
aged 14-16 in secondary school, and aged 16-18 in higher secondary school).9Higher 
education includes technical schools, colleges and universities. In most of the villages 
there is a government primary school (94% of the rural population live within 1 km. 
of a primary school). Government schools charge negligible fees, and never refuse to 
enrol a child. There are no Board examinations until class 5, but primary schools 
can sometimes ask a child to repeat a particular class. The supply problem is more 
pronounced in middle schools as only 57% of the population live within 1 km. of a 
middle school.
The low quality of schools mainly in the rural areas has been noted by many authors. 
A famous example is the PROBE survey, which collected data on primary schools in
7World Development Report, 2006 reporting data for 2000.
8 The 2003 report shows some improvement in India’s gender gap, but it remains relatively high 
compared with other developing countries.
9This was formerly one school with all children aged 14-18, in classes 9-12.
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randomly selected villages in north India. It finds that only one quarter of the sample 
schools have at least two teachers, two all-weather classrooms, and some teaching aids. 
In addition, the report indicates an insufficient number of teachers and classes so that 
if all children at primary school age were enrolled in a government primary school, 
there would be more than 100 pupils per classroom on average, and 68 pupils for each 
teacher. The school facilities are also in poor condition. Only 41% of all primary 
schools had drinking water and only 40% had non-leaking roofs. Teachers’ absence is 
a serious concern, and at the time of the team visit, around 50% of schools had no 
teaching activity.
1.3 Literature Review
Human Capital Externalities
There are many theoretical reasons to expect social benefits from education to 
exceed private benefits. One key channel is through the significant role education 
plays in determining economic growth. Aghion and Howitt (1988) divide the role 
of human capital in endogenous growth models into two broad groups. According 
to the first group, a high level of human capital increases innovation and adoption 
of new technology (Romer (1990), Nelson and Phelps (1966)). The second group 
claims that social interaction in the same industry creates learning opportunities which 
enhance productivity (Lucas (1988)). While the first approach attributes growth to an 
existing stock of human capital, the second approach emphasises the need for ongoing 
accumulation of human capital to sustain economic growth.
In both of these groups, externalities are generally built into the production technol­
ogy without full description of the micro-foundations generating the externalities. But 
Acemoglu (1996) provides a model which explores the micro-foundation of externali­
ties. His model states that since human capital and physical capital are complementary 
in production, investment in physical capital depends on the expected level of human 
capital. Because labour markets are imperfect and workers and firms are not perfectly 
matched, firms choose to locate themselves in more educated areas. As a result, work­
ers in educated areas have a higher probability of working for a capital-intensive firm 
and therefore their productivity tends to be higher.
Other theoretical approaches emphasise the role of human capital in affecting non- 
market outcomes. For example, Lochner (2004) suggests that education increases the 
opportunity cost of crime, and a more educated society therefore endures lower levels of
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crime. Others have suggested that educated citizens can make better-informed political 
decisions and take greater part in communities and political activities (for example, 
Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004)). Similarly it is believed that a traditional 
society with more educated women might also benefit from lower fertility rates and 
better nutrition and health.
The macro-level evidence on the contribution of education to growth is mixed and 
inconclusive.10The main drawback of the literature is that unobserved characteristics 
could affect both growth and schooling. It is difficult to isolate changes in education 
from other policies enhancing growth. Moreover the direction of causality is not clear, 
as a society which expects the economy to expand and generate more opportunities for 
skilled labour would invest more in education. In addition, measurement errors and 
differences in the quality of education between countries make it even harder to reach 
a clear verdict on the contribution of education to economic growth.
Micro-level evidence on the effect of human capital on innovation and technology 
adoption is more promising. For example, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) show that the 
adoption rate of high-yielding seed varieties (HYVs) in India is affected by neighbours’ 
experience. They also discover that farmers with experienced neighbours are signifi­
cantly more profitable than those with inexperienced neighbours. Thus, the neighbour 
effect is not just peer pressure or imitation but an actual learning process. Similarly 
Knight and Weir (2004) find that educated farmers are the first to adopt new tech­
nology in rural Ethiopia. They also show that uneducated farmers imitate them and 
adopt the new technology in a later stage.
The evidence on social non-market outcomes is limited. While there is much evi­
dence that schooling is correlated with better aggregate economic outcomes and with 
a variety of social outcomes, the magnitude of the effect and the interpretation of the 
results are unclear. Only a small number of existing papers deal with causality is­
sues and unobservable variables in a convincing way. For example, societies with a 
lower crime level might attract a better-educated population, rather than the other 
way around. Alternatively, societies with good opportunities for skilled labour may 
encourage people to learn instead of performing a criminal activity.
One direct approach to estimate human capital externalities is to focus on esti­
mating the effect of aggregated human capital on a firm’s productivity. For example, 
Knight and Weir (2006) estimate the effect of local average education on farm produc­
tivity in rural Ethiopia. They show that average community education significantly
10 See Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a review.
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increases farm productivity as well as reducing inefficiencies in the production process. 
An alternative empirical approach toward estimating market externalities is to estimate 
the effect of local education level on an individual’s wage.11 The basic premise here is 
that in the absence of externalities local achievements should not affect individuals.
The second chapter of this thesis attempts to assess human capital externalities in 
India employing this approach. It follows three existing papers: Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000), Ciccone and Peri (2000), and Moretti (1998), which are discussed in more detail 
in that chapter.
Credit Market Imperfections in Developing Countries
Households in developing countries are exposed to significant fluctuations in in­
come due to the important role played by agriculture. Fluctuations in weather and 
in world commodity prices translate into income shocks. In addition poor sanitation 
and health services increase the risk of infectious diseases. Market opportunities to 
deal with these risks are limited due to information problems, absence of collateral, 
and enforcement difficulties, causing households to engage in alternative methods to 
smooth their consumption and income.
Extensive literature analyses the level of success such informal mechanisms have 
in smoothing consumption.12The key benchmark of the empirical tests is that with 
perfect markets transitory income should not have an effect on consumption. Thus 
the coefficient of transitory income in a regression of household consumption should 
be close to zero. Alternatively, the coefficient of transitory income in a regression of 
household saving should be near to one. Similarly, if informal mechanisms to share risk 
are successful the coefficient of idiosyncratic income shock in a consumption regression 
should again be close to zero. The general finding of these approaches is that households 
are reasonably successful in smoothing consumption.
However, this type of analysis does not recognise the cost of strategies employed 
by households to limit their exposure to risk. This is most often achieved by making 
conservative but less profitable production decisions and engaging in a more diverse 
economic activity. In other words, when financial markets are incomplete household 
production and consumption choices are no longer separable, leading to costly and 
inefficient adjustments to production and investment decisions. Research focusing on 
the almost full consumption smoothing achieved by informal mechanisms gives only a 
very partial picture of the full costs of credit market inefficiencies.
11 For a full literature review see Moretti (2004).
12 For a literature review see Besley (1994), Conning and Udry (2005), Morduch (1995).
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Substantial literature provides evidence of such costly activity to mitigate risk. For 
example, Binswanger and Rozenzweig (1993) examine the impact of risk on farm in­
put composition. They show liquid assets and draught animals both being used to 
smooth consumption. Furthermore, as the environment becomes riskier, as measured 
by changes in weather conditions, vulnerable households shift production toward more 
conservative input composition. Analysis by wealth suggests that wealthy households 
do not significantly change the composition of their inputs, whereas income smoothing 
costs poor households and households of median wealth 35% and 15% of farm prof­
its, respectively. These results indicate that market imperfection can also result in 
escalating income inequality.
A few theoretical papers examine the role of imperfect credit markets in the per­
sistence of income discrepancies. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that if an indivisible 
investment is required for acquiring education, then initial income inequalities will 
translate to unequal accumulation of human capital and hence to the persistence of 
wealth inequalities across generations. Banerjee and Newman (1993) generate similar 
predictions with occupational choice depending on initial wealth when credit markets 
are imperfect. An important implication of these predictions is that income distribution 
can have an effect on growth.13
Some research directly tests the effect of credit market imperfection on investment in 
human capital, including health and education. For example, Foster (1995) investigates 
the fluctuations in child weight after major floods in rural Bangladesh. He shows 
that in the presence of credit constraints income shocks harm child growth. However 
landowner households with collateral made use of sufficient credit and did not suffer 
these effects. Similarly, in investigating child health in South India, Behrman (1988) 
finds that because households are unable to smooth consumption, the health of children 
suffers during the season before the main harvest when food is scarce. Furthermore, 
girls’ health suffers more due to gender discrimination. Jacoby and Skoufias’s (1997) 
research, discussed in more details in the main text of the thesis, finds that children in 
rural South India are often taken out of school in response to adverse income shocks.
The third chapter of the thesis forms part of the research examining the effect of 
credit constraints on educational outcomes. However unlike other literature I employ a 
direct measure of credit availability, which allows me to directly estimate the marginal 
effect of credit availability on educational outcomes.
13 For a survey of empirical literature testing the effect of inequality on growth, see Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003).
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Political Institutions and Education in Developing Countries
Traditional public economics assumed the objective function of governments to be a 
weighted average of social welfare. In other words it was assumed that the government 
acted as a central planner which tried to achieve optimal allocation of resources for 
the benefits of society. Political economy has shifted the focus of analysis to conflict of 
interests between various groups in the society and between politicians and the public. 
Today it is clear that in order to be able to say more about the appropriate form 
and level of government involvement it is important to focus considerable attention on 
government incentives. Moreover, it is clear that government incentives are influenced 
not only by the composition and preferences of the voters but also by the institutional 
structure.14
There is clear evidence that government investment in education in developing 
countries is motivated to some degree by political considerations rather than mere 
considerations of efficiency. For example, Pritchett and Filmer (1999) in their meta­
literature review show that most papers find that the marginal product per dollar of 
inputs not directly valued by teachers is commonly 10 to 100 times higher than that of 
inputs valued by teachers. These results are in contrast with optimisation models that 
predict equal marginal returns and could be explained by a stronger political influence 
of teachers on policymakers compared with limited influence of parents. Kingdon 
and Muzammil (2003) provide a systematic study of teachers’ political influence in 
U ttar Pradesh in India. They find that teachers not only influence the appointment 
of teachers but also influence legislation on education and the level of supervision over 
teachers. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) show that corruption is a major issue with 
financing of education in Uganda, with only 20% of transfers from central government 
actually reaching schools in 1995.
One of the main political institutions affecting education is the level of centralisation 
of funds and monitoring. In recent years many developing countries have undergone 
financial decentrahsation in response to the failures of centralised school systems. In 
addition many communities were given more responsibility in monitoring providers of 
public goods. Local communities are supposed to have the best knowledge about the 
needs of their children, strong incentives to monitor the performance of teachers and 
headmasters, and a comparative advantage in conducting this monitoring.
Evidence for the effectiveness of decentralisation is inconclusive. For example,
14 A large section of the literature also analyses the efficiency of government schools compared with 
private schools, however this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
22
Jimenez and Sawada (1999) and Jimenez and Paqueo (1996) find that enhanced com­
munity and parental involvement in schools has improved student skills, diminished 
student absences, and reduced school costs. Reinikka and Svensson (2003) show that 
better information enabling the community to monitor local officials increased the per­
centage of funds from the central government which actually reached the schools from 
20 percent in 1995 to 80 percent in 2001.
However, it is not clear that decentralisation and empowerment of local communities 
is always beneficial. One danger is that in a country with a heterogeneous population, 
decentralisation will enable strong elite groups to intimidate disadvantaged weaker 
segments of society and to ignore their needs. A second danger is that the local 
demand for education is too weak and thus a better ability to monitor the education 
providers is not sufficient to improve educational outcomes. For example, Kremer and 
Vermeersch (2005) find no effect of granting school committees with monitoring power 
on teachers’ absence and performance in Kenya. Simlarly, Chaudhury etc. (2005) find 
little evidence that attempting to strengthen local community ties in India reduces 
absence.
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) illustrate how ethnic diversity limits the ability to im­
pose social sanctions in diverse communities, resulting in reduced primary school fund­
ing and poorer school facilities in western Kenya. Kremer, Moulin and Namunyu (2003) 
analyse decentralised school responsibility in Kenya allowing local communities free­
dom to establish new schools. They show that this situation created incentives for local 
communities to build too many small schools, to spend too much on teachers relative 
to non-teacher inputs, and to set school fees above those preferred by the median voter 
with the result that many children are prevented from attending school.
Another important political structure in developing countries is political reserva­
tion. Many countries have experimented with political reservation in order to increase 
minority representation in the political process. Pande (2003) shows in a theoretical 
model that when candidate entry is mediated by political parties with policy prefer­
ences independent of their candidate’s identity, changes in legislator identity brought 
about by political reservation can only affect policy in the absence of full policy com­
mitment. Moreover, such changes may not be significant unless every legislator has a 
voice in the policymaking process.
The empirical evidence supports the incompleteness of political commitments and 
shows that politician identity does affect policy outcomes. The main finding of Pande
(2003) is that political reservation in Indian states has increased redistribution of re­
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sources in favour of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes which benefit from political 
reservation. She also finds that scheduled caste and scheduled tribe reservation reduces 
overall resources toward education. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) study the effect 
of reservation for women in local government in two districts in India and show that 
women invest more in goods which are relevant to the needs of local women and invest 
less in education.
The fourth chapter of the thesis examines the effect of a special political institution 
in India on educational outcomes. Teachers in India have a unique representation in 
the Indian parliament, and I check how this representation affects educational inputs 
and outcomes.
1.4 Description of the Thesis
This thesis attempts to assist the debate on government intervention in the provision 
of education. Its first part examines two important market failures in India which 
are used to justify government involvement in the educational market. Specifically, it 
assesses human capital externalities and the influence of credit constraints. Its second 
part studies political considerations affecting the provision of education in India. This 
part questions the assumption that governments are motivated purely by efficiency 
considerations. It shows that political considerations play an important role in the 
government decision-making process.
The second chapter employs two large representative employment and unemploy­
ment surveys in India to assess human capital externalities. Following existing liter­
ature regarding the USA,15the identification method is based on examining the co­
efficient of local educational achievements in individuals’ wage equations. The key 
assumption is that in the absence of externalities an individual’s wage is affected only 
by the individual’s characteristics. The analysis starts by examining the effect of re­
gional average schooling years on individuals’ wages, and then focuses the analysis 
down to the district level.
The chapter offers two main contributions to the existing literature. One is that 
it is one of a very few attempts to assess human capital externalities in a developing 
country where average educational achievements are particularly low.16It is not certain 
that externalities should be larger under these circumstances. However, since there are
15Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Ciccone and Peri (2000), and Moretti (1998).
16 A discussion of the relevant papers on developing countries is provided under chapter 2 below.
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good theoretical reasons to believe so, it is beneficial to test this possibility empirically. 
Secondly, the chapter presents a theoretical model underlining the differences between 
general equilibrium models and human externalities models. 17In doing so it contributes 
to the discussion in the existing literature regarding the method for assessing human 
capital externalities.
Special attention is paid to the key identification issues of unobserved variables and 
endogenous education. The main concern is that regions with better infrastructure 
would have better educational achievements but also better salaries for reasons other 
than education. Therefore, fixed effects are included to account for unchanged local 
characteristics. Control variables are also included to account for unfixed character­
istics. A second important concern is that causality might be reversed as wealthier 
regions have higher demand for education. While potential endogeneity concerns can­
not be completely eliminated the chapter provides various robustness checks to mitigate 
the endogeneity concerns.
A third econometric concern is the ability to separate between a general equilibrium 
effect and an externalities effect. I develop a simple theoretical model which illustrates 
the effect human capital externalities have on wages. It highlights the differences 
between an externalities model and a general equilibrium model and generates testable 
predictions regarding a human capital externalities effect, in order to distinguish it 
from a general equilibrium effect. I then test these predictions empirically.
The findings demonstrate a strong effect of local (regional/district) average edu­
cational achievements on household wages, even after accounting for the household’s 
own education level and a regional fixed effect. For example, a one-year increase in 
average regional schooling years raises household wages by 3.8%. These results suggest 
the existence of human capital externalities. Moreover, in fine with theoretical predic­
tions for human capital externalities, I find the above effect to be more pronounced at 
the district level rather than the regional level. Contrary to the general equilibrium 
interpretation of the effect, educated workers are not disadvantaged by an increase in 
the supply of educated workers. In fact, educated workers benefit from living in an ed­
ucated society. Furthermore, externalities are much more pronounced in non-primary 
industries, where human capital plays a more significant role in production.
The third chapter employs a large and representative employment and unemploy­
ment survey combined with information on bank availability to study the effect of 
credit constraints on educational outcomes in India. It starts by examining the effect
17 Independently, a similar model was developed by Moretti (2004b).
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of credit on school attendance and incidences of lagging behind at school. Then it 
makes use of panel data to explore the effect on school attendance of changes in family 
circumstances. It also tests the extent that credit availability helps to mitigate adverse 
income shocks. Finally, the chapter considers the effect of bank availability on school 
completion.
This chapter offers three main contributions to the existing literature. Most im­
portantly, it focuses on identifying the marginal effect of credit constraints instead of 
merely verifying the existence of these constraints. Secondly, it employs a direct and 
relatively exogenous measure of credit availability, compared with most research which 
employs variables that are clearly endogenous, such as access to land or other assets. 
Thirdly, it focuses on a developing country where there are clear credit constraints and 
in doing so, contributes to understanding the widespread costs of credit imperfections.
The main finding of the empirical analysis is that the availability of banks sig­
nificantly increases the probability of attending school and reduces the probability of 
lagging behind at school. Moreover the availability of banks mitigates wealth inequali­
ties in school outcomes. The panel data analysis reveals that adverse temporary income 
shocks, such as unemployment, reduces the probability of attending school. However 
access to credit helps to mitigate the negative effects of these shocks. Finally, the 
results are not limited to short-term outcomes, such as school attendance, but are also 
present in actual school completion rates.
The fourth chapter focuses on the supply side and the effect of certain political 
considerations on the provision of education in India. Specifically, it examines the 
effect of teachers’ political power on education. Teachers in India are granted a special 
representation in the state Upper Houses, which no other profession enjoys. Middle and 
secondary school teachers enjoy political representation, but primary school teachers 
are excluded from the political process. The parliamentary setting varies across time 
and across the Indian states, with some states having a fixed bicameral parliamentary 
system, some a fixed unicameral system, and some switching from bicameralism to 
unicameralism. The chapter makes use of this unique time-state variation to study the 
effect of teachers’ political power within bicameralism on the provision of educational 
inputs and on educational outputs.
The chapter offers a notable contribution to the political economy literature. Upper 
Houses are widespread political institutions but little is known about their effect. It 
is generally very difficult to empirically assess the effect of political institutions, and 
Upper Houses in particular, because there is very limited country-time variation in their
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existence. As a result, identification is based upon cross-country regressions, and in 
this framework it is hard to account for unobserved variables. In addition, differences 
in structure and powers of political institutions across countries make it even more 
difficult to interpret the results. The institutional setting in India provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the role of Upper Houses.
India is a federal country and educational matters are principally the responsibility 
of state governments. As a result, educational achievements are highly uneven across 
India. Specifically, literacy rates and school completion rates vary significantly across 
the country. By examining some of the political considerations of state governments, 
this chapter makes a contribution toward understanding the substantial inequalities 
in education. Moreover, the discrimination of primary school teachers in the political 
system helps to partially explain the major inequalities in educational resources and 
outcomes between primary schools and secondary schools.
Political influence of teachers in the parliament is limited by the fact that Upper 
Houses do not have a power of veto. I develop a simple theoretical model to examine 
the political effect of Upper Houses with no veto power. The main assumption of the 
model is that there is political cost associated with disagreement between the Upper 
House and the government. Therefore the government compromises its preferences and 
adjusts the budget toward that preferred by the Upper House. This theoretical section 
predicts that the representation of middle school and secondary school teachers will 
shift resources toward these teachers.
I test the effect of teacher representation within bicameralism by employing both 
micro-level regressions and state-level regressions. Accordingly, the data used includes 
both household data and state panel data for the main sixteen Indian states combined 
with information on the existence of Upper Houses.
A simple comparison between bicameral states and unicameral states reveals that 
the allocation of Upper Houses is not random. Larger states, more populated states 
and richer states were allocated Upper Houses. Therefore a comparison of educational 
achievements between those types of states is misleading. Consequently, the identifi­
cation is based on a differences in differences method. I compare between two groups, 
the first comprising all states with a fixed parliamentary regime, and the second com­
prising all states which switched from bicameralism to unicameralism. Then I compare 
the rate of change from before the regime change to after the change.
The assumption of the differences in differences method is that in the absence of 
change education would have evolved similarly in the two groups of states. I therefore
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test this assumption in this chapter. I also discuss the possibility of endogenous change 
of the parliamentary regime. Finally I examine the option of a general political change 
affecting both the parliamentary regime and educational policy.
The main finding of the chapter is that teacher representation increases the level of 
teacher employment in represented schools and reduces employment in unrepresented 
schools. This shift in resources influences actual educational outcomes. Upper Houses 
are associated with a 3% increase in middle and secondary school completion rates and 
a corresponding drop in primary school completion rates. Contrary to the intended 
objectives of teacher representation, teachers have used their political power to shift 
resources in their favour.
Overall, the thesis demonstrates strong evidence of market failures affecting the 
education sector. The existence of externalities implies that individuals under-invest 
in education. Limited access to credit results in insufficient human capital investment, 
so households sacrifice potential future benefits from education in favour of short-term 
benefits from child labour.18Taken together, the evidence presented in the first part of 
the thesis indicates that existing investment in education in India is insufficiently low 
and that an intervention in the market could be beneficial. However, the second part of 
the thesis suggests that government intervention should be assessed and implemented 
carefully. Even though an intervention in the market is valuable it is not clear that 
the government would achieve optimal allocation of resources, since governments are 
driven by political considerations and not just by considerations of economic efficiency. 
In the debate over government role, more attention should be devoted to government 
incentives.
18 The economic returns for literacy and for primary school in India are found to be quite low and 
estimated to be lower than 2%. (See Duraisamy (2002), Kingdon (1998), Kingdon and Unni (2001) 
and Vasudeva-Dutta (2006)). However, the returns rise with the level of schooling and are estimated 
to be around 5-10% for each year of secondary school studies and around 15-20% for each year of 
university studies.
28
R E FE R E N C E S
Acemoglu, Daron, (1996), “A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in 
Human Capital Accumulation” , The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 778- 
804.
Acemoglu, Daron and Joshua Angrist, (2000), “How Large are Human Capital 
Externalities? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws” , MIT, Department 
of Economics, Mimeo.
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt, (1998), “Endogenous Growth Theory” , MIT 
Press, Cambridge MA.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Esther Duflo, (2003), “Inequality And Growth: What 
Can The Data Say?” , Journal of Economic Growth, 267-299.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Andrew F. Newman, (1993), “Occupational Choice and 
the Process of Development” , Journal of Political Economy, 101 (2), 274-298.
Becker, G. (1964), “Human Capital” , Colombia University Press, New York.
Behrman, Jere, (1988), “Interhousehold Allocation of Nutrients in Rural India: 
Are Boys Favored? Do Parents Exhibit Inequality Aversion?”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 40 (1), 32-54.
Besley, Timothy, (1994), “Savings, Credit and Insurance” , in Handbook of De­
velopment Economics, edited by J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan, Vol. 3, Ams­
terdam, North Holland.
Binswanger, Hans and Mark Rosenzweig, (1993), “Wealth, Weather and the Com­
position and Profitability of Agriculture Investments”, Economic Journal, 103, 
56-78.
Card, David, (1999), “Education in the Labour Market” , in Handbook of Labour 
Economics, edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Amsterdam, North Holland.
Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo, (2003), “The Impact of Reser­
vation in the Panchayatu Raj: Evidence From A Nationwide Randomized Ex­
periment” , MIT ,Mimeo.
Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan 
and F. Halsey Rogers, (2005), “Teacher Absence in India: A Snapshot” , forth­
coming in Journal of the European Economic Association.
Ciccone, Antonio and Giovanni Peri, (2000), “Human Capital Externalities in 
Cities”, CEPR Discussion Paper 2599.
29
Conning, Jonathan and Christopher Udry, (2005), “Rural Financial Markets in 
Developing Countries” , forthcoming in The Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 
Vol. 3, edited by Evenson, R.E., P. Pingali, and T. P. Schultz.
Dreze, Jean and Jackie Loh, (1995), “Literacy in India and China”, Centre of 
Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Working Paper 29.
Duraisamy, P. (2002), “Changes in Returns to Education in India, 1983-94: by 
Gender, Age-Cohort and Location” , Economics of Education Review, 21(6), 609- 
622.
Foster, Andrew, (1995), “Prices, Credit Constraints, and Child Growth in Low- 
Income Rural Areas”, Economic Journal, 105(430), 551-570.
Foster, Andrew and Mark R. Rosenzweig, (1995), “Learning by Doing and Learn­
ing from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture” , Journal 
of Political Economy, 1176-1209.
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira, (1993), “Income Distribution and Macroeco­
nomics” , Review of Economic Studies, 60 (1), 35-52.
Glewwe, Paul and Michael Kremer, (2005), “Schools, Teachers, and Education 
Outcomes in Developing Countries” , forthcoming in Handbook on the Economics 
of Education, edited by Eric A. Hanushek.
Hanushek, Eric A. (2002), “Publicly Provided Education” , in Handbook of Public 
Economics, Vol. 4, edited by A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Amsterdam, North 
Holland.
Human Development Report, (1998),
http: / /hdr.undp.org/reports/view_reports.cfm
Human Development Report, (2002),
http: / /hdr.undp.org/reports/view_reports.cfm
Jacoby, Hanan and Emanuel Skofias, (1997), “Risk Financial Markets and Human 
Capital in a Developing Country”, Review of economic Studies, 64(3), 311-35
Jimenez, Emmanuel, and Vicente Paqueo, (1996), “Do Local Contributions Af­
fect the Efficiency of Public Primary Schools?” , Economics of Education Review, 
15(4), 377-386.
Jimenez, Emmanuel and Yasuyuki Sawada, (1999), “Do Community-Managed 
Schools Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador’s EDUCO Program”, World Bank 
Economic Review, 13(3), 415-441.
30
Kingdon, Geeta G. (1998), “Does the Labour Market Explain Lower Female 
Schooling in India?” , Journal of Development Studies, 35(1), 39-65.
Kingdon, Geeta G. and Mohd. Muzammil, (2003), “The Political Economy of 
Education in India: Teacher Politics in U ttar Pradesh” , Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi.
Kingdon, Geeta G. and Jeemol Unni, (2001), “Education and Women’s Labour 
Market Outcomes in India” , Education Economics, 9(2), 173-195.
Knight, John and Sharada Weir, (2004), “Externality Effects of Education: Dy­
namics of the Adoption and Diffusion of an Innovation in Rural Ethiopia” , Eco­
nomic Development and Cultural Change, 53 (1), 93-113.
Knight, John and Sharada Weir, (2006), “Production externalities of education: 
Evidence from rural Ethiopia”, forthcoming in Journal of African Economies.
Kremer, Michael, Sylvie Moulin, and Robert Namunyu, (2003) “Decentralization: 
A Cautionary Tale” , Work in Progress, Harvard University.
Kremer, Michael and Christel Vermeesh, (2005), “School Committee Empower­
ment: Preliminary Notes”, Harvard University, Mimeo.
Krueger, Alan B. and Mikael Lindahl, (2001), “Education for Growth: Why and 
For Whom?”, Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 1101-1136.
Lochner, Lance, (2004), “Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Ap­
proach”, International Economic Review, 45 (3), 811-843.
Lucas, Robert E. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development” , Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 22(1), 3-42.
Miguel, Edward and Mary Kay Gugerty, (2005), “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanc­
tions, and Public Goods in Kenya” , Journal of Public Economics, 89 (11-12), 
2325-2368.
Milligan, Kevin, Enrico Moretti and Philip Oreopoulos, (2004), “Does Education 
Improve Citizenship? Evidence from the U.S. and the U.K.”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 8 8 , 1667-1695.
Morduch, Jonathan, (1995), “Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing” , 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (3), 103-114.
Moretti, Enrico, (1998), “Social Returns to Education and Human Capital Exter­
nalities: Evidence from Cities”, UC Berkley Department of Economics, Mimeo.
Moretti, Enrico, (2004), “Human Capital Externalities in Cities” , in Handbook 
of Regional and Urban Economics, Amsterdam, North Holland.
31
Moretti, Enrico, (2004b), “Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: 
Evidence From Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-Sectional Data”, Journal of 
Econometrics, 1 2 1 (1-2 ).
Nelson, Richard R. and Edmund S. Phelps, (1966), “Investment in Humans, 
Technological Diffusion, and Economic Growth”, American Economic Review, 
61, 69-75.
Pande, Rohini, (2003), “Can Mandated Political Representation Provide Disad­
vantaged Minorities Policy Influence? Theory and Evidence from India”, Amer­
ican Economic Review, 93 (4), 1132-1151.
Pritchett, Lant and Deon Filmer, (1999), “W hat Education Production Func­
tions Really Show: A Positive Theory of Education Expenditures”, Economics 
of Education Review, 18, 223-239.
The PROBE Team, (1999), Public Report on Basic Education in India, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi.
Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson, (2003), “The Power of Information: Evi­
dence from a Campaign to Reduce Capture” , World Bank, Mimeo.
Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson, (2004), “Local Capture: Evidence from a 
Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda” , Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, 119(2), 679-705.
Romer, Paul M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change” , Journal of Political 
Economy, 98(5), 71-102.
UNESCO, (2002), “Education for All: Is the World On Track?”, UNESCO Pub­
lishing. http: / /portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php
UNESCO, (2003), “Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality” , UN­
ESCO Publishing, http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php
Vasudeva-Dutta, P. (2006), “The structure of wages in India, 1983-1999” , forth­
coming in Education Economics.
World Development Report, (1999/2000), “Entering the 21st Century” , 
http://econ.worldbank.org
World Development Report, (2006), “Equity and Development” ,
http://econ. worldbank.org
32
Chapter 2
A ssessing Human Capital 
Externalities in India
2.1 Introduction
Human capital externalities have significant implications for both endogenous growth 
models and educational policies. In particular, externalities are crucial to one of the key 
questions regarding educational policies: the question of whether governments should 
subsidise education or not. The case for subsidising human capital on a wide scale 
rests on the existence of a significant divergence between private and social benefits. If 
private benefits from education are much lower than social benefits, then individuals 
under-accumulate human capital. This under-accumulation generates the possibility of 
a classic market failure in which, on efficiency grounds, there is room for government 
intervention. But in the absence of this or other market failures, government provision 
for education would for the most part only result in reducing private investment.
Many economists believe that human capital externalities play an important role in 
explaining the substantial variation in growth rates existing between various countries. 
Accordingly, growth models emphasise the central role of human capital externalities 
in enhancing technological innovation and technological diffusion, which result in faster 
economic growth (see for example, Acemoglu and Angrist (2 0 0 0 ) ) . 1
1In contrast, there are important papers that view factor accumulation as the main source of 
differences between countries. Young (1995) in his influential paper uses growth accounting to show 
that much of East Asian growth can be attributed to factor accumulation. Mankiw Romer and 
Weil (1992) claim that the Solow model with human capital explains most of the differences between 
countries.
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There are substantial theoretical reasons to believe in the existence of externalities. 
One approach stresses that countries with proportionally well-educated populations 
generate greater innovation and technological diffusion due to efficient exchange of 
ideas.2A second approach is based on imperfect matching between firms and workers, 
causing firms to invest more physical capital in localities where the expected human 
capital is higher. This results in an increase in productivity of all types of workers.3A 
third approach emphasises the non-market benefits of education, such as reducing 
crime, increasing voter participation, and reducing birth rates.4
This chapter takes an important step at estimating human capital externalities in 
developing countries and offers two central contributions. First, there is very limited 
literature estimating human capital externalities outside of the USA and, in particular, 
in developing countries. Moreover, this chapter offers much more convincing methods 
to deal with econometric concerns over unobserved variables and endogeneity than the 
methods employed by existing literature on developing countries. Developing countries 
provide a better prospect for assessing human capital externalities because of the low 
levels of literacy and schooling in many of these countries. Empirical evidence shows 
that private benefits from education are decreasing, i.e. the financial benefits from 
primary education are much higher than the financial benefits from secondary school or 
graduate studies.5If social returns from education also diminish with increasing average 
education, we can expect externalities to m atter more in developing countries.6
The second contribution of this chapter is that it helps to resolve the controversy in 
existing literature regarding methods for assessing human capital externalities. Ciccone 
and Peri (2000) showed that if workers with different levels of human capital were com­
plementary in production then an increase in the supply of educated workers increased 
the marginal productivity of uneducated workers and thus raised their wages, even in 
the absence of externalities. Hence, in contrast to the conventional methodology of 
identifying externalities, a positive effect of average education level on workers’ wages 
cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence of externalities. This chapter presents
2Aghion and Howit (1998), Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), and Shumpeter (1934).
3 Acemoglu (1996).
4 See chapter 1 for a full discussion.
5Krueger and Lindahl (2001).
6 It is not obvious that social benefits and private benefits behave in the same way. It appears that 
having a few brilliant researchers can contribute more to a society than an egalitarian increase of an 
additional year of schooling (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991)). Diminishing social benefits from 
education are more of an empirical question. However, a comparison of the benefits to society of first 
degrees, and the benefits to society from an increase in literacy rates, is likely to be in favour of the 
latter. Therefore it is well worth pursuing this possibility empirically.
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a simple empirical test to distinguish between externalities and a general equilibrium 
effect. The central idea is to show that an increase in the supply of educated workers 
has diverse effects on different types of workers. While Ciccone and Peri focused on the 
positive effect of an increase in the supply of educated workers on uneducated workers’ 
wages, I show that in the absence of externalities the effect on educated workers’ wages 
is negative.
India provides an ideal setting given low educational achievements, significant cross- 
state variation, and high quality data. Using two NSS (National Sample Survey) rounds 
of employment and unemployment surveys from India, this chapter examines the effect 
of average local education level on household expenditure, used as a proxy for workers’ 
wages. It tests the effect at the district level and also at the larger regional level, 
adjusting for household characteristics including level of education. In addition, this 
chapter empirically examines the question of what affects externalities, and which types 
of people benefit from living in an educated society. By assessing the effect of average 
education on different types of workers in different industries, we can get a better 
understanding of the mechanism underlying externalities.
The main finding of my empirical analysis is that average education in any locality 
(district or region) has a strong positive effect on household expenditure over and 
above the household’s own education, even after accounting for the regional fixed effect 
and after applying different measures of average education. The magnitude of the 
externalities is approximately half as large as that of private returns. For example, a 
one-year increase in average regional schooling raises household expenditure by 3.8%, 
while the private benefit from an additional schooling year is 7.8%.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the previous 
literature; section 3 outlines a theoretical framework and highlights the differences 
between two alternative interpretations of the empirical estimation; section 4 reviews 
the economic strategy; section 5 presents the results; section 6  concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In spite of the important implications toward educational policies and growth models, 
most of the empirical microeconomic literature focuses on the benefits to individuals. 
Using data on individuals’ education and income, the existing research provides strong 
evidence of a substantial payoff from investment in education, especially in primary 
schools (see Card (1999) or Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a review). However, from
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this microeconomic evidence it is not clear whether the aggregate benefits to society 
from schooling exceed the private benefits. Discussing of the effect of education in the 
macroeconomic literature does not provide any better evidence (see Venniker (2001) 
or Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for a review). Considering the difficulties in obtaining 
accurate country-level data on changes in educational attainments, it is not surprising 
that the cross-country literature generates inconclusive evidence on aggregate educa­
tional effects. I take an alternative approach, using cross-state data within a large 
country.
The empirical literature on human capital externalities is quite limited. Earlier 
attempts to measure human capital externalities, using data on cities, suffered from 
serious econometric problems, such as the effect of unobserved variables and the issue 
of endogenous city education levels, mainly due to selective inter-city migration (e.g. 
Rauch (1993)). However, three important attempts using data on cities in the USA 
were made to measure human capital externalities and deal with concerns over endoge­
nous variables and unobserved variables. These papers used a repeated cross-section 
which allowed them to introduce city fixed effects and time fixed effects, in order to 
reduce concerns over unobserved city characteristics.
However, these papers employed very different estimation methods and so it is not 
surprising that they yielded mixed results. Angrist and Acemoglu (2 0 0 0 ) included 
city average schooling years in the individual wage equation as their measure for ex­
ternalities. To solve the concerns over endogenous variables, they employed compul­
sory schooling laws as instrument variables for average education. However, they did 
not discuss the existence of an alternative interpretation of their results as a general 
equilibrium effect, and the identified externalities of around 1% were not statistically 
significant.
Moretti (1998) applied a different method for estimating human capital external­
ities. In the first stage he computed the specific representative wage of group j  in 
city c at time t , after accounting for observed individuals’ characteristics including 
education level. In the second stage he estimated the effect of city average education 
on the average representative wage, accounting for the city’s ethnic structure. As an 
instrument variable for city average education in 1980 and 1990 he used the city’s 
demographic structure in 1970 and 1980 respectively. Moretti found significant exter­
nalities of around 2%. However, his claim that the city demographic structure does 
not affect wages directly is debatable. In addition, like Angrist and Acemoglu, he did 
not discuss the existence of an alternative interpretation of his results as a general
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equilibrium effect.7
Ciccone and Peri (2000) applied three different methods for identifying externali­
ties. To eliminate the general equilibrium interpretation of the results they kept the 
composition of workers fixed. Like Moretti they computed the representative wage of 
group j  in city c at time t, but when computing the average wage they kept the weights 
assigned to each group fixed at the level they were at the earliest data point. They 
found no evidence of externalities.
Literature on human capital externalities in developing countries is limited and 
inconclusive. Various papers have estimated the effect of education on adoption of new 
technologies. For example, Knight and Weir (2004) examined the role of education in 
the adoption and diffusion of fertiliser in rural Ethiopia. They found that at the early 
stages of technology adoption educated people were more likely to adopt the technology. 
In later stages they were imitated by other non-educated farmers and education became 
less important in determining the usage of the technology. While this research approach 
is interesting and demonstrates the existence of a learning process in agriculture, it is 
hard to generalise the results as they are quite limited to a specific area and to a very 
specific context.
A more comprehensive approach is to estimate the effect of average education on 
productivity or on wages. Unlike similar literature focusing on the USA, literature 
focusing on externalities in developing countries did not deal convincingly with econo­
metric issues of unobserved variables, endogeneity and general equilibrium effect.8One 
of the main problems is that none of the papers employed a panel dataset, which would 
have allowed it to account for unobserved local characteristics.
Knight and Weir (2006) estimated the effect of average community education on 
productivity in rural Ethiopia. They found the effect of average education on pro­
ductivity to be positive, significant and large. However, once village variables were 
included the effect was reduced to a third of its original size. Moreover, the lack of 
panel data did not allow them to include community fixed effects. Consequently a 
third unobserved factor such as agricultural or economic conditions could have been 
partially responsible for the results by causing farmers to invest more in both education
7 Subsequent to completion of this chapter Moretti (2004) has now provided a similar theoretical 
model to distinguish between externalities and general equilibrium. He also employed individual fixed 
effect and dealt in a more convincing way with migration issues. In this later version he used an 
additional instrument variable: the presence of land-granted colleges. The magnitude of the results is 
slightly reduced.
8Duflo’s paper (2000) while dealing convincingly with econometric concerns touch on the subject, 
but did not focus on human capital externalities.
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and productivity-enhancing farm inputs.
Employing data from the Kenyan welfare monitoring survey Kimenyi, Manda and 
Mwabu (2004) estimated human capital externalities in Kenya. Following the litera­
ture on the USA they introduced local average years of education into Mincer’s wage 
equation. They found that district-level average education for males and females had 
a positive and statistically-significant effect on earnings for all workers in urban areas. 
However, they made only a very limited attempt to account for unobserved district 
characteristics or for endogeneity. They included teacher-pupil ratio as a proxy for 
school quality and province fixed effects, which account for unobserved province differ­
ences but not for district characteristics.
Michaud and Vencatachellum (2003) estimated the effect of average village educa­
tion of the four main racial groups on wages in South Africa. They found that the 
impact of human capital externalities on wages differs by race. More specifically, they 
found that the average human capital of blacks in South Africa had a positive effect 
on the wages of white workers, whereas the aggregate human capital of whites had a 
negative impact on the wages of black workers, so the demand for black workers fell 
when there were more skilled white workers. As in the papers discussed above, their 
data was not a panel dataset and therefore their ability to account for unobserved 
characteristics was limited.
Kochar (2003) estimated separately the effect of average education of the poor 
and of the rich on farm profitability in India. Employing government expenditure on 
schooling as an IV he found that schooling of the poor had a negative effect on farm 
profits because it increased the wages paid for farm workers. In contrast schooling of 
the rich had a positive effect on profitability. These results are in line with Ciccone and 
Peri (2000) and the general equilibrium model, and could easily be explained by labour 
supply and demand, so they do not imply negative or positive externalities. Moreover, 
like other papers discussed above the authors did not employ a panel dataset and 
therefore had limited ability to account for unobserved variables.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a theoretical model which illustrates how human capital exter­
nalities affect wages and expenditures. It also provides a useful organisational device 
for discussing the empirical assessment of human capital externalities. The aim is to 
provide foundations for the empirical tests and a structured scheme for interpreting the
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results. This section also outlines a unifying framework in the subsequent discussion 
of the literature. In particular the model examines criticism raised by Ciccone and 
Peri (2000) regarding previous identification methods, and underlines the differences 
between predictions generated by general equilibrium models and those generated by 
human capital externalities models.
However, this theoretical section does not attempt to explain what generates exter­
nalities or identify their micro-foundations. Thus the notion that an exchange of ideas 
can increase productivity is modelled by allowing the total factor productivity (TFP) 
to depend on average education.
Micro-economic theories, including that of Mincer (1974), predict no effect of av­
erage education on individuals’ wages. Therefore the common empirical strategy to 
identify externalities has been to estimate the effect of average education on wages. 
However, Ciccone and Peri (2000) show that average education affects wages if we ap­
ply a general equilibrium framework and assume different levels of human capital to be 
complementary in production. Therefore interpreting the effect of average education 
as evidence of human capital externalities is potentially unsafe. In the following model 
I demonstrate the effect of average education on wages both in the presence and in the 
absence of externalities.
Let the economy consist of one production sector9and two types of agents, who can
supply either 1 unit of raw labour or hi units of human capital. These two groups are
distinguished by their different levels of disutility from studies -r .10In the first group,
0%
of size L, each individual generates very high disutility from studies and therefore 
chooses to supply only 1 unit of raw labour.n In the second group, of size (x—l)L ,12each 
individual generates a lower disutility from studies ^  and therefore chooses to study 
and supply hi units of human capital according to his utility:
h(1+T)
v(ci, hi) =  C i-  1 (2.1)
<?2(1 + T )
where q  is consumption and r  is a parameter measuring the convexity of the costs
9 An extension of the model to a two-sector economy may be found in Appendix 2.7.
10 Alternatively, one can interpret the distribution of Si as different abilities or distribution of wealth, 
when there are credit constraints.
11 The optimal level of hi is too small, therefore workers choose to supply raw labour. For simplicity, 
I assume that the labour supply is inelastic.
12 x >  1. The proportion of educated people is therefore ^ 1  or 1 — which is positively depended 
on x.
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function.
For purposes of simplicity, I assume that there are only two factors of produc­
tion: human capital (h) and raw labour (/). Consistent with the argument by Cic­
cone and Peri, I assume complementary production factors13and more specifically, a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Thus, the production function of firm i j ,  with hi 
educated workers and lj uneducated workers, is:
V ijiljA )  =  A l f h t a) (2.2)
where A =  A qH1 is the TFP with 7  being a parameter measuring externalities. Exter­
nalities can be either positive or negative and in the absence of externalities 7  =  0. H  
is the average education level and therefore can be rewritten as the aggregate education 
divided by the overall population size, H  =  Thus the demand functions of firm i j  
for workers are:
w(l) =  dyv V i’hi'1 =  a AaT T 'lf - l)h ['-a) (2.3)
w(h) =  dy» & ’hi) =  (1  -  a )A jT l« h T «  (2.4)
Dividing equation (2.3) by equation (2.4), yields the following result:
hi ( 1  -  a)w(l) 
lj aw(h)
Hence, all firms have the same ratio of educated labour to raw labour and this ratio 
depends negatively on the wage ratio .
The aggregate supply of raw labour is the number of uneducated people, L. The 
supply of educated labour depends on the optimisation decision of individuals from the 
second group. Assuming that there is no saving, we can substitute q  by Wi =  w(h)hi, 
and solve dv^ hi) — 0  for h*, to find that the supply of individual i from group H  is:
f  =  w(h) (2.6)
0 2
Hence, all individuals with low disutility of studying ^  choose the same level of edu­
13 Ciccone and Peri (2000) show that the identification problems arise only when workers are imper­
fect substitutes. If workers are perfect substitutes then the effect of average education on individuals’ 
wages can be attributed uniquely to externalities and the identification problem is eliminated.
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cation /i2. Solving for equilibrium generates the following results:14
w (iy  =  aAoH(l+1~a)x ^ -a) =  aA 0h ^ l~a)x-''l{x -  l^ + i- a )  (2.7)
w(h)* =  (1  -  a)A0H i~,~a)x - a =  (1  -  a)Aoh^~a)aT7(x -  1 ) ^ - “) (2.8)
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) characterise equilibrium. To determine the effect of an 
increase in human capital on wages and to correspond to the empirical section we can 
analyse two cases: first, the case of an increase in the average human capital (H) 
regardless of the reason for such increase, and second the case of an increase in the 
proportion of educated workers in the population (x).
Proposition 1 The Effect o f  H um an Capital on Wages
•  If there are no externalities ( j  =  0) then the wages of uneducated workers increase 
if  there are more educated people (Ax  > 0)  or if average education increases 
(Ah2 > 0  or A H  > 0). The wages of educated workers will however fall.
•  If externalities are sufficiently large (a <  7  < ax), then wages of both educated 
and uneducated workers increase when educated workers accumulate more human 
capital.
• If externalities are even larger ( 7  > ax), then wages of both groups of workers 
increase when educated workers accumulate more human capital and/or a larger 
proportion of the population becomes educated.
Proof.
• dw^  =  ( 7  +  1 — a)aA 0H ^ a^x^~a\  so dw^  >  0 if and only if 7  +  1 — a  >  0. 
In particular, if 7  =  0 then dv^  must be positive because a  < 1.
• — =  ( 7  +  x — ax) aA )^27 + 1 _ a ^ ~ 7 ^ (x ~~ l / 7-a\  so dw^  >  0 if and only if 
( 7  +  x — ax) >  0. In particular, if 7  =  0 then dw^  must be positive as a  <  1 
and x > 0 .
•  dwdjf =  ( 7  — a) (1 — a) AqH ^  a so dwJ^  - > 0 if and only if 7  > a. In
particular, if 7  =  0  then dwJff must be negative because a  >  0 .
14Note that f* =  f  =  H X  =  h2(x -  1)
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• dWfa* =  C1 _  a ) so >  0
if and only if 7  > ax. In particular, if 7  =  0 the sign of dw^  must be negative, 
as a  >  0  and x > 0 .
In order to assess human capital externalities, I focus first on the arguments of 
Ciccone and Peri. The results in the absence of externalities ( 7  =  0), specifically 
equations (2.3) and (2.7) and part 1 of proposition 1, indicate that an increase in the 
supply of educated labour, either in the form of a greater proportion of the population 
being educated or in the form of each individual being more educated, will increase the 
marginal productivity of raw labour (MPL). Therefore, unless the supply of workers is 
fully elastic, an increase in the supply of educated workers will also raise the uneducated 
workers’ wages. The essential point is that even in the absence of externalities an 
increase in average education raises some of the workers’ wages, so it is impossible 
to assess human capital externalities simply by looking at the coefficient of average 
education in the wage equation. Therefore, Ciccone and Peri challenge the common 
estimation method of externalities, and claim that it is impossible to rule out that the 
underlying reason for the average education effect may be purely a general equilibrium 
mechanism.
However, turning to the effect of human capital on educated workers’ wages yields 
very different results. While the prediction of a general equilibrium effect is that wages 
of uneducated workers rise as a result of an increase in the supply of educated workers, 
the prediction for wages of educated workers is now a fall instead of a rise. Only if 
externalities are sufficiently large ( 7  > a  or even 7  > xa) will we observe a positive 
effect of average education on educated workers’ wages.
These results generate significant implications for the identification strategy. To 
be more precise, in order to assess human capital externalities it is important to look 
separately at the effect of average education on educated workers. If the empirical 
analysis shows that educated workers’ wages depend positively on average education, 
then the general equilibrium effect alone cannot explain the results and hence the 
existence of human capital externalities can be inferred.
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2.4 D ata and Estim ation M ethod
The chapter aims to identify the effect of local educational achievements on the pro­
ductivity of individuals. Subsequent to Ciccone and Peri (2000) challenging previous 
identification methods, considerable attention has been devoted in this section to dis­
cussing the differing predictions of the externalities model and the general equilibrium 
model.
My assessment of human capital externalities is based on two representative house­
hold employment and unemployment surveys of 365 districts15 within 74 different re­
gions of India, conducted in 1987-1988 (round 43) and 1993-1994 (round 50), by the 
National Sample Survey (NSS) organisation. Each round covers approximately 40,000 
urban households and 80,000 rural households, and contains various details about their 
socio-economic status, educational attainments, and demographic composition. I have 
focused on households where the head of the household is of working age, i.e. between 
20 and 64.
Table 2.1 contains a limited fist of descriptive statistics categorised by round and 
sector. For all education levels the achievements are seen to be significantly better 
in urban areas. For instance, while literacy rates are below 50% in rural areas they 
are above 75% in urban areas. Over time there is a small improvement in all edu­
cational attainments, especially literacy rates and primary school completion rates. 
Examination of less aggregated measures of educational attainments in regions reveals 
substantial variation across regions at any specific point in time, and also substantial 
variation in the change of educational attainments over time. For example, the literacy 
rates vary significantly between regions, from 95-97% in urban regions in Karnataka, 
Kerala and some Union territories, to 20-30% in rural areas of Rajasthan. Table 2.2 
presents average expenditure by education level. In general, expenditure increases with 
education and over time there is an increase in expenditure in both rural and urban 
areas.
The main identification strategy is based on the absence of local educational at­
tainments in the individual’s wage equation according to Mincer (1974). In other 
words, according to standard theory an individual’s wage is determined only by the 
individual’s own characteristics including their level of education, but not by average 
education level in the relevant geographical area. Therefore, a key part of the identi­
fication strategy is to add local average education into the household’s wage equation.
15 Some regions of Jammu and Kashmir were not surveyed.
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Thus the basic estimation equation is:
~Po+Pxut+^hut +  SH it+loSit+R  4- T  +  U +  €ut (2-9)
which makes use of three kinds of variables. The first type is the dependent variable 
ln(E^t) being the log expenditure per capita of household i in locality I at time t. The 
second type Hu, is the educational achievement in locality I at time t. The third type 
are control variables xut , hut , and Sit- In addition each regression includes regional 
fixed effect R ,16time fixed effect T, and sector dummy U (urban/rural).
The dependent variable \n(Eiu) is a function of expenditure rather than wage. While 
both the theoretical model and previous empirical literature discuss human capital 
externalities in terms of education affecting wages, in developing countries a great 
share of income is generated by home production, which is by and large agricultural 
activity. Moreover, since a considerable part of the wage is provided in goods and 
kinds instead of cash, it becomes difficult to estimate correctly the value of the income. 
Furthermore, self-employment in small businesses makes it even harder to generate 
a reliable measure of income. Therefore assuming that human capital externalities 
affect all parts of income, including home production,17it seems more appropriate to 
use expenditure data instead of wage figures, even if saving is not a constant share of 
income.
The main variable of interest is local educational attainment Hu, but the data 
allows me to measure educational achievements only in terms of education levels rather 
than schooling years. Therefore I employ three broad types of educational attainment 
measures. The first type is the proportion of people in a certain geographical area who 
achieved a specific level of educational attainment, for example, the regional literacy 
rate, or the regional rate of primary school completion. In the theory section I note it 
as (^zy), which is positively depended on x. The second type is the average education 
level, where each level of educational attainment receives a ranked value. 18In the theory 
section I note it as H. The third type is a proxy for average schooling years, which in the 
theory section I note as hi. I assign the number of schooling years to individuals based 
on the number of years required to complete each educational level under the education
16 Regression size limitation made it impossible to include district fixed effect.
17I discuss the empirical effect of home production in Appendix 2.8.
181 for illiterate, 2 for literate, 3 for completing primary school, 4 for completing middle school, 
5 for completing secondary school, and 6 for graduate. The exact formula is detailed in the Data 
Appendix.
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system in India. To be precise, I assign 5 years of schooling to individuals completing 
primary school, 8  years of schooling to individuals completing middle school, 1 2  years 
of schooling to individuals completing secondary school, and 15 years to individuals 
completing higher education. I also assign one year of studies for literate individuals.
The measurement of the latter is inaccurate as it does not fully take into account 
schooling years of people who dropped out of school midway through a particular 
education level. For example, a person who studied for ten years appears in my data as 
someone who completed middle school but not secondary school and therefore accounts 
only for eight years of primary and middle school. However, I find it useful to employ 
this measure as it is easier to interpret the coefficient on average schooling years than 
to interpret the coefficients on the other two measures of educational achievements.
The relevant geographical unit is of two types: regions and districts. Each state in 
India comprises a number of regions, between one and seven depending on the state’s 
size, with each region covering several districts.
The control variables can be classified into two distinct categories. The first type is 
a vector of household characteristics xut , including social group, religion, age,19number 
of males/females working, size of the household,20and a vector of household education 
/lift.21 For the household education levels I have calculated the number of people at 
each household with each level of education (illiterate, literate, primary school, middle 
school, secondary school, graduate).22The second type of control variable is a vector of 
state variables including GDP per capita, length of roads, population and taxes. 
To obtain these state control variables I employed a second source of data, the Indian 
states panel dataset, which includes annual economic and political variables for the 
sixteen major Indian states between 1958 and 1994.23
Following previous papers, in the first phase I identify externalities by examining S, 
the coefficient of local average education. This identification is based on the assumption 
that in the absence of externalities and accounting for the individual’s own education 
and other characteristics, this effect is expected to be zero. However, the theoretical
19 Square age was not significant.
20 The regressions generate similar results if instead of including the size of the household and the 
number of household members who work, they include the size of the household and the square size 
of the household.
21 The group omitted is the number of household members who completed primary school. Where 
appropriate the regressions include schooling years instead.
22 The results are robust when using dummy variables for the education level of the head of the 
household instead of the education levels of all of the household members.
23 The dataset is described in Besley and Burgess (2000).
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discussion, based on Ciccone and Peri (2000), demonstrated that even in the absence of 
externalities an increase in the supply of educated workers in the city raises the wages 
of uneducated workers. Therefore, if we employ the regression only for uneducated 
workers, then the coefficient on average education, S, is equal to 7  +  1 — a. This is a 
positive expression even in the absence of externalities, as 1 — a  >  0. Employing the 
regression for all types of workers, 5 becomes a weighted average of 7 + 1  — a  and 7  — a. 
Consequently at least part of 5 in equation (2.9) is due to a general equilibrium effect 
rather than externalities.
However the theoretical section showed that in the absence of externalities an in­
crease in either the supply of educated workers or the average schooling years affects 
educated workers negatively, so only in the presence of sufficiently large externalities 
can the coefficient for educated people be positive. Consequently, an important part of 
the empirical strategy is based on analysing the expenditures equation of the educated 
workers, where finding a positive effect on educated workers can be interpreted as evi­
dence for the existence of human capital externalities. In view of that, I have introduced 
education interaction terms. This helps me to examine empirically whether externali­
ties affect educated workers differently from uneducated workers, or if all workers are 
equally affected, and in particular whether educated workers are positively affected by 
local educational attainments.
The amended estimation equation is as follows:
(Eat) =  pQ+PXiH+Xhiit+dHit+ipHitCin+^QSft+R +  T  +  U +  em (2.10)
where all the definitions are the same as before, and HitCm is the education interac­
tion term. Cm =  1 if the household is educated and zero otherwise. For robustness 
checks I have performed regressions varying the level of education for a household to be 
deemed educated. Specifically, I employed three main definitions for educated house­
holds. Under the first definition a household was classified as educated if the head 
of the household was literate. Under the second definition a household was classified 
as educated if the head of the household had completed primary school. Under the 
third definition a household was classified as educated if the head of the household had 
completed middle school. To test the hypothesis that educated households are disad­
vantaged by living in an educated society, I have tested whether (p +  8 ^  0. Observing 
V?>0 implies that educated workers’ gains are higher than those of uneducated work­
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ers. Yet even if <p is negative, which implies that educated workers’ benefits are lower 
than uneducated workers’ benefits, then as long as cp +  S is positive we can interpret 
the results as evidence of externalities.
In general, the main econometric concerns with the above approach are unobserved 
variables which could affect both regional average education and household expendi­
ture, and potential endogeneity of average education level.
Unobserved variables could cause people living in regions with higher levels of edu­
cation to have higher income due to other reasons than average education in the region; 
for example better bureaucracy in the region can improve both the functioning of mar­
kets and the education system, leading to an increase in both the education levels in the 
region and individuals’ earnings. Another example could be credit constraints: limited 
borrowing possibilities can affect both investment in physical capital and investment 
in human capital, therefore creating a correlation between productivity and human 
capital.
In order to minimise the issue of unobserved variables I have used a repeated cross- 
section to introduce a regional fixed effect and time fixed effect. However, using the 
regional fixed effect solves only the problem of unobserved fixed characteristics of the 
region but not the problem of changes in unobserved variables. If average education 
is a proxy for local GDP or if changes in unobserved local characteristics, such as 
growth rates, are correlated to the changes in the levels of education, it can result in a 
correlation between the error term and the dependent variable. Therefore I have added 
to the regressions measures of GDP (per capita state deflated income), infrastructure 
(length of state highways), rural and urban population, and proxies for government 
actions (state taxes, state expenditures).
Endogeneity can be an issue if educated workers move to richer regions. Therefore, 
I have examined migration trends employing a third source of data, the Indian dis­
trict database created by Maryland University which combines district-level data from 
census and agricultural sources between 1961 and 1991. It turns out that migration 
rates are small and fairly constant over time, implying that the latter concern can be 
dealt with by the regional fixed effect so long as the educational achievements of the 
immigrants are fixed over time.
While the above argument does mitigate the problem, endogeneity remains a con­
cern and I still need to perform robustness checks to provide greater confidence in the 
results. Therefore to further mitigate concerns over endogeneity and unobserved vari­
ables I have introduced industry interaction terms. The key principle is that finding
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a significant difference in the coefficients on local educational achievements between 
industries makes it less likely that household expenditure have increased the local ed­
ucational achievements. To claim for such reverse causality one would have to explain 
why current household expenditure of workers in one industry has affected the local 
educational achievements while the expenditure of workers in another industry does 
not have the same effect.
In addition to the general concerns regarding unobserved variables and endogeneity, 
a specific concern exists with regard to interpretation of the education interaction 
term. If being educated is correlated with other variables it can result in the education 
interaction term not measuring the gap in externalities between educated workers and 
uneducated workers. In particular, if educated people work in separate industries, then 
the interaction term will measure the gap in externalities between different types of 
industries. Thus to separate the two effects of industry and education, I have added 
two more interaction terms into the following regression:
In ( E m )  =  +  ^hm  +  SHu  +  cpHitCut +  'ifjHitlut
+0HitCiitIut+rYoSit +  R  +  T  +  U +  em (2.11)
in which all of the definitions are as in equations (2.9) and (2.10), apart from the 
additional non-primary industry interaction term HitIm , and the educated people in 
non-primary industry interaction term HuCutluu which captures the difference in the 
gap between educated and uneducated workers in the two different industries.
Introducing local averages into micro-regressions raises yet another econometric 
concern. As Moulton (1986, 1990) shows, if the error terms are correlated within the 
regions then the standard errors from OLS estimation can be biased. Therefore all the 
regressions are clustered by year and by locality (region or district), and the standard 
errors are corrected accordingly.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Base R esults
As explained in the methodology section, I have measured externalities as the effect 
on household expenditure of local average education, over and above the household’s
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own education level, with equation (2.9) providing the basic estimation.
The upper part of Table 2.3 reports basic results from my data, with the dependent 
variable in all regressions being the natural logarithm of household expenditure per 
capita. Throughout my analysis I account for other factors affecting household expen­
diture by using state and time fixed effects and some household characteristics including 
religion, social group, main industry, age, size of household, number of workers in the 
household, and most importantly household level of education.
In column 1 of table 2.3 local educational achievements are represented by regional 
average schooling years, and a positive and significant association between local edu­
cational achievements and household expenditure is clearly seen. Columns 2-6 confirm 
that these results are not sensitive to the construction of schooling years from grouped 
information on education.
Each of the columns contains a different measure of regional educational achieve­
ments. For example in column 2 regional educational achievements are measured in 
terms of education level completed, while in column 3 regional educational achieve­
ments are measured in terms of regional literacy rates. While the measures of literacy 
rates and education level are more precise given the limitations of the data, they are 
more difficult to interpret and therefore later on I focus on the measure of schooling 
years.
The magnitude of the effect is quite large, half as large as the size of private returns. 
In column 1 an increase of one year in the regional average schooling is associated 
with an increase of household expenditure by 3.8%, while an increase in household 
schooling years is associated with 7.8%. This means that living in a region where 
average schooling is two years higher is as good for the household members as obtaining 
an additional schooling year themselves. Column 2 reveals very similar results: a one 
unit increase in education level, which is equivalent on average to approximately three 
schooling years, raises household expenditure by 12.4%.
The lower part of the table presents the effect of local educational achievements 
when the reference area is a district rather than a region. The results turn out to be 
much more pronounced when they refer to a smaller local area, so the effect of lo­
cal educational achievements is seen to diminish with size. Theories on human capital 
externalities suggest such a pattern, where the importance of local educational achieve­
ments decreases with the size of area. For example the probability of exchanging ideas 
for improvement of productivity or innovation falls with increasing distance between 
people. Similarly, applying the imperfect matching theory of Acemoglu, companies
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making investment decisions take into account the expected level of human capital in 
their local labour market rather than the human capital in the whole country.
Taken together, the results demonstrate a consistent picture. Local educational 
achievements are associated with higher expenditures, even after taking into account 
the private educational achievements. The magnitude of the effect is impressive and 
counts for as much as half of the private benefits from education, and in line with 
theory the externalities are even more pronounced in smaller geographical units.
2.5.2 R obustness Checks
While these results show a clear and positive correlation between local educational 
achievements and household expenditure, three significant issues remain outstanding. 
First, they make no effort to separate the externalities from the general equilibrium 
effect. Secondly, other unobserved local characteristics could affect both local edu­
cational achievements and household expenditure. Finally, local educational achieve­
ments could be endogenous and responding to household expenditure. In the next 
sub-section I address these concerns.
A significant concern regarding the interpretation of equation (2.9) arises from the 
complementarity in production between educated workers and uneducated workers. 
When different types of workers are complementary the results cannot be automat­
ically interpreted as evidence for human capital externalities, as they could be due 
to a general equilibrium effect. However, a suitable way to distinguish between the 
two interpretations is to assess the effect of average education on educated workers. 
If general equilibrium were the only driving force behind the results above, we would 
expect to find a negative supply effect on educated workers’ wages. Therefore, as de­
scribed in equation (2.10) I have added an education interaction term24to test whether 
an educated environment disadvantages educated workers.
The results are reported in table 2.4. In order to simplify the interpretation of the 
local educational coefficient, local educational achievements are measured in terms of 
local average schooling years in all of the regressions. In the first part of the table the 
local area refers to regions, and in the second half it refers to districts. For purposes 
of robustness I employ two different definitions of educated workers. Therefore, in 
columns 1, 2, 5 and 6  educated households are defined as households with the head 
being literate, while in the rest of the table they are defined as households with the
24 Set to 1 if the household is above a specific level of education.
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head completing at least primary school. As the table shows the interaction terms are 
negative and significant. The results are robust with respect to a change in the local 
area from region to district, to inclusion of additional control variables, and to different 
definitions of educated workers. The benefits for educated people from an increase in 
the supply of educated people are smaller than those of uneducated people as a result 
of the downward slopping demand function for educated workers. Nonetheless they are 
seen to be positively affected, implying that educational externalities are present and 
large enough to fully offset the complementary effect between educated workers and 
uneducated workers.
Table 2.5 and the even columns of table 2.4 incorporate an additional set of specific 
time-state control variables. All regressions now include GDP per capita, population 
size, taxes, and length of roads. Together these variables help to control for alternative 
factors which could theoretically affect both educational achievements and household 
expenditure. The table shows that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of state 
controls.
Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 report the results with a non-primary industry interaction 
term. In all of the tables local educational achievements are measured as local average 
schooling years. Table 2.6 includes the industry interaction term on its own, while 
table 2.7 combines it with the two other interaction terms described in equation (2.11): 
the education interaction term, and the educated in non-primary industry interaction 
term .25 The last interaction term captures the different size of gap between educated 
and uneducated workers in different industries.
The non-primary industry interaction terms are between 1% and 2% and significant, 
revealing that externalities are much more evident in non-primary industries where hu­
man capital plays a more significant role. The theoretical reasons for expecting greater 
externalities in non-primary industries are directly linked to the micro-foundations of 
externalities. If externalities are a result of an exchange of ideas, we will observe greater 
externalities where ideas contribute more to production. If externalities are a result 
of capital investment by firms anticipating the local level of human capital, as in the 
Acemoglu model, then we will observe greater externalities where investment decisions 
are more dependent upon human capital. Appendix 2.7 extends the theoretical model 
to allow for two types of industries with greater externalities in the non-primary sector.
Table 2.8 shows explicitly the sum of the relevant coefficients from table 2.7. For 
example, in part B of table 2.8 educated workers are defined as primary school gradu­
25 Set to 1 for educated household if its main industry is not mining or agriculture.
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ates. Primary school graduates benefit less than workers who did not complete primary 
school. The difference between the columns is also significant, implying that external­
ities exist more significantly in non-primary industries.
Furthermore, these results make it less likely that the driving force behind the 
estimation is solely unobserved variables or endogeneity, as otherwise we should expect 
to find no difference between primary and non-primary sectors. It is also important 
to note that these additional results strengthen the previous ones, and that living in 
a more educated society does not disadvantage educated workers as the sum of the 
coefficients of educated workers is positive.
Comparing my results with existing ones, there are four key distinctions in variable 
definitions and datasets. The first is that I compose a measure of schooling years 
out of grouped educational data rather than having a direct measure of schooling 
years. The second difference is that I employ expenditure data rather than wage 
data. The third difference is that the geographical unit of my analysis is either a 
region or district rather than a city. Finally, I analyse at the household level rather 
than the individual. However, all of these differences are fairly inconsequential. The 
most important distinction between my analysis and previous papers is its focus on a 
developing country where educational achievements are particularly low, and therefore 
local educational achievements are more likely to affect household expenditure. Indeed 
the magnitude of my results turns out to be considerably greater than those found in 
the previous papers, detailed in section 2 .2 , which focused on the USA.
To conclude, these results support the existence of externalities and suggest that 
externalities are greater in non-primary industries where human capital plays a more 
important role in production. Secondly, my focus on a developing country with par­
ticularly low educational achievements generates more significant results than those 
found in previous papers.
Finally, the chapter estimates human capital externalities to be between 3% and 
5%, varying with the industry and education of individuals. This is a large effect, 
especially when compared with the very low levels of private returns to primary school 
estimated in previous papers.26The magnitude of the effect gives rise to important pol­
icy implications. It shows that there are large benefits to education in India. However, 
since the perceived private returns to education are quite low, especially at the primary 
school level, and at the literacy level, individuals under-invest in education. To help
26The estimated average private returns to a year of schooling in India is around 7%, and the 
private returns to a year of primary school are only around l%-2%.
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individuals internalise the effect of their education the government of India should try 
to reduce the direct and indirect cost of schooling and to improve the private returns 
from schooling.
2.6 Conclusion
It has long been argued that education can generate important consequences by con­
tributing to the economic growth and elimination of poverty in developing countries. 
It was considered that private benefits from education would be of a different scale in 
developing countries; however Duflo (2001) established in the Indonesian case that pri­
vate benefits from primary school in developing countries are of the same magnitude as 
those in developing countries. Therefore, the argument for distinctive treatment of ed­
ucational attainments in developing countries leans mainly on either credit constraints 
or a significant divergence between the social benefits from education and the private 
benefits.
However, although human capital externalities have an important implication on 
both policy decisions and growth theory, most of the empirical literature is focused 
on private returns. Since there are also positive social returns from education, private 
returns underestimate the total economic value of schooling. The few attempts to mea­
sure human capital externalities have been concentrated mainly on the USA, but less 
developed countries provide an interesting case for measuring human capital externali­
ties due to their low levels of education. India is characterised by particularly low levels 
of educational achievements even compared to other developing countries, and also by 
a large variation in education levels across different regions. These two characteristics 
combine with low constant migration, very high quality data, and large samples, to 
make India an excellent place for trying to reach a clearer conclusion regarding the 
existence of externalities.
The main contribution of the chapter is its attempt to provide rigorous estimates 
of human capital externalities in developing countries and to deal convincingly with 
concerns over unobserved variables and endogeneity. Apart from an attempt to get 
more conclusive evidence on externalities, this chapter takes the existing literature a 
step further. It examines what affects human capital externalities, and who benefits 
from an educated society. It also provides an answer to criticism by Ciccone and 
Peri of measures of externalities. By analysing the different predictions of a general 
equilibrium model and of an externalities model, the chapter provides an empirical test
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to distinguish between the two models.
The results show a strong effect of average local education on household expenditure 
even after accounting for the household’s own education level and other household 
characteristics. The effect is robust to different measures of average education. More 
importantly, the effect is also significant when regional fixed effects are included.
The combined evidence suggests that an educated environment positively affects 
individuals’ achievements. Educated people also benefit from living in an educated 
society, and externalities are seen to be greater in industries where human capital plays 
a more important role in production. Furthermore, externalities are more pronounced 
when the locality is smaller, so educational achievements at the district level are more 
significant than at the larger regional level. The magnitude of the effect suggests 
that individuals under-invest in education. Therefore the government of India should 
help individuals to internalise the full benefits of education by reducing the direct 
and indirect cost of schooling. However, in order to generate policy recommendations 
there are a few questions that still need to be addressed. In particular, more detailed 
research is required toward establishing the level of education which is most important 
in generating significant social benefits. Finally, future research is also required to 
measure the effect of average education on non-market outcomes, such as voting rates, 
crime, and birth rates.
2.7 Appendix: M odel For Two-Sector Economy
I assume here that the economy consists of two production sectors: primary industries 
and non-primary industries. I will indicate the sector as subscript m  £ [1,2], where 
772 =  1 is the sector of primary industries, and m =  2 is the sector of non-primary 
industries. The main difference between the two sectors is in the role of human capital. 
In the non-primary sector, the human capital externalities are greater. Similar to 
Acemoglu (1996), I assume some frictions in the labour market, and that workers have a 
certain probability p of being employed in the non-primary sector.27These assumptions 
have three implications. The first is that different wages may exist between the two 
sectors. The second implication is that the size of each sector is exogenous, and the 
third is that the ratio between human capital and raw labour is the same in both 
sectors.
27For simplicity, I assign the same probability of being in the non-primary sector to an educated 
worker and to a non-educated worker.
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All assumptions regarding factors of production are as before. The production 
function of firm i j  in sector m , with hi educated workers and Ij uneducated workers, 
is:
yijm(lj ,h i) =  A ml ° h ? - a) (2.12)
where Am =  A qI P 171 is the TFP, with 7 m being a parameter measuring externalities
in sector m. Externalities are greater in the non-primary sector, i.e. 7 2  > 7i- H  is
the average education and therefore can be written also as H =  Accordingly the 
demand functions of firm i j  in sector m  for workers are:
(/) =  gjg f e =  (2.13)
o l j  J
Wm{h) = gjt e & fr) = (1 _ a ) A o w - i « h T «  (2 .14)
Dividing equation (2.13) by equation (2.14) yields the following result:
him   (l &)^m(0
Ijm aw m(h)
(2.15)
Hence, all firms in sector m  have the same ratio of educated labour to raw labour [J]m, 
and this ratio depends negatively on the wage ratio •
The aggregate supply of raw labour is the number of uneducated workers, L. Nev­
ertheless, the supply of educated labour depends on the optimisation decision of in­
dividuals from the second group. Substituting c* by Wi and maximising the expected 
utility p[w2(h)hi -  ^ (1+r)] +  (1 -  p)[wi(h)hi -  ^ (1+r)], the supply hi of individual i 
from the second group is:
y - =  (1 -p )w i(h )  + p w 2(h) (2.16)
0 2
Hence, all individuals with low cost of studying ^  choose the same level of education 
h2. Solving for equilibrium generates the following results:
wm( iy  =  aA 0H iy,n+1 a)x (1_Q) =  aA 0h!?’n+1~c‘)x-~l"'(x -  l)h".+1- “) (2.17)
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Wr ,(h,)* =  (1 -  a)AoH bm a)x~a =  (1 -  a)A 0h!?m~a)x - l"‘{x -  (2.18)
It is easy to see that the model yields very similar results to those in the main the­
oretical section above, with one additional insight that the effect of average education 
on wages is greater in the non-primary sector:
Proposition 2 Com parison o f the Effect o f Average Education
For each type of worker, the effect of average education is greater in the non-primary 
sector if externalities in the non-primary sector are greater than corresponding exter­
nalities in the primary sector.
Proof. 1. >  0 if
(72 — Q)^72“a“1)x(-^)(a; — l)(72~a) — (7J — a)h<2'~a~1^ ( x  — l ) ^ -0 ) >  0.
Since (73 — a) > (7 X — a) it is enough to show that
h<? 2~a~ly -T ^ a :  -  1) ^ - “) -  x < ^ ( x  -  >  0,
which is true as long as w2(h)* ^  wi(h)*, and this is true as long as 72 >  7X.
2 . >  o if
fi^2~a  ^x 1--12^  (x — 1)^ 72_“_1 (^72 — ax) — h2fl~a>x<-~',1~1Hx — l)^7l~a_1'(7 1 — ax) >  0. 
Since (73 — ax) >  (/y1 — ax)  it is enough to show that
x^~l2~X\ x  — l j f r a - ® - 1) — h ^ 1-0^X^ _ l l ~l\ x  — ^  0 ,
which is true as long as w2(h)* ^  W\(h)*, and this is true as long as 72 > *yv
3. >  0 if
( 7 2  + 1  — a)x(~l2  ^ (x — l ) ( 72+1_a) /i272_a  ^— (7 i  + 1  — a)x(~l1  ^ (x — l ) ( 7l+1_Q:) h 27 l_ a  ^ >  0 .
Since (73 +  1 — o) >  (7 ! +  1 — a) it is enough to show that
z (-72) (x -  l ) ^ +1"a) /472“a) -  (x -  l ) ^ +1-«) /47l“a) > 0,
which is true as long as w2(l)* ^  W\{1)*, and this is true as long as 72 >  7 ^
4 dw ^r _  >  0 if (72 +  x -  ax) hi72+1- a)x ( - ^  (x -  l ) (72"a)
— i'll +  x ~  a x ) h27 l+ 1_Q ^ _ 7 l_ 1  (x — l)(7l_a) > 0 .
Since (73 +  x — ax) > (/y1 +  x — ax)  it is enough to show that
h^ + l -a )x ( -^ - l )  (x _  ^(7,-a) _  ft(71+l-o.)x(- 7l - l ) (x _  ^(7,-a) >  0>
which is true as long as w2(l)* ^  Wi(l)*, and this is true as long as 72 >  7i- ■
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2.8 Appendix: Expenditures versus Wages
This appendix describes in a simple framework the effect of employing expenditure data 
rather than wage data for the estimation of human capital externalities in developing 
countries. As I mention in the main text, although the theory and previous empirical 
literature discuss human capital externalities in terms of education affecting wages, in 
developing countries a great share of income is generated by home production, which 
is by and large an agricultural activity. In theory, human capital externalities might 
affect home agricultural production as well as wages. Moreover, since a considerable 
part of wages in developing countries is provided in goods and kinds instead of cash 
it becomes more difficult to estimate reliably the monetary value of the income, and 
consequently employing wage data reduces the dataset significantly.
The following model illustrates how human capital externalities in home production 
might affect the estimation. I assume that household i in locality I has two sources 
of income: home production fu and money wage, Wu- In addition it is assumed that 
there is no saving and therefore the household’s aggregate income wu+fu  is equal to its 
expenditure, E X u .  Both wage and home production are functions of the household’s 
characteristics as well as regional educational attainments, and can be described by 
the following equations:
Wu = w ( z i )  +  p H I (2.19)
/ iZ =  / f e ,L )  +  <777z (2 .2 0 )
where Zi is a vector of household characteristics and L  is the size of its land, p measures 
the externalities in the market and a  measures the externalities in home production. As 
long as p — a it does not make a difference whether I employ expenditure data or wage
data. However if p ^  a then my estimation of human capital externalities is an average
of the two effects. In the absence of reliable wage data the way to separate these two 
effects is to add a land interaction term, as a proxy for the amount of home production. 
Thus, I estimate the following regression separately for non-primary industries and for 
primary industries:28
(Em ) =  0Q+pxilt+)'hiit+'nH it+vHitLut +  H- R  +  T  -\-U  +  eiZt (2.21)
28 The results are robust to the inclusion of an education interaction term.
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in which all of the definitions are as in the main text, and HuLut is a land interaction 
term.
The results indicate that the land interaction coefficient v  is negative, but the total 
externalities effect is still positive i.e. rj +  v  >  0, implying that externalities in home 
agriculture activity are smaller but positive nonetheless. Consequently, employing 
expenditure data instead of wages provides a lower bound for the effect of externalities 
on wages.
However, employing expenditure data also has some limitations. One limitation of 
the consumption data is that it is household-level data rather than individual-level data. 
As a result I observe the average externalities at the household level, so my estimation is 
inaccurate to the extent that externalities may affect individuals within the household 
differently. Moreover, this empirical test cannot distinguish human capital externalities 
within the household from private returns to education. A second limitation is that 
expenditures are affected to some extent by household wealth and assets. As a result 
the observed effect of education on expenditures might actually capture the returns to 
physical capital. However, this issue is not of a large concern, because human capital 
externalities are shown above to actually be smaller for households possessing land, 
contrary to the expected effect if the coefficient of human capital externalities were 
capturing the returns to physical capital.
2.9 Data Appendix
This appendix documents the data sources and describes the various calculations and 
adjustments which have been made for the econometric analysis. As I mention in the 
main text the data used in this chapter comes principally from the NSS employment 
and unemployment surveys, which are combined with other sources for purposes of 
robustness.29
The National Sample Survey (NSS), initiated in the year 1950, is a nationwide, 
large-scale, continuous survey operation conducted in the form of successive rounds. In 
1970 the NSS was reorganised and all aspects of its work were brought under a single 
government organisation, namely the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 
under the overall direction of a Governing Council to impart objectivity and autonomy 
in the matter of collection, processing and publication of the NSS data. The Governing
291 have added state controls from Besley and Burgess (2000) who collected data on GDP, taxes, 
and road infrastructure for the sixteen major states of India.
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Council consists of 18 experts from within and outside the Government and is headed 
by a recognised economist or statistician.
The NSS employment and unemployment survey is conducted once every five years 
along with the annual consumer expenditures survey. The survey is a large and repre­
sentative sample, which covers the whole of India except some districts of Jammu and 
Kashmir, some interior remote villages of Nagaland, and some inaccessible villages of 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
The sample households are drawn based on a two-stage stratified random sampling 
procedure. In the first stage villages and urban blocks are randomly selected from a 
list of villages and urban blocks based on the previous census. In the second stage, 
the households are arranged by means of livelihood (main occupation), and area of 
landholding in rural areas, or monthly per capita consumption expenditure in urban 
areas.
The survey period is divided into four sub-rounds, each covering a period of three 
months. Within a particular sub-round, the fieldwork is spread out uniformly over 
different weeks/months as far as possible.
The survey is carried out by trained professional teams. The questionnaires and 
collection methods are identical across India as far as possible. As illiteracy is prevalent 
in India the questionnaires are completed by the interviewers. Hence non-response bias 
is unlikely to be correlated with literacy. In fact, Datt and Ravallion (2002) examined 
the representation of the poor in the NSS surveys and found it to accurately represent 
the poor households. They compared the NSS consumption data and the national 
accounts data on consumption of food staples, items which figured prominently in the 
budgets of the poor. The authors found little disparity between the two sources of data, 
suggesting that the NSS data was likely to accurately represent the poor households 
and their consumption.
The local (reg io n a l/d is tric t)  educational achievem ents are calculated in three 
ways based on the NSS data, which includes information on the highest levels of general 
and technical education attained by the members in the household. The first way is to 
use the percentage of people in the population who achieved at least a certain education 
level, for example the percentage of literate people or the percentage of people complet­
ing at least primary school. More formally, if n* is the number of people in household 
z, Wi is the weight assigned to the household, and dki is a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 if the kth member of household i achieved at least a certain education level,
y^ ni XO'd
then the local average educational attainment would be: 1fe=1^t kl.
£ i = 1
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The second way is to calculate the weighted average of the ranked values assigned 
to each education level. More formally, Vki is the ranked value assigned to the specific 
education level achieved by the kth  member of household i, with v i^ =  1 for being 
illiterate, =  2 for being literate, =  3 for completing primary school, =  4 for 
completing middle school, =  5 for completing secondary school, and =  6 for 
being a graduate. If all other variables are defined as before, than the local average 
ranked education level would be: w%Vkl.
£ i= l
The third way is to calculate the local average years of schooling. More formally, 
ski is the number of schooling years attributed to the kth  member of household z, with 
ski =  1 for literate, ski =  5 for completing primary school, ski =  8 for completing 
middle school, ski =  12 for completing secondary school and ski =  15 for completing 
higher education. If all other variables are defined as before, than the local average 
number of schooling years would be: .
Z-<»=1 WiTli
The information on monthly per capita expenditure (in Rupees) is taken di­
rectly from the NSS employment and unemployment survey. The figures are based 
on a detailed questionnaire in the consumer expenditures survey, which is carried out 
simultaneously with the employment and unemployment survey.
In general, the household characteristics are based on the characteristics of the 
head of the household, although for purposes of robustness I also check if the results are 
affected by including an average of household member characteristics. The breakdown 
of industries into non-primary industry and primary industry is done under the 
National Industrial Classification system (NIC), with agriculture and mining being de­
fined as primary industry. Educational achievem ents of the household are defined 
as the number of people in the household who achieved each specific level of education, 
namely the number of literate people, the number of people completing primary school 
etc.,30or alternatively as household average schooling years, as appropriate.
30 All the results are repeated with education level being defined as the household head’s education 
level.
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TABLE 2.1 
DATA DESCRIPTION
ROUND 43 (1987-8) ROUND 50 (1993-4)
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Monthly Expenditure Per Capita (Rupees.) 161.70 274.56 290.85 506.64
(96.41) (196.36) (157.6) (333.87)
Schooling (Years) 1.92 4.41 2.92 5.43
(0.81) (0.86) (0.81) (0.75)
Education Level (Average Ranked Value) 1.93 3.26 2.08 3.47
(1.309) (1.73) (1.41) (1.77)
Literacy Rates* 0.43 0.76 0.47 0.78
(0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.41)
Primary School Completion Rates* 0.27 0.62 0.31 0.65
(0.45) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48)
Middle School Completion Rates* 0.14 0.45 0.19 0.52
(0.35) (0.50) (0.39) (0.50)
Secondary School Completion Rates* 0.07 0.32 0.09 0.37
(0.25) (0.47) (0.29) (0.48)
Graduation Rates* 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14
(0.12) (0.31) (0.13) (0.35)
Non-Primary Industry 0.28 0.91 0.28 0.91
(0.45) (0.29) (0.45) (0.29)
Women Head of Household 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
Scheduled Caste and Tribes 0.31 0.16 0.32 0.16
(0.46) (0.36) (0.47) (0.36)
Size of Household (Number) 5.10 4.70 4.90 4.46
(2.58) (2.60) (2.40) (2.33)
Hindu 0.85 0.79 0.86 0.80
(0.35) (0.40) (0.35) (0.40)
Muslim 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14
(0.30) (0.35) (0.29) (0.34)
Age of Head of Household (Years) 43.43 41.59 43.80 41.91
(14.05) (13.85) (13.70) (13.71)
Self-Employed 0.12 0.34 0.13 0.34
(0.33) (0.47) (0.33) (0.47)
Number of Observations 80033 43705 66521 44364
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All values are proportions unless other units are indicated. 'Education 
variables represent the proportion of people who completed each relevant education level or higher. See the Data 
Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables.
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TABLE 2.2
AVERAGE EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (RS.) BY EDUCATION LEVEL
ROUND 43 (1987-8) ROUND 50 (1993-4)
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Illiterate 152.36 193.94 268.06 345.48
(86.14) (127.09) (137.96) (208.99)
42013 10008 32115 8861
Literate 174.90 220.55 306.80 409.20
(97.12) (138.03) (154.07) (253.17)
12758 5726 10595 5307
Completed Primary School 193.87 243.79 334.43 436.75
(108.24) (160.14) (171.18) (267.76)
11215 7088 8617 5791
Completed Middle School 212.04 272.11 359.86 483.78
(118.38) (181.82) (185.39) (298.19)
7086 5915 7185 6695
Completed Secondary School 255.35 374.23 430.95 638.27
(138.75) (246.58) (220.55) (388.49)
5394 9299 6183 10659
Graduate and Above 311.23 529.56 511.65 910.90
(158.54) (325.31) (249.03) (495.16)
1518 5655 1815 7031
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses, with the number of observations below the SD. Education level refers to 
the education of the head of the household. S ee  the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the 
variables.
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TABLE 2.3
HUMAN CAPITAL EXTERNALITIES -  BASIC RESULTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Education1 Years Level Literacy Primary Middle Secondary
Regional Education 0.038 0.124 0.242 0.41 0.564 0.659
(3.27)** (3.74)** (2.61)** (335)** (4.33)** (3.71)**
Household Schooling Years 0.078
(85.01)**
Illiterate HHM2 -0.055 -0.055 -0.055 -0.056 -0.056
(18.19)** (18.16)** (18.11)** (18.74)** (18.32)**
Literate HHM2 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(6.02)** (6.07)** (5.90)** (6.19)** (5.98)**
Middle school HHM2 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.025
(9.14)** (9.21)** (9.16)** (9.01)** (9.09)**
Secondary school HHM2 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.075 0.075
(20.04)** (20.22)** (20.13)** (19.91)** (19.96)**
Graduate HHM2 0.211 0.212 0.212 0.211 0.21
(32.68)** (32.82)** (32.88)** (32.75)** (32.55)**
Observations 222502 222563 222563 222563 222563 222563
R-squared 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
District Education 0.047 0.155 0.417 0.428 0.57 0.874
(6.00)** (7.46)** (7.03)** (5.66)** (6.33)** (7.77)**
Household Schooling Years 0.077
(88.72)**
Illiterate HHM2 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.059 -0.06
(27.43)** (27.25)** (27.74)** (27.82)** (28.02)**
Literate HHM2 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018
(7.28)** (7.75)** (6.84)** (7.37)** (7.54)**
Middle school HHM2 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.025
(10.03)** (10.37)** (10.28)** (9.47)** (10.32)**
Secondary school HHM2 0.074 0.076 0.076 0.074 0.072
(24.24)** (24.70)** (24.70)** (23.91)** (23.85)**
Graduate HHM2 0.193 0.195 0.195 0.193 0.19
(31.35)** (31.28)** (31.35)** (31.47)** (31.72)**
Observations 160699 160746 160746 160746 160746 160746
R-squared 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The table reports OLS coefficients. Absolute t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors clustered by region/district are in parentheses. The dependent variable is monthly per capita expenditure. 
1. Local education in column 1 is measured in terms of local average schooling years, in column 2 in term s of average 
education level, and in columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 in terms of literacy rate, primary school completion rate, middle school 
completion rate, and secondary school completion rate respectively. 2. HHM stands for number of household members. 
All regressions include regional fixed effect, time and sector fixed effects, with all additional variables detailed in table 2.4. 
The number of regions is 74, while the number of districts is 365.
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TABLE 2.4
EDUCATION INTERACTION TERM
REGIONS DISTRICTS
Education Interaction Term: Literate Primary School Literate Primary School
Regional/District Schooling 0.043 0.052 0.042 0.051 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.054
(3.57)** (3.78)** (3.53)** (3.73)** (6.89)** (6.33)** (6.76)** (6.23)**
Education Interaction -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013
(2.41)* (2.20)* (2.38)* (2.18)* (4.12)** (3.59)** (3.92)** (3.31)**
Dummy for Educated Household 0.095 0.098 0.054 0.055 0.121 0.118 0.079 0.073
(8 .48 )** (8 .21)** (4 .49 )** (4 .34)** ( 10.40 )** (9 .90 )** (6 .45 )** (5 .85)**
Household Schooling Years 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.077 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.076
(78 .12)** (76 .25)** (79 .80 )** (79 .25)** (79 .45 )** (82 .11)** (78 .28)** (81 .84)**
Time and Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Regions/Districts 74 58 74 58 365 323 365 323
Observations 222441 175083 222441 175083 160655 135655 160655 135655
R-squared ® ^ 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.53
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The table reports OLS coefficients. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by region/district are in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is monthly per capita expenditure. All regressions include time and sector fixed effects, regional fixed effect, and control variables for age of head of household, size of 
the household, number of male/female workers, dummy for female head of household, dummy for scheduled castes and tribes, various industry dummies, and dummy for being self- 
employed. In addition, the even columns include state income per capita, state length of roads, state total taxations, and state population. Average education is measured in terms of 
average schooling years. Educated status is defined as being literate in columns 1,2,5, and 6, and as having completed at least primary school in other columns.
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TABLE 2.5
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: STATE CONTROLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regional Education 0.047 0.139 0.227 0.471 0.699 0.814
(3.51)** (3.61)** (2.10)* (3.34)** (4.41)** (3.90)**
Household Schooling 
Illiterate HHM1
0.08
(81.75)**
-0.058 -0.058 -0.058 -0.059 -0.059
Literate HHM1
(18.40)**
-0.018
(18.44)**
-0.018
(18.33)**
-0.018
(18.65)**
-0.018
(18.75)**
-0.018
Middle school HHM1
(6.43)**
0.023
(6.47)**
0.024
(6.30)**
0.023
(6.46)**
0.023
(6.50)**
0.023
(8.37)** (8.48)** (8.42)** (8.18)** (8.32)**
Secondary school HHM1 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.073
Graduate HHM1
(17.93)**
0.209
(18.07)**
0.21
(18.01)**
0.21
(17.86)**
0.209
(17.95)**
0.208
Observations 175110
(29.68)**
175143
(29.77)**
175143
(29.85)**
175143
(29.73)**
175143
(29.61)**
175143
R-squared 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
District Education 0.048 0.148 0385 0.405 0.563 0.947
(5.56)** (6.76)** (6.64)** (5.15)** (5.39)** (7.63)**
Household Schooling 
Illiterate HHM1
0.079
(93.54)**
-0.062 -0.061 -0.062 -0.063 -0.064
Literate HHM1
(27.43)**
-0.02
(27.36)**
-0.021
(27.53)**
-0.019
(27.95)**
-0.02
(28.12)**
-0.02
Middle school HHM1
(7.81)**
0.025
(8.28)**
0.025
(7.41)**
0.025
(7.85)**
0.023
(8.07)**
0.025
Secondary school HHM1
(9.02)**
0.075
(9.25)**
0.075
(9.15)**
0.076
(8.59)**
0.074
(9.32)**
0.073
Graduate HHM1
(23.22)**
0.194
(23.43)**
0.196
(23.45)**
0.196
(23.02)**
0.194
(22.80)**
0.191
Observations 135670
(30.26)**
135699
(29.96)**
135699
(30.09)**
135699
(30.49)**
135699
(30.46)**
135699
R-squared 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The table reports OLS coefficients. Absolute t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors clustered by region/district are in parentheses. The dependent variable is monthly per capita expenditure. 
1. HHM stands for number of household members. All regressions include regional fixed effect, time and sector fixed 
effects, and all additional variables including state  controls are a s  in table 2.4. Local education in column 1 is m easured in 
terms of schooling years, in column 2 in terms of education level, and in columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 in terms of literacy rate, 
primary school completion rate, middle school completion rate, and secondary school completion rate respectively. The 
number of regions is 74, while the number of districts is 365.
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TABLE 2.6
NON-PRIMARY INDUSTRY INTERACTION TERM
REGIONS DISTRICTS
Regional/District Schooling 0.031 0.042 0.043 0.043
(2.72)** (3.20)** (5.18)** (4.96)**
NPI Interaction1 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.013
(3.72)** (3.19)** (2.69)** (2.66)**
NPI Dummy1 -0.016 -0.015 -0.001 -0.005
(1.04) (0.91) (0.05) (0.37)
Household Schooling 0.079 0.081 0.078 0.08
(87.38)** (85.01)** (90.05)** (94.41)**
Time and Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No Yes No Yes
Number of Regions/Districts 74 58 365 323
Observations 222441 182898 166558 140932
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.53
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The table reports OLS coefficients. Absolute t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors clustered by region/district are in parentheses. The dependent variable is monthly per capita expenditure. 
1. Non primary industry (NPI) equal to 1 if the main industry of the household is not agriculture or mining. All additional 
control variables are as in table 2.4. Average education is measured in terms of average schooling years.
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TABLE 2.7
EDUCATION AND NON-PRIMARY INDUSTRY INTERACTION TERMS
REGIONS DISTRICTS
Literate Primary School Literate Primary School
Regional/District Schooling 0.037 0.045 0.038 0.046 0.052 0.049 0.051 0.049
(3.07)** (3.26)** (3.22)** (3.43)** (5.99)** (5.33)** (5.91)** (5.38)**
Education Interaction -0.013 -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 -0.022 -0.017 -0.021 -0.016
(3.11)** (1.88) (3.76)** (2.60)* (5.23)** (3.71)** (4.95)** (3.52)**
NPI Interaction1 0.017 0.02 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.012 0.016
(3.81)** (3.89)** (3.33)** (3.36)** (2.99)** (3.65)** (2.81)** (3.19)**
Education and NPI Interaction1 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.002
(1.32) (0.37) (2.68)** (0.82) (2.36)* (0.29) (2.72)** (0.86)
NPI Dummy1 -0.035 -0.035 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024 -0.029 -0.016 -0.019
(2.31)* (2.09)* (1.7) (1.54) (1.82) (2.08)* (1.18) (1.4)
Dummy for Education 0.109 0.104 0.07 0.065 0.133 0.124 0.09 0.079
(9.34)** (8.17)** (5.71)** (4.89)** (11.43)** (10.24)** (7.25)** (6.20)**
Household Schooling 0.074 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.077
(79.59)** (79.35)** (80.78)** (81.36)** (79.09)** (81.36)** (77.29)** (79.62)**
State Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Regions/Districts 74 58 74 58 365 323 365 323
Observations 222441 175083 222441 175083 160655 135655 160655 135655
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.53
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The table reports OLS coefficients. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by region/district are in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is monthly per capita expenditure. All regressions include regional fixed effect, time and sector fixed effects, and all additional variables are as in table 2.4. Average 
education is m easured in terms of average schooling years. 1. Non primary industry (NPI) equal to 1 if household main industry is not agriculture or mining.
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TABLE 2.8
SUMMARY OF EDUCATION AND INDUSTRY EFFECTS
8.A Primary Industry Non-Primary
Illiterate2 3.7 5.4
Literate 2.4 4.1
8.B Primary Industry Non-Primary1
Below Primary2 3.8 5.2
Primary + 3 2.3 4.3
8.C Primary Industry Non-Primary1
Below Middle 3.4 4.6
Middle + 3 3 4.8
Notes: The table reports the sum of the appropriate coefficients from regression (2.11) with average regional education. 
The control variables are the sam e as in table 2.7. 1. The difference between non-primary industries and primary 
industries is significant at 5%. 2. The difference between educated and uneducated households is significant at 5%.
3. The gap between educated and uneducated households is significantly different in primary and non-primary industries.
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Chapter 3 
Education and Credit Constraints 
in India
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the effect of credit constraints on children’s schooling in India. 
The widely-cited justification for government intervention to finance education, includ­
ing considerable loans and generous subsidies, is the observation that people are unable 
to mortgage their future income to finance their studies. Thus in many countries, and 
particularly in the USA and the UK, policy on education is based on the assump­
tion of credit constraints. Moreover, one of the key explanations for the relatively low 
educational attainments in developing countries in spite of high potential returns is 
households’ limited access to credit.1
But the empirical evidence for credit constraints affecting education is indirect and 
inconclusive. In developed countries the main focus of the empirical literature is to 
test for credit constraints affecting schooling decisions. To identify these constraints 
researchers take one of two key empirical approaches. The first approach builds on the 
separation between investment decisions and income. With perfect credit markets ed­
ucational decisions depend only on interest rates and future returns but not on income. 
Therefore the observed correlation between family income and schooling achievements 
has been taken as an indicator of credit constraints.2The second approach is based on 
research estimating the returns to education. Research, summarised in Card (1999,
1 Other explanations include low quality of schools, insufficient market for skilled labour, and 
culture barriers.
2 See Carneiro and Heckman (2003) for a critical review of the literature.
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2001), has found that in the majority of cases the Instrument Variable (IV) coeffi­
cients have been significantly larger than the OLS coefficients. IV coefficients indicate 
the potential returns from a marginal increase in schooling, while the OLS coefficients 
evaluate current returns to schooling. The fact that potential returns to schooling are 
greater than actual returns implies that investment is not being fully exploited, due to 
some form of constraint.
However Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003) point out that there are serious in­
terpretation problems with the existing evidence and that limited credit access is only 
one possible explanation of existing results. Since current income is highly correlated 
with permanent income the correlation between income and education can indicate a 
long-term effect of income on ability and motivation. In their papers they show that 
once ability is taken into account the effect of current income on American college 
enrolment is in fact limited. Furthermore, heterogeneous returns to education can 
cause the IV coefficient to be greater than the OLS coefficient even in the absence of 
credit constraints. Carneiro and Heckman estimate that no more than 8% of the US 
population are prevented by credit constraints from attending college, and therefore 
claim that further policies targeted to deal with credit constraints are less likely to 
eliminate the extensive wealth gap in American college enrolment. Given the relative 
importance of early childhood education they recommend to devote more resources 
toward intervention at an early age. Moreover, education is not just an investment but 
also a consumption good. The demand for education increases with income because 
education has a status value. Hence a positive relationship between parental income 
and child schooling could simply be due to education being a normal good rather than 
as a result of credit constraints.
Surprisingly, in spite of the clear evidence of credit constraints in developing coun­
tries, the literature on their effect on education is quite limited. More importantly, the 
existing literature focuses mainly on inferring from schooling decisions the structure 
of the credit markets. It shows that schooling decisions respond to income shocks and 
takes this to indicate incomplete credit markets. However it does not evaluate the 
marginal effect of credit availability on school achievements. For example, Edmonds 
(2005) studies the timing effect of anticipated large cash transfers on child labour and 
schooling in South Africa. He concludes that households do not borrow against an­
ticipated pensions to finance child education and takes this to indicate the existence 
of credit constraints. Similarly, Jacoby and Skofias (1997) employ data on variation 
in rainfall from six Indian villages as a proxy for unexpected income shocks. Based
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on the response of school attendance to idiosyncratic shocks they reject the existence 
of complete intra-village credit and insurance markets and conclude that with limited 
credit markets parents draw on child labour to smooth their income.
A second key drawback of the existing literature is that it employs various measures 
of credit constraints which are likely to be endogenous and to directly affect returns 
from education. For example, employing data for Peruvian children Jacoby (1994) 
studies the relationship between credit constraints and the probability of lagging be­
hind at school. As an indicator of credit constraints he employs household assets and 
concludes that children in households with credit constraints leave school earlier than 
those with access to credit. However, a different explanation of the results could be 
that richer households care more about education. Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) 
also find that transitory income shocks in Tanzania increase child labour and that 
having collateral mitigates these effects, but again the authors cannot rule out the pos­
sibility that richer households have higher returns from schooling. Likewise, Guarcello 
etc. (2002) identify a sub-sample of credit-constrained households in Guatemala using 
self-reported information on denial of credit and why families were not able to apply 
for credit. They find that income shocks increase child labour and reduce school atten­
dance, and that limited access to credit causes similar effects. Once more, assumption 
of causality is problematic as it is possible that unmotivated households are excluded 
from the credit market and also care less for education.
This chapter takes a different approach and offers three main contributions to the 
existing literature. Most importantly, it focuses on the key question of identifying the 
marginal effect of credit constraints instead of merely verifying their existence. It does 
so by adopting a more direct way of estimating credit constraints. Unlike previous 
research I directly observe credit constraints and therefore do not count on the corre­
lation between income and schooling, which could have some alternative explanations. 
Secondly, while some literature employs land and assets as an indicator of collateral, 
both of which are clearly endogenous and could directly affect the returns to education, 
I employ bank availability as an indicator of credit availability. While I cannot claim 
that bank availability is a completely exogenous variable it is a significant improve­
ment on employing household assets, and on the spectrum ranging from completely 
exogenous to completely endogenous it is closer to the exogenous end. Thirdly, by 
focusing on a developing country the chapter contributes to a better understanding of 
the indirect costs of credit constraints in developing countries.
Households in developing countries are more exposed to risk for various reasons. For
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example, agricultural activity is an importance source of income, and poor sanitation 
increases the risk of infectious diseases. Furthermore market opportunities to deal with 
risk are limited due to information problems, absence of collateral, and enforcement 
difficulties. The restricted formal mechanism to deal with risk causes households to 
engage in expensive and less efficient methods to smooth their consumption and in­
come.3 Research reveals that households choose less risky but less advanced productive 
technology (for example Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1993), Morduch (1994)). This 
chapter shows that this effect is not limited to production decisions but also extends to 
human capital investments. Thus households surrender future benefits from education 
in favour of short-term benefits from child labour when access to credit is limited.
India provides an ideal setting given the low educational achievements, significant 
time-state variation in bank availability, and high quality data. Employing the Na­
tional Sample Survey (NSS) employment and unemployment round 55 combined with 
information on bank availability this chapter studies the effect of credit constraints on 
level of school attendance and lagging behind at school. In addition, employing panel 
data this chapter explores the effect of changes in family circumstances on schooling 
decisions. Finally, the chapter studies the effect of bank availability on school comple­
tion.
The main finding of my empirical analysis is that bank availability significantly 
increases the probability of attending school and reduces the probability of lagging 
behind at school. Moreover access to credit significantly mitigates the importance of 
income in determining school outcomes. Using panel data the chapter reveals that if 
one of the parents becomes unemployed the probability of continuing schooling drops 
by 8 percentage points, but credit availability almost completely mitigates the effect. 
These results are also evident in actual school completion results with bank availability 
during schooling years increasing primary school completion by 3 percentage points.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 describes the relevant background and 
the data; section 3 presents the econometric method and results; section 4 concludes.
3 Informal mechanisms to deal with risk help to smooth consumption. However, existing research 
shows that these informal mechanisms are far from perfect.
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3.2 Background and Data
3.2.1 Credit Availability
Credit and insurance markets in India, as in many other developing countries, suffer 
from enforceability and information problems. Consequently access to credit from the 
formal sector is relatively limited. The share of formal or institutional sources in total 
debt was only 61.2% in the 1990s.4For insurance, more than 85 percent of the popu­
lation relies primarily on extended family networks and informal saving arrangements 
for old-age security and insurance.
Yet India compares favourably with other developing countries in terms of the 
distribution of financial services. The average population served per commercial bank 
branch in India was around 15,000 in 2002, or if including branches of rural cooperative 
banks, 12,800, close to levels in Indonesia and Mexico.5
Furthermore, following Indira Gandhi’s bank nationalisation drive launched in 1969, 
bank branches are relatively available and accessible even in rural areas. These gov­
ernment regulations undertook to affect bank location and lending practices to favour 
the poor. As part of this effort, in 1977 they imposed a 1:4 branch licence policy which 
required banks to open four branches in rural locations without banks for every branch 
opened in locations already covered by an existing bank.
This legislation resulted in substantial achievements in enhancing access to credit 
in rural areas. In 1947, the first survey of rural indebtedness documented that money­
lenders and other informal lenders met more than 90% of rural credit needs. The 
share of banks in particular was only about 1% of total rural household debt. Fol­
lowing bank legislation, the share of banks in rural household debt increased to about 
29% in 1991 and the share of formal or institutional sources in total debt reached 
61.2%.6Correspondingly, the share of moneylenders declined steadily over these four 
decades. At the present time, according to official surveys, the median distance to the 
nearest financial institution ranges from 2 km (post office branches) to 5 km (com­
mercial banks, cooperative banks) and the median time taken to travel to the nearest 
commercial bank, cooperative or rural bank is 30 minutes.
The ambitious bank branch expansion program sought to expand the rural bank
4 Basu and Srivastava (2005).
5In addition, the share of financial assets in GDP in India is about 93%, compared to 81% in 
Argentina and 68% in Mexico. (Basu and Srivastava (2005)).
6 Basu and Srivastava (2005), Burgess and Pande (2005).
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branch network and also equalise individual access to banks across Indian states. While 
it was highly successful in increasing bank branch availability and in reducing inequality 
across Indian states, there remains a substantial variation in the availability of bank 
branches across India. For instance, in 1996 there was one branch serving an average 
of 10,000 people in Punjab compared with almost twice as many people per branch in 
Assam.
On the insurance side, unemployment benefits and other forms of income insurance 
are available only to a small minority of the labour force, being those employed in 
the formal sector.7One of the key schemes is provident funds, a retirement saving tool 
available mainly to formal sector employees with only 12% of the working population 
being covered.8Provident funds, besides providing an old-age income, are used to mit­
igate income shocks and their holders are entitled to withdraw their funds in event of 
unemployment or job change. In addition, members of provident funds are automati­
cally members of the Employees Deposit Linked Insurance, which pays compensation 
to the legal heirs upon death of a member.
3.2.2 D ata
The chapter seeks to identify the effect of credit availability on schooling decisions. Fol­
lowing criticism by Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003) of the circumstantial evidence 
of credit constraints from the USA, considerable attention has been devoted towards 
obtaining a more direct and exogenous measure of credit constraints.
My empirical analysis makes use of household data, combined with state-level vari­
ables on the availability of banks. The household data is the National Sample Survey 
(NSS) employment and unemployment round 55 conducted in 1999. A panel dataset 
was created for a sub-sample of households which were revisited three months later. 
After restricting the sample to children aged 6-18 who were revisited, the data has 
around 31,000 observations for rural areas and 19,000 observations for urban areas. 
The state-level variables come from Burgess and Pande (2005) and Besley and Burgess 
(2000).9
7 The government initiated some programs under which those in need and without regular em­
ployment axe obliged to undertake work-related activity in return for state income transfers. Some of 
these programs axe aimed at the unemployed in the non-formal sector. However, the programs helping 
the non-formal sector axe limited and oblige people to undertake work in return for transfers.
8Another important scheme is the Employees’ State Insurance Act (ESI), which provides health 
insurance.
9 Description of the state-level data can be found in the Data Appendix.
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The NSS data contains detailed information on household characteristics including 
religion, social group, household composition, and Monthly Per Capita Expenditure 
(MPCE). In addition detailed information on the parents is available, including em­
ployment status, principal activity, education, age, and whether they are members of 
a provident fund. The information on each child includes not only gender and age but 
also information on the principal activity of the child, i.e. whether he/she works, does 
household chores, or attends school. It also includes information on educational status, 
i.e. whether the child currently attends school, has dropped out of school, or never 
attended school. Furthermore, if the child attends school the data contains information 
on the school level (primary, middle or secondary).
The key dependent variable is a child school attendance dummy, based on whether 
school is the child’s main activity. In addition to this, based on child age and the type 
of school attended, I construct a variable indicating whether a child is lagging behind 
his age group at school. For example if a child is 16 but still attends middle school 
this variable equals 1. As I have no information on the precise class attended by each 
individual but only on the type of school I can capture only some of the cases of lagging 
behind at school and my measure is most accurate for children at the age of starting a 
new school level (i.e. 12 or 15).10
To measure the extent of credit availability I employ information on the number 
of bank branches. Although this is a crude measure which ignores other formal and 
informal sources of credit, I believe it successfully captures the cost of borrowing as 
banks account for a substantial amount of household credit, and also as other infor­
mal arrangements are much more expensive sources of credit which only emerge as a 
response to a fault in the formal sector.11! make use of the substantial variation be­
tween states in the availability of bank branches to estimate the effect of credit on 
schooling outcomes. I also make use of the change in credit availability over time as 
a result of the bank expansion program to obtain supplementary evidence regarding 
credit constraints and actual school level achieved.
I employ the information on provident fund membership as an indicator of family ac­
cess to insurance. In my data, a provident fund is available for 12% of the children. The
10 The main argument against using a school lagging variable is that it may be the result of data 
errors. My data contains two visits for each individual and allows me to compare the age recorded in 
each visit. I found only a small percentage of people with contradicting ages and these were omitted 
from my analysis.
11 The bank branch expansion caused a dramatic rise in the importance of banks as a source of 
household credit, and bank loans now account for more than 30% of rural household debt.
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major drawback of this variable is that provident fund membership is available mainly 
for the formal sector and is therefore liable to be correlated with other unobserved 
family characteristics. Consequently I report results for provident fund membership 
but keep the main focus of this chapter on the effect of bank availability.
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the main variables classified by rural and urban 
location. School attendance is lower in rural areas with 64% of children of school age 
attending school, compared with 78% in urban areas. Lagging behind at school is 
more prevalent in rural areas. In rural areas 30% of children who are supposed to be 
starting middle and secondary schools areas are still attending primary and middle 
schools respectively; in urban areas the equivalent figure is only 24%. The mean 
monthly expenditure is 416 Rs. in rural areas compared with more than 50% higher 
in urban areas.
Table 3.2 provides state-by-state information on school attendance and bank avail­
ability. School attendance ranges from as low as 47% in Bihar to 85% in Kerala. 
The number of people per bank branch varies between 9,700 and 20,000. Generally 
speaking, states with reduced bank availability have lower school attendance figures.
3.3 Econometric Analysis
I am interested in the effect of credit constraints on schooling in India. In the follow­
ing four sub-sections I present my econometric approach and results. The first two 
sub-sections present some basic results. They examine the correlation between expen­
diture and school achievements, and the extent to which bank availability affects these 
relationships. The last two sub-sections present the key results based on panel data 
estimations. I first examine the effect of income shocks on school attendance and then 
examine the long-term effect of credit on school outcomes.
3.3.1 H ousehold Characteristics and School O utcom es
As a first stage I simply explore the correlation between household income12 and school 
attendance. Thus employing the NSS employment and unemployment data, I run the 
following probit regression:
121 employ household expenditure as a proxy for family income. In developing countries it is 
difficult to obtain a reliable measure of income because a large share of income is generated by home 
production, and a considerable part of the wage is received in goods and kinds.
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h i s  —  a  +  @ X i s  +  ^ f l i s  +  S  +  € i s (3.1)
where his is a dummy variable indicating whether child i currently attends school, X is 
are child and family characteristics such as demographic composition, land ownership, 
religion, gender, age, and household composition, S  is state fixed effect and IiS is family 
income proxied by monthly per capita expenditure measured both as a continuous 
variable and as a quartile-based dummy variable allowing for non-linear income effects. 
I estimate equation (3.1) separately for each type of school to allow for different effects 
of income on primary, middle, and secondary schools. To account for possible serial 
correlation in the error terms I cluster the standard errors by state.
Table 3.3 reports the basic results on the probability of attending school. Unsurpris­
ingly, the correlation between income and school attendance is positive and significant. 
As expected parents’ education has a very significant and positive effect on the proba­
bility of attending school. While the level of maternal education over and above basic 
literacy does not have a notable effect, paternal education has a diminishing positive 
marginal effect. The demographic, ethnic and religious effects are also as anticipated, 
with the existence of young siblings reducing the probability of attending school by 2 
to 4 percentage points, females being 12 percentage points less likely to attend school 
than males, and a reduced level of school attendance being reported for Muslim children 
and traditionally disadvantaged groups. The effect of land is insignificant, possibly as 
a result of two opposing effects: on the one hand land can be used as collateral and 
therefore can reduce credit constraints, while on the other hand with incomplete labour 
markets land increases the returns for child labour.13
To give some idea of the magnitude involved Column 1 shows that moving from 
the lowest income quartile to the second quartile increases the probability of attending 
school by 6.6 percentage points. The effect of moving from the second quartile to the 
third quartile is smaller with a further 3-4 percentage points increase in probability, 
and moving to the final quartile has a similar marginal effect. Column 2 employs a 
continuous income variable and reveals results of a slightly greater magnitude. A rise 
of 300 Rs. in monthly per capita income14 increases the probability of attending school 
by 9 percentage points.15Columns 3-5 present the results separately for each age group.
13Bhalotra (2000b).
14 Monthly income of 300 Rs. per capita is around the 25-percentile level.
15 The small differences between columns 1 and 2 are probably a result of omitting outliers in the 
continuous regressions.
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The effect of income on the probability of attending school is much higher for children 
of secondary school age than for children of primary and middle school age.
Following Jacoby (1994) I next estimate equation (3.1) employing school lagging as 
the dependent variable for all children currently attending school.16Table 3.4 displays 
the results for school lagging conditional on school attendance. Column 1 presents the 
results for children aged 12 and 15 and indicates a negative effect of income on school 
lagging.17 An increase of 300 Rs. in monthly per capita income reduces school lagging by 
2.4 percentage points. Separating these results by age group, columns 2 and 3 reveal 
the effect for children of middle school age to be not significant, but the effect for 
children of secondary school age to be negative and significant. Column 4 introduces a 
rural interaction term for children of secondary school age.18Households in rural areas 
have a greater income dependency on agriculture. In addition, poor infrastructure 
and sanitation increase the exposure to health risks in rural areas. Therefore I expect 
credit availability to be of greater importance in rural areas. As predicted, the effect of 
income on school lagging becomes insignificant for urban areas, but remains negative 
and significant in rural areas where credit constraints are more apparent.
Overall the above results are in fine with expectations and demonstrate a large 
and statistically significant correlation between income and school achievement. Since 
educational decisions are not dependent on income when credit markets are perfect, a 
possible interpretation of these results is that households are credit-constrained. How­
ever, while this correlation may be consistent with credit constraints it is by no means 
an exclusive explanation. As pointed out by Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003), 
unobserved family characteristics such as motivation and ability could increase both 
school attendance and family income and consequently create the observed correlation. 
Moreover as mentioned earlier, part of the demand for education is related to its status 
value rather than investment value, especially in countries like India, where the returns 
to primary school education are quite low. In that case the demand for education will 
increase with income and create a positive correlation between education and income 
regardless of credit constraints. A more explicit and direct approach is required for 
estimating the importance of credit constraints and for quantifying the influence of
16 Jacoby (1994) argues that using a school lagging variable mitigates the issue of unobserved family 
characteristics because it is not clear why poor children should lag behind at school as opposed to 
leaving school altogether. However, this argument is problematic because if poor children come from 
less motivated families then they can exhibit irregular school attendance and repeat classes as a result.
17 Children start middle school at the age of 11 and start secondary school at the age of 14.
181 do not report the results for middle school children because the results are not significant even 
without an interaction term.
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credit availability on schooling decisions.
3.3.2 Credit A vailability
Now I turn to a more direct approach to estimate borrowing constraints and the in­
fluence of credit availability. The main variables of interest are credit availability and 
its interaction with household expenditure. My main measure of credit availability is 
based on the number of people per bank branch in each state. If in the child’s state 
of residence 15,000 people or less are served by one bank I define bank availability 
to be l .19In an alternative specification, I also consider provident fund membership 
which allows households access to money at times of economic distress as an indicator 
of credit accessibility. As provident fund membership is more likely to be correlated 
with unobserved household characteristics, I limit the use of this variable. I estimate 
the following probit regression:
his =  OL-\- {3Xis +  7Iis +  TjBisIis +  S  +  €is (3-2)
where BiaIiS is an income-credit interaction term, and all other variables are defined 
as in equation (3.1). To account for possible serial correlation in the error terms I again 
cluster the standard errors by state. As before, I estimate equation (3.2) multiple times 
using a dummy for school attendance as one dependent variable and a school lagging 
variable as a second dependent variable.
The identification takes advantage of the variation in bank availability. However, 
bank branch placement is not random. In general, banks choose to locate themselves in 
relatively rich states with substantial economic activity. If these states have more banks 
and they also provide better education or more opportunities for educated people the 
coefficients on bank availability would be an overestimate of the true impact of access 
to banks on education.20Therefore I include state-fixed effect to account for unobserved 
state characteristics.
For the interaction term I employ a dummy variable for banks serving no more 
than 15,000 people.21 The coefficient of interest is rj. Coefficient rj measures the inter­
action between credit availability and family income and therefore is less likely to be
1915,000 is the mean number of people served per branch in India; for a specific list of states see 
table 2. When I change the threshold, results do not change significantly.
20The government of India has attempted to equalise access to credit across the Indian states, 
however it is still the case that relatively rich states have better access to credit.
21 If instead I employ the number of people per branch the results stay qualitatively the same.
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correlated with unobserved state characteristics. I expect credit availability to mitigate 
the importance of income in determining schooling outcomes, so 77 is expected to be 
negative in school attendance regressions and positive in school lagging regressions.
Table 3.5 reports the results for credit availability. Section A presents the results 
for bank availability. Income increases the probability of attending school but this 
effect is significantly mitigated when banks are widely available. Column 2  discloses 
the results for lagging behind at school. Once more bank availability mitigates the 
effect of income. Section B presents the results for provident fund membership. Access 
to a form of insurance mitigates the importance of income; however this effect is only 
significant for the school attendance regression.
The magnitude of the effect is quite impressive, especially considering that the 
interaction term is roughly half the size of the income effect. For example in column 1 
a rise of 300 Rs. in monthly per capita income increases the probability of attending 
school by 13 percentage points. However, if banks are widely available the effect is 
reduced to 5 percentage points. Column 2  displays an even greater influence on school 
lagging regressions. The bank interaction term is the same magnitude as the income 
effect, so where banks are available income does not affect the probability of lagging 
behind at school, compared with an adverse effect of 6  percentage points where banks 
are not widely available.
Overall, the above results establish a large and statistically significant influence of 
credit availability on school achievement. Access to credit not only improves educa­
tional outcomes but also reduces wealth inequality in school achievement. However, I 
cannot completely rule out that some unobserved state characteristics could be corre­
lated with bank availability and affect rich people differently to poor people. Therefore 
now I turn to a more comprehensive analysis based on panel data estimation.
3.3.3 Incom e Shocks
One of the significant implications of credit constraints is that temporary income shocks 
can force households to engage in expensive and less efficient methods to smooth their 
consumption and income. Therefore, households might choose to rely on child labour in 
spite of its heavy long-term cost. To study the effect of shocks on schooling I construct 
a panel dataset by merging the data from the first visit with data collected three 
months later. Thus the panel data has among other variables information on changes 
in employment and school activity in the three months between the two visits. In the
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three months between the two visits around 5% of children dropped out of school, and 
4% re-entered school. 5% of the families had a new child, 3% lost a member of the 
family, and around 4% of parents lost their job.
I estimate the effect of changes in family circumstances on schooling decisions for 
all children who attended school in the first visit. The regression is:
=  ot P A X is +  7 A Zis +  r]BiSA X iS +  S  +  (3-3)
where h2is is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child attends school at the time of the 
second visit. Child and family characteristics which never change are dropped from 
the regression. A X is and AZ{s are two types of changes in family circumstances. The 
first type is a job loss by one or more of the parents. The second type is a change in 
family size due to a birth, or a household member leaving the house.22BiSA X iS is an 
interaction term between bank availability and job loss.
Out of these two types of shocks the first one is more likely to represent a transitory 
shock. Permanent income shocks are likely to affect schooling decisions regardless of 
borrowing opportunities, whereas temporary income shocks can be overcome through 
temporary money borrowing if the opportunity is available. Therefore while I expect 
both P and 7 to be negative, inferring from 7 on the credit market is less obvious. The 
interaction term is between bank availability and loss of employment. The prediction 
is that 77 > 0 because the adverse effects of income shocks should be mitigated where 
credit is easily available.
In general a decision to drop out of school is likely to be determined by the long- 
run returns to education. Hence if returns to education vary over time and are also 
correlated with credit constraints it can impose a bias on the estimation. However, my 
analysis focuses on the decisions to drop out of school over a period of three months. 
It is unlikely that the returns to education would dramatically change in such a short 
period.
Table 3.6 displays the panel data results. The left part of the table shows the 
basic results for each age group. On average the effect of a departure in the family 
or a birth is between 2 to 3 percentage points. It is interesting to note that older 
children are more vulnerable to a change in the family condition, probably because 
they can help by finding a job or by doing household chores. The effect of job loss is
221 cannot identify the reason for leaving the household and therefore cannot separate between 
death, marriage and other reasons for leaving the household.
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considerable and reduces the probability of staying in school by 8 percentage points. 
The second part of the table introduces an interaction term between credit and job loss. 
Bank availability reduces the adverse effect of job loss but the coefficient is significant 
only for older children. This means that credit can help to overcome job loss without 
taking older children out of school. This could be because parents are more willing to 
borrow to smooth school attendance at secondary school level due to the high returns 
to secondary education in the Indian labour market. However, parents may not be 
willing to similarly borrow to smooth primary school or middle school attendance as 
the returns to education are low at these levels.23
Overall these results show that credit constraints limit families’ ability to smooth 
school attendance. While these results are somewhat weaker compared with those 
presented above, they are much more compelling as I employ a panel dataset and 
account for unobserved family characteristics.
3.3.4 School Com pletion
The above results establish a negative effect of credit constraints on current school 
outcomes. It is interesting to next check whether these results present themselves 
in actual long-term educational outcomes or whether these results merely indicate a 
temporary withdrawal from school with limited long-term effects.
I now therefore turn to examining the effect of bank availability on obtained edu­
cation levels. The analysis here focuses on the education obtained by individuals who 
were adults in 1999 and were six years old sometime between 1960 and 1990. It exam­
ines how bank availability at the time those people went to school has affected their 
educational outcomes. The regression for individual i from state s and cohort c is:
hies =  & +  (3Xics +  SBica +  S  +  C  +  €ica (3 -4 )
where hies is an educational outcome variable, the variable of interest BiCS is a vari­
able measuring the number of schooling years during which banks were widely avail­
able, and X ics is a vector of exogenous variables determining educational out comes.24 5  
is state fixed effect and C  is cohort fixed effect, which account for unobserved state
23 The economic returns for the first 8 years of school in India are quite low and estimated to be lower 
than 2%. (See Duraisamy (2002), Kingdon (1998), Kingdon and Unni (2001) and Vasudeva-Dutta 
(2006)). However, the returns are much higher for secondary school.
24Individual controls including gender, social group, rural residency, and other state controls from 
the year when each individual started school.
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and time characteristics.
The data allows me to measure educational outcomes only in terms of education 
levels rather than schooling years. Therefore I employ two types of educational out­
comes. The first one is a dummy variable for completing primary school. The second 
type is a proxy for average schooling years. The measurement of the latter is not ac­
curate since it does not fully take into account schooling years of people who dropped 
out of school before completing a particular education level. For example, a person 
who studied for ten years appears in my data as someone who completed middle school 
but not secondary school and therefore accounts only for eight years of primary and 
middle school. However, I find it useful to employ the schooling measure as it is easier 
to interpret the coefficient on average schooling years.
Table 3.7 reports the results. The left part of the table describes the marginal 
effects from probit estimation on the probability of completing primary school. Each 
additional school year under a widespread banking system increases the probability of 
primary school completion by 0.6 percentage points. Hence the probability of primary 
school completion grows by 3 percentage points where banks are available throughout 
all five years of school. Column 6 shows that each year of bank availability increases 
the number of years in school by 0.05 years.
An important concern with the specification in equation (3.4) is the possibility of 
alternative local characteristics which could enhance both bank expansion and educa­
tional achievements. In the absence of a policy requirement on bank branch placement
1 would expect greater branch expansion in richer states, and if richer states provide 
better education then I would overestimate the true effect of bank availability. On 
the other hand, if the Indian central bank was successful in forcing banks to open 
relatively more branches in poorer states then the above logic suggests that I would 
underestimate the true effect of bank availability.
The inclusion of time fixed effect and state fixed effect accounts only for fixed 
unobserved characteristics, but does not perfectly eliminate the prospect of specific 
time and state unobserved variables. Therefore I include a set of specific time-state 
control variables, including political and economic variables. Political variables account 
for a change in political atmosphere affecting educational policies. Economic controls 
account for economic development enabling more investment in education. Columns
2 and 7 incorporate an additional set of control variables: all regressions now include 
educational inputs as well. Together these variables help to control for alternative 
factors which could theoretically affect schooling decisions. Furthermore as a robustness
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check columns 3 and 8 provide the results with additional state-specific time trend. The 
table shows that the results are generally not sensitive to the inclusion of state controls, 
although a state-specific time trend reduces the magnitude and the significance of the 
marginal effect reported in column 3.
Credit constraints are expected to have a larger effect in rural areas because income 
is largely dependent on agricultural activity and because health risks are also higher. 
Therefore I lastly estimate equation (3.4) separately for rural and urban areas. I expect 
the effect of credit availability to have greater significance in rural areas. Columns 4, 
5, 9 and 10 show that the effect of credit availability on educational outcomes is only 
significant in rural areas. Given poverty levels in India it is hard to believe that credit 
constraints have no effect in urban areas of India. One explanation for these results is 
that the returns to primary education are much higher in rural areas compared with 
urban areas (Duraisamy (2002)), so people might be less willing to borrow money to 
finance primary education in urban areas. In addition it is important to notice that 
these results refer to long-term effect on school outcomes. According to my findings 
primary school completion rates are not affected by credit constraints in urban areas 
but school attendance is affected. It is possible that even if income shocks force children 
to withdraw from school temporarily they can go back to school when the situation 
improves.
Overall these results suggest a significant positive effect of bank availability on 
education levels, which is more pronounced in rural credit-constrained areas. They 
show that the effect of imperfect credit is not limited to a short-term withdrawal from 
school but also has a long-term impact.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have tested the influence of credit constraints on school outcomes in 
India. The policy on education in many countries, including government loans and 
subsidies for education, is based on the assumption of borrowing constraints. These 
policies, together with the substantial private returns of education and the contribution 
of education to economic growth, make this issue of considerable interest.
I have chosen to focus on a developing country where households are considerably 
exposed to risk and where official mechanisms to mitigate such risk are limited. Exist­
ing literature has established the adverse effect of limited borrowing opportunities on 
investment in physical capital. This chapter shows that the effect extends also to in­
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vestment in human capital. In the absence of formal mechanisms for income smoothing, 
households rely on child labour and sacrifice long-term benefits of education. Looking 
specifically at India is valuable given the low educational achievements and substantial 
state variation in both educational outcomes and credit availability.
The main contribution of this chapter is the use of a direct and relatively exogenous 
measure of credit constraints. Unlike previous literature I do not rely on the correlation 
between income and education to establish the existence of credit constraints and do not 
employ household assets as an indicator of collateral. Instead I make use of information 
on bank availability.
My findings suggest that credit constraints play an important role in educational 
outcomes in India. Furthermore credit constraints explain a substantial part of ex­
isting wealth inequality in education. Where banks axe widely available income plays 
only a small role in determining educational achievements. However, when access to 
credit is limited and expensive, income has a large and statistically significant effect 
on education. Credit also helps to mitigate the adverse effects of transitory income 
shocks. Finally, I find that the negative effect of credit constraints in rural areas is 
not limited to short-term outcomes but is seen also in long-term outcomes of school 
completion rates and schooling years. This is an important finding as more than 70% 
of the population lives in rural areas.
From the policy perspective my results suggest that programs to expand schools 
without understanding the risks and constraints faced by households might be unsuc­
cessful. In addition, compulsory school laws could damage household welfare. On 
the other hand, programs to provide cheap credit and insurance to credit-constrained 
households could have an indirect effect on human capital decisions. Financial devel­
opment might reduce wealth inequality in access to education.
3.5 Data Appendix
This appendix describes the main data sources employed and the various calculations 
and adjustments which have been made for the econometric analysis. As I mention 
in the main text the data used in this chapter comes principally from three sources. 
The first source is the 1999 employment and unemployment round of the National 
Sample Survey (NSS). This is a household-level dataset, which contains among other 
things information on the main activity, age, and education of each individual in the 
household, and their last state of residency if they came from another state. In all
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school completion regressions I employ the last state of residency as a proxy for the 
state of birth. The second data source is Indian state panel data, collected by Besley 
and Burgess (2000) from a wide variety of original sources. This data covers the main 
sixteen Indian states for the period 1960-1992. Haryana split from the state of Punjab 
and enters the sample in 1965. The third source is bank data collected by Burgess and 
Pande (2005) for the main sixteen Indian States for the period 1960-1992.
B an k  A vailability: Burgess and Pande (2005) collected bank branch data from 
the Reserve Bank of India (2000). Based on bank and population data I define a 
dummy variable Bis equal to 1 if each bank branch serves on average 15,000 people or 
less. Alternatively, I employ the continuous variable of number of people served per 
bank branch. For school completion regressions I construct a variable BiCS measuring 
the number of schooling years out of the maximum potential 5 years of primary school 
during which banks were widely available. So for individuals who were born in a state 
which never had widely available banks this number is equal to 0, and for individuals 
living in a state with widely available banks throughout the period this number is equal 
to 5. Otherwise, if 2  defines the first calendar year after banks became widely available, 
and b defines individual birth year, then Bics =  (b +11) — z  subject to maximum value 
of 5 and minimum value of 0.
E ducationa l Variables: Based on the child’s main activity I construct a school- 
attendance dummy equal to 1 if the child’s main activity is school. Based on child age 
and the type of school he/she attends I define a school lagging variable. Specifically, 
if the child is 12 or older but still attends primary school, or if the child is 15 or older 
but still attends middle school, this variable is equal to 1. The number of schooling 
years is constructed in the same way as in chapter 2.
Econom ic Shocks: A sub-sample of households was revisited three months after 
the first visit, allowing me to construct household panel data. I use changes in house­
hold composition and economic activity between the two visits to construct variables 
measuring economic shocks. In particular, I define a variable indicating a new child, a 
variable indicating a departure from the household, and a variable indicating job loss 
by one or more of the parents.
The information on M P C E  (monthly per capita expenditure in Rupees) is taken 
directly from the NSS employment and unemployment survey. The figures are based 
on a detailed questionnaire in the consumer expenditures survey, which is carried out 
simultaneously with the employment and unemployment survey. In general, the house­
hold characteristics are based on the characteristics of the parents of the children.
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State-L evel V ariables include the size of the population, political variables, and 
economic and infrastructure variables. They are taken from Besley and Burgess (2000) 
and are described in more detail in the next chapter.
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TABLE 3.1
DATA DESCRIPTION
Rural Urban
School Attendance 0.64 0.78
(0.48) (0.41)
Lagging at School 0.30 0.24
(0.46) (0.43)
Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (Rupees) 415.99 680.72
(324.59) (497.30)
Child Age (Years) 11.51 12.00
(3.72) (3.72)
Female Child 0.46 0.47
(0.50) (0.50)
Land Less Than 0.01 Hectares 0.19 0.43
(0.39) (0.49)
Land 0.01-1 Hectare 0.49 0.20
(0.50) (0.40)
Land More Than 1 Hectare 0.27 0.05
(0.45) (0.22)
Household Size (Number) 6.61 6.30
(2.69) (2.63)
Females in Household (Number) 3.24 3.08
(1.70) (1.67)
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 0.69 0.53
(0.46) (0.50)
Muslim 0.13 0.19
(0.33) (0.39)
Christian 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.15)
Other Religions 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.18)
Mother Doesn't Work 0.60 0.82
(0.49) (0.39)
Mother Self-Employed (or family business) 0.21 0.08
(0.40) (0.27)
Mother Employed 0.19 0.10
(0.39) (0.30)
Father Doesn't Work 0.18 0.17
(0.38) (0.37)
Father Self-Employed (or family business) 0.45 0.37
(0.50) (0.48)
Father Employed 0.37 0.46
(0.48) (0.50)
Female Siblings Aged 0-5 (Number) 0.39 0.47
(0.68) (0.50)
Male Siblings Aged 0-5 (Number) 0.39 0.25
(0.67) (0.56)
Observations 38545 21806
Notes: standard deviations are in parentheses. All values are proportions unless other units are indicated. The omitted 
religious group is Hindus. The omitted land-ownership group is landless. S ee  the Data Appendix for details on the 
construction and sources of the variables.
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TABLE 3.2
BANK AVAILABILITY AND SCHOOLING STATISTICS
Population Per Branch School Attendance School Rank
Punjab 9716 0.77 5
Kerala 9890 0.85 1
Karnataka 10922 0.69 8
Jammu & Kashmir 11040 0.78 4
Tamil Nadu 12811 0.76 6
Gujarat 12968 0.69 9
Haryana 13616 0.78 3
Andhra Pradesh 14598 0.66 10
Maharashtra 14867 0.80 2
Rajasthan 15557 0.65 12
Orissa 15783 0.63 15
Madhya Pradesh 16520 0.64 13
West Bengal 17175 0.64 14
Uttar Pradesh 17903 0.65 11
Bihar 19658 0.47 16
Assam 19771 0.75 7
All of India 15047 0.67
Notes: School attendance refers to children aged 6-18 and is based on whether school is defined as the child’s main 
activity.
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TABLE 3.3
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Group All All 6-11 12-14 15-18
25%-50% MPCE 0.066252
(4.75)***
50%-75% MPCE 0.099
(7.57)***
75%-100% MPCE 0.143
(13.94)***
MPCE (Impact Per Rupee) 0.0003 0.000225 0.000284 0.000486
(13.49)*** (7.96)*** (6.36)*** (14.30)***
Mother is Literate or more 0.136 0.132 0.09 0.15 0.168
(16.19)*** (14.84)*** (10.55)*** (10.34)*** (8.89)***
Literate Unschooled Father 0.086 0.088 0.073 0.084 0.058
(7.86)*** (7.73)*** (6.66)*** (5.41)*** (2.53)**
Primary School Father 0.122 0.125 0.093 0.115 0.14
(9.90)*** (9.85)*** (7.83)*** (9.57)*** (7.82)***
Middle School Father 0.156 0.158 0.109 0.157 0.197
(15.78)*** (15.71)*** (14.33)*** (10.21)*** (8.12)***
Secondary School Father (or higher) 0.226 0.218 0.13 0.207 0.342
(14.83)*** (15.41)*** (11.78)*** (9.12)*** (11.01)***
Female Siblings Aged 0-5 -0.032 -0.036 -0.022 -0.035 -0.032
(4.21)*** (4.69)*** (4.01)*** (3.38)*** (2.04)**
Male Siblings Aged 0-5 -0.018 -0.02 -0.008 -0.023 -0.03
(1.81)* (1.98)** (1.10) (1.20) (2.54)**
Mother Doesn't Work 0.022 0.026 0.019 0.055 0.041
(1.76)* (1.84)* (1.28) (2.72)*** (1.94)*
Mother Self-Employed -0.001 0.003 0 0.017 0.017
(0.04) (0.14) (0.01) (0.70) (0.82)
Father Doesn't Work -0.103 -0.099 -0.058 -0.139 -0.103
(5.96)*** (5.69)*** (2.80)*** (2.80)*** (3.51)***
Father Self-Employed 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.027 0.004
(1.02) (1.18) (1.32) (1.01) (0.18)
Rural -0.073 -0.022 -0.013 -0.046 -0.012
(6.87)*** (2.36)** (0.84) (2.34)** (0.63)
Female -0.122 -0.124 -0.087 -0.158 -0.133
(6.06)*** (6.16)*** (7.17)*** (6.23)*** (3.50)***
Scheduled Castes/Tribes -0.053 -0.05 -0.037 -0.053 -0.045
(7.46)*** (7.26)*** (4.28)*** (4.76)*** (3.49)***
Muslim -0.127 -0.125 -0.076 -0.154 -0.148
(10.75)*** (10.29)*** (9.06)*** (9.67)*** (7.72)***
Christian 0.042 0.038 0.018 0.012 0.123
(1.39) (1.29) (0.57) (0.25) (2.23)**
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50242 49313 24692 11869 12752
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table reports the marginal effect from probit 
regressions, using monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) a s  a  proxy for income level. Absolute t-statistics calculated 
using standard errors clustered by sta te  are reported in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 include also school age dummy. 
All regressions include state  fixed effect and are weighted. Variables covering households with more than one married 
child, number of females, number of males, being the eldest child, and age are also included in the regressions but are 
not reported due to lack of space.
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TABLE 3.4
LAGGING AT SCHOOL
(1 ) (2) (3) (4)
Age Group 12 or 15 12 15 15
MPCE (Impact Per Rupee) -0.00008 -0.000047 -0.00014 -0.000069
(1.79)* (0.62) (1.84)* (0.84)
Interaction Rural and MPCE 
Mother is Literate or more -0.045 -0.066 -0.035
-0.000257
(1.80)*
-0.03
(1.93)* (2.48)** (0.96) (0.78)
Literate Unschooled Father -0.009 -0.052 0.082 0.083
(0.22) (1.17) (1.27) (1.30)
Primary School Father -0.085 -0.062 -0.118 -0.117
(2.82)*** (1.28) (2.49)** (2.43)**
Middle School Father -0.136 -0.161 -0.087 -0.083
(6.01)*** (3.99)*** (1.48) (1.44)
Secondary School Father (or higher) -0.203 -0.183 -0.237 -0.239
(6.97)*** (3.82)*** (4.90)*** (4.86)***
Female Siblings Aged 0-5 0.064 0.077 0.038 0.031
(4.28)*** (5.66)*** (1.18) (0.98)
Male Siblings Aged 0-5 0.042 0.058 -0.021 -0.026
(2.69)*** (3.46)*** (0.87) (1.05)
Mother Doesn't Work -0.049 -0.036 -0.067 -0.055
(2.76)*** (1.36) ( l . l l ) (0.92)
Mother Self-Employed -0.03 -0.007 -0.064 -0.057
(1.21) (0.29) (0.95) (0.80)
Father Doesn't Work 0.086 0.082 0.105 0.112
(1.14) (1.28) (0.93) (1.01)
Father Self-Employed -0.018 0.013 -0.07 -0.068
(1.05) (0.85) (2.24)** (2.13)**
Rural 0.022 0.026 0.015 0.151
(1.00) (1.07) (0.36) (2.36)**
Female 0.027 0.036 0.013 0.016
(0.91) (0.91) (0.31) (0.36)
Scheduled CastesATribes 0.018 0.007 0.042 0.044
(0.95) (0.27) (1.38) (1.43)
Muslim 0.07 0.112 0.015 0.021
(2.98)*** (4.06)*** (0.29) (0.42)
Christian -0.028 -0.008 -0.079 -0.088
(0.43) (0.09) (0.91) (1.01)
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6072 3818 2239 2239
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table reports marginal effect from probit 
regressions, using monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) as a  proxy for income level. Absolute t-statistics calculated 
using standard errors clustered by state  are reported in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 include also school age dummy. 
Variables covering households with more than one married child, number of females, number of males, being the eldest 
child, and age are also included in the regressions but are not reported due to lack of space. All regressions include state 
fixed effect and are weighted.
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TABLE 3.5
SCHOOL AND CREDIT AVAILABILITY
A. Banks B. Provident Funds
Dependent Variable Attending School Lagging Attending School Lagging
Age 6-18 12 or 15 6-18 12 or 15
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MPCE (Impact Per Rupee) 0.00043 -0.00021 0.00023 -0.00012
(6.65)*** (7.26)*** (9.87)*** (2.00)**
Interaction Term - 0.00026 0.00023 - 0.00013 0.00017
(3.38)*** (5.07)*** (7.31)*** (1.4)
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43419 5167 46399 5728
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table reports the marginal effect from probit regressions, using monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) a s  a 
proxy for income. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. The interaction term is between MPCE and credit availability, 
m easured in columns 1-2 employing bank availability and in columns 3-4 employing provident fund membership. Bank availability variable is a  dummy equal to 1 if in the child’s  state  of 
residence 15,000 people or less are served by one bank. Provident fund membership is a  dummy equal to 1 if at least one of the child’s  parents is a  member of a  provident fund. Lagging 
regressions are for children aged 12 or 15 currently attending school. A child is said to lag behind at school if he/she attends a  school at a  lower level than the level expected by his/her 
age. All regressions include fixed effect and are weighted. The additional control variables are the sam e as in tables 3.4 and 3.3.
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TABLE 3.6
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND INCOME SHOCKS
Age Group All 6-11 12-14 15-18 All 6-11 12-14 15-18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
New Baby -0.022 -0.021 -0.008 -0.055 -0.021 -0.019 -0.003 -0.068
(2.90)*** (2.48)** (0.81) (3.54)*** (2.83)*** (2.44)** (0.32) (4.03)***
Household Member Left -0.029 -0.012 -0.046 -0.052 -0.026 -0.009 -0.046 -0.043
(5.20)*** (1.77)* (3.90)*** (4.16)*** (4.22)*** (1.38) (3.24)*** (3.12)***
Job Loss - 0.08 - 0.068 - 0.072 - 0.136 - 0.094 - 0.068 - 0.101 - 0.202
(8.91)*** (6.10)*** (5.29)*** (7.99)*** (8.19)*** (4.56)*** (6.07)*** (9.46)***
Bank Interaction Term 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.02
(1.39) (0.78) (1.53) (1.97)**
Observations 42704 23388 10823 8493 36635 20411 9238 6986
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table reports the marginal effect from probit regressions. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard errors 
clustered by state are reported in parentheses. The interaction term is between job loss and credit availability. Bank availability variable is a  dummy equal to 1 if in the child's state  of 
residence 15,000 people or less are served by each bank. Job loss variable is a  dummy equal to 1 if at least one of the parents lost their job between the two visits. All regressions are for 
children who attended school on the first visit. All regressions are weighted.
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TABLE 3.7
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND BANK AVAILABILITY
Completed Primary School School Years
Sample All All All Rural Urban All All All Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Bank Availability 0.006082 0.006378 0.003593 0.008597 0.002675 0.053962 0.056464 0.041361 0.067218 0.04584
(1.75)* (2.26)** (1.54) (2.35)** (1.01) (1.70) (1.78)* (2.11)* (2.04)* (1.29)
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Economic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Political Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
School controls NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Trend NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Observations 241405 205617 205617 145183 96222 241405 205617 205617 145183 96222
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.2
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Columns 1-5 report the marginal effect from probit regressions, and columns 6-10 report OLS coefficients. Absolute t- 
statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by state  are reported in parentheses. Bank availability is the number of years during school age years in which 15,000 people or less 
were served by one bank branch. Economic controls include real state  domestic product per capita, rural and urban population, scheduled caste population, and scheduled tribe 
population. Individual controls include dummies for gender, rural residency, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and dummies for various religions. Political variables include a  dummy 
for the leading political group in the Lower House as defined in the Data Appendix of chapter 4, political margin, and voter turnout. All regressions include state and cohort fixed effects and 
are weighted.
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Chapter 4
Bicam eralism  and Public Education  
Provision: Theory and Evidence 
from India.
4.1 Introduction
Understanding the effect of political institutions on public policy is of key interest to 
political economy. One political institution which is widespread but has received little 
attention in the literature is bicameralism.1 India is a federal country which inherited 
a bicameral legislative system from British rule. Some Indian states are still bicam­
eral today, while others have changed to unicameralism, creating a unique time-state 
variation in the existence of Upper Houses. In addition teachers are granted special 
representation in the Upper Houses that no other profession enjoys. Employing both 
household data and state panel data this chapter brings together the unique institu­
tional variation and teacher representation to study their combined effect on public 
provision of education.
Education is primarily a state matter in India and as a result there is significant 
variation in educational achievements across the Indian Federation, for example female 
literacy varies from 20 percent in Rajasthan to 86 percent in Kerala. Understanding 
how political institutions influence education is an important step in explaining this 
variation in educational outcomes.
1 Around one third of the countries in the world today have bicameral legislatures, including almost 
all federal countries.
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Traditionally, public finance has assumed that governments provide an optimal al­
location of public goods. The literature analysing political influence on public goods 
provision was pioneered by Stiglitz (1974) who highlighted the fact that the median 
voter equilibrium does not necessarily exist. While the median voter approach is valu­
able in analysing certain aspects of public goods provision, its main disadvantage is 
that it is an ‘institution-free’ idea, and by its nature does not provide an insight into 
comparative institutions. Recently economists have devoted more attention to the ef­
fect of political institutions on political and economic outcomes. In their pioneering 
work, Persson and Tabellini (2004) show in cross-country regressions that a parliamen­
tary system generates more public goods and higher taxes than a presidential system. 
Besley and Case (2003) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence from 
the United States. Exploiting the broadly uniform institutional setting in the USA this 
literature generates scope for isolating the real effect of political institutions. However, 
this research is limited by the extent of institutional variation which has occurred 
within the USA.
Literature specifically concerning the role and economic impact of Upper Houses is 
quite limited even though Upper Houses are widespread. It has been argued that bicam­
eralism generally reduces corruption while in federal nations the main justification for 
the existence of Upper Houses is to represent states’ individual interests.2 Ansolabehere 
etc. (2002) examines in a theoretical paper the effect of unequal voting weights in the 
federal Upper House and deduces that unequal weights do not necessarily imply a bias 
against small-state in public goods provision. Money and Tsebelis (1997) find a U- 
shaped relationship between the size of the government and the number of times laws 
are transferred between the two houses of the French parliament. Testa (2003) studies 
the effect of Upper Houses combined with lobbying groups on corruption employing 
cross-country regressions. She finds that when the two houses are of different political 
composition bicameralism increases corruption, while if the two houses are of similar 
political composition bicameralism reduces corruption.
The key limitation for empirical research of institutions in general and bicameral­
ism in particular is that there is limited variation within countries, so identification is 
based upon cross-country regressions. In this framework it is difficult to account for 
unobserved variables. In addition it is difficult to interpret the results due to incom­
parability of definition of variables, sampling methods and institutions. Qualitative 
differences between Upper Houses are rarely accounted for even though Upper Houses
2 For a full discussion of bicameralism see Money and Tsebelis (1997).
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vary significantly worldwide, both in terms of powers and in methods of selecting mem­
bers. At one extreme are Upper Houses that are constitutionally coequal with Lower 
Houses,3in the middle are Upper Houses which are coequal subject to restrictions, such 
as on monetary bills,4and at the other extreme are Upper Houses which have an essen­
tially advisory capacity or can only delay the passage of laws.5Membership selection 
can be by direct election, indirect election, nomination, or heredity.6
India provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of bicameralism on pub­
lic goods provision. The constitution defines the composition of Upper Houses (known 
at the state level as Legislative Councils), and gives the states the power to abolish 
their Upper Houses, or to create new ones, resulting in a unique time-state varia­
tion in the existence of comparable institutions. Secondly, while teachers in India are 
granted a special privilege to choose their own representatives in the Upper Houses, 
primary school teachers are excluded, as they are not entitled to take part in these 
elections/This implies that there may be different effects of having an Upper House on 
primary schools and higher-level schools. I exploit this fact in my empirical estimation. 
This special privilege of teachers does not allow me to distinguish between the effect 
of Upper Houses and teachers’ political representation, but does allow me to focus my 
research on a well-defined subset of public goods: education.
Employing both household data and state panel data for the sixteen major Indian 
states over the period 1960-1992, I examine the effect of Upper Houses combined with 
teacher representation on education. The empirical analysis relies on the time and 
state variation in the existence of Upper Houses. The main findings of my empirical 
section are that the existence of an Upper House combined with teacher representation 
benefits middle and secondary schools at the expense of primary schools, with a fall in 
primary school completion rates of 3 percentage points, and an increase of 3 percentage 
points in middle and secondary school completion rates.
This chapter employs a theory based on a bargaining process between Upper Houses 
and governments. The government knows that if it makes a budget allocation which
3 For example Upper Houses in the United States, Italy and Switzerland.
4For example, Upper Houses in India, Belgium and South Africa.
5 Such as the French Senate, the British House of Lords, and the Irish Senate.
6 Generally speaking, there is a correlation between the mode of selecting members and the powers 
given to the Upper House: the more democratic the selection process the more power the Upper House 
will enjoy.
7 See Kingdon and Muzammil (2000, 2003) for a systematic study of teacher involvement in politics 
in Uttar Pradesh in India, including the historical reasons for their involvement and its effect on 
educational legislation and appointment of teachers.
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is too different from the preferred allocation of the Upper House, amendments will be 
proposed. There is a cost associated with disagreements between the Houses, so the 
government is to some extent willing to compromise its preference in advance.
The theoretical model shows that groups of teachers who have political representa­
tion in the Upper House of the Indian state legislature are more successful in attracting 
resources than unrepresented groups of teachers. The empirical section shows that these 
extra resources are partially responsible for improvements in school outcomes.
Extensive literature has investigated the effect of school inputs including teachers’ 
salaries on student outcomes and found mixed results. According to Hanushek (2002) 
only 9% of the estimates in the USA for the level of teachers’ education and 14% of 
the estimates for teacher-pupil ratios show positive and statistically-significant effects 
on student performance. Specifically regarding India, Kingdon and Teal (2005) found 
that teachers’ salaries improve students’ achievements in private schools but not in 
public schools, where most teachers have a permanent job and are not worried about 
losing their position.
While the evidence is inconclusive, it does not say that money and resources do not 
matter but that simply spending more money on schools does not necessarily improve 
outcomes, especially if the resource allocation within some of the schools is inefficient. 
Moreover my empirical results do not suggest that the improvements in educational 
outcomes are solely explained by smaller teacher-student and school-student ratios. 
Other mechanisms should be considered, for example, teachers’ representation could 
attract more quality teachers into teaching. Alternatively, representation could also 
serve to provide better facilities for both students and teachers, which improve school 
attendance.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework; section 3 describes the relevant institutional background; section 4 reviews 
the econometric strategy and discusses the results; section 5 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
The aim of this section is to offer foundations for the empirical tests and a structured 
scheme for interpreting the empirical results. I present a theoretical model which 
illustrates how differences between the two legislative houses in their preferences over 
educational inputs are translated into policy decisions even in the absence of a power 
of veto. I compare the policy taken in states with Upper Houses and states without
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Upper Houses. In doing so I generate a number of predictions about the influence 
of bicameralism on educational provision as well as providing a useful organisational 
device for discussing my empirical assessment.
The model explores only the official influence channel, whereby teachers electing 
members of the parliament can affect legislation and budget decisions. The legislative 
rules are modelled according to the legislative process in India but could easily be 
adopted to fit other countries. The empirical strategy focuses on identifying the effect 
on educational inputs, which are decided by monetary bills. Accordingly, the theo­
retical model focuses only on monetary bills. However it is straightforward to extend 
the model to non-monetary bills, on which the Upper House can have an even greater 
effect.8In addition, I do not rule out some alternative mechanisms of influence.
The model is based on a bargaining process between the government and the Upper 
House. I do not model the bargaining process between the coalition parties and take 
the government structure as given. The model focuses on the allocation of educational 
inputs between primary schools and higher levels of schools. I do not explicitly model 
the objective functions of each agent but since secondary school teachers and middle 
school teachers attached to secondary schools have representatives in the Upper House 
and not in the Lower House, I assume that the preferences of the Upper House are 
more in favour of these teachers.
Consider a model with two agents i € {1,2} with i =  1 being the government 
and i =  2 being the Upper House. With a given educational budget each agent has 
a preferred allocation between primary schools and higher schools. Let x =  1 be the 
preferred point of the government, where educational achievements in all schools are 
equally cared for. Let x =  0 be the preferred point of the Upper House, where only 
middle and secondary school achievements are of concern to it.9Thus, in the absence 
of an Upper House the policy implemented is x =  1. The policy offer available to 
each agent is denoted by Xi € [0,1]. The utilities from a chosen policy x are (x, 1 — 
x), representing the proportionate utilities to the government and the Upper House 
respectively. These given utilities correspond to the fact that each agent achieves higher 
utility as the chosen allocation is closer to its preferred point. Thus, the bargaining 
process focuses on choosing a point along the continuum between these two preferred 
allocations.
8 For example, Kingdon and Muzammil (2003) find that in Uttar Pradesh teachers have affected 
non-monetary bills, such as laws regarding supervision of teachers.
9 These assumptions are just for simplicity. All that really matters is that the Upper House has 
some bias in favour of middle and secondary schools.
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The political process has three stages. In the first stage the government makes an 
offer x\. In the second stage the Upper House can either accept the offer or propose 
an amendment X2. If the Upper House accepts the offer the bargaining ends and the 
utilities are (#1,1 — Xi). Otherwise a third stage takes place where the Lower House 
votes on the amendment, and either accepts or rejects it. In the case of acceptance of 
the amendment, the resulting utilities are (81X2, £2(1  — ^2)), whereas if the government 
rejects the amendment the allocation of the budget is passed in its original form despite 
dissent by the Upper House, and the utilities are , <5|(1 — £ 1)). Si E [0,1] are 
discount factors representing the cost to the government and to the Upper House of 
disagreement, either due to reputational damage or as a result of delaying the budget 
legislation.
It is easy to show that the limiting case where the Upper House does not suffer 
at all from a disagreement, i.e. where 62 — 1, is not interesting as it always results 
in a disagreement. Since the government anticipates that the Upper House will not 
accept any policy except for its own preferred policy, the government does not make 
any effort to compromise. Intuitively, if the Upper House does not lose anything from 
suggesting amendments, it will always amend the budget to represent its preferred 
choice, and therefore the price of making it indifferent is too high. In the same way, it 
is also easy to show that if the government does not suffer at all from a disagreement, 
i.e. <£i =  l, then the government always follows its preferred policy. This is because 
the government can simply reject any amendment and receive its original offer without 
cost. Hence, I assume that and 62 are strictly less than 1.
I solve the model backwards. In the last stage of the bargaining process the gov­
ernment will logically accept any amendment X2 if S\x2 ^  8\x \, therefore in the second 
stage if the Upper House chooses to make an amendment, its optimal value will be 
x2 =  ^1^ 1, in which case the utilities are (8\ x \ , 82(\. — ^i^i))- Hence in the first 
stage the government knows that the Upper House is willing to accept any offer X\ if 
1 — X\ ^  #2 (1  — ^1^ 1) • Thus if the government seeks a compromise, its optimal offer 
is Xi =  • The government prefers this compromise to simply ignoring the Upper
House and forcing through its preferred value of 1, if ^  8\. In other words
agreement is reached if the benefit from an agreement is non-negative.10
( 1 in the absence of an Upper House
or if < S\ 5
11_ ^ i otherwise
10If 8 \ =  8 2  — 8  the condition is fulfilled for 8  <  0.75.
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P ro p o sitio n  3 U pper H ouse Effect
For a sufficiently low and positive discount factor the existence of an Upper House 
generates a smaller x* compared to policy in the absence of an Upper House.
P roof. In the presence of an Upper House with 62 >  On and l-stsi ^  i^» x* ~  
1^ | i , which must be smaller than 1 because £1 < 1. ■
This Proposition states that policies taken in states with Upper Houses are fur­
ther away from governments’ ideal points than policies taken in states without Upper 
Houses. Intuitively, the reasons for the result are clear. Where costs are associated 
with a parliamentary conflict the government is willing to compromise its preferences 
even in the absence of a power of veto.
To conclude the model generates an important implication for the empirical strat­
egy. It shows that Upper Houses affect the legislation even in the absence of a power 
of veto. It also shows that if the Upper House favours secondary and middle schools, 
then its existence will serve to improve educational outcomes of middle and secondary 
schools at the expense of primary schools. In other words, I expect selective teacher 
representation in the Upper House to have a negative effect on primary schools and a 
positive effect on higher level schools. It is this prediction of the model which I will 
bring to the data. In particular, I will exploit the variation in the existence of Upper 
House, and will use different measures of educational policy and educational out­
comes, e.g. number of school teachers, number of schools, and school completion rates, 
to compare policy taken in states with teacher representation in the Upper Houses with 
policy taken in states where the government does not need to be involved in political 
bargaining with an Upper House.
4.3 Institutional Background and Data
India provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of bicameralism due to 
its st£te-time variation in the existence of comparable Upper Houses. In addition 
the composition of Upper Houses provides special representation to a very narrow 
group of people and hence reveals more concrete information about the direction of 
preference gaps between the Upper House and the Lower House. Moreover the exclusion
11 At the extreme case when 8 2  =  0, x* =  1. In other words, if the Upper House discounts 
disagreement by so much that it would never dare make an amendment, then the government does 
not make any concession and chooses its preferred policies.
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of primary school teachers generates contradicting predictions for different levels of 
schools, which I explore empirically.
4.3.1 U pper H ouses
The introduction of an Upper House in India in 1921 was a product of British rule.12Upon 
independence a great discussion arose around the necessity of the bicameral system. 
Nevertheless, the new constitution of India established the Upper House as a federal 
chamber, representing the interests of the states in federal legislation. Article 168 of 
the constitution created a similar bicameral structure at the state level for various 
states of India, and article 169 of the constitution granted the states’ Lower Houses 
the power to abolish Upper Houses or create one where none exists. Originally, the 
constitution of India provided for having bicameralism in six states. 13By 1960 after 
several reorganisations and separations of states, eight states had an Upper House. 
West Bengal, Punjab, Andhra-Pradesh, and Tamil-Nadu subsequently abolished their 
Upper Houses in late 1969, early 1970, 1985, and 1986, respectively. 14No state without 
an Upper House chose to create one.
In structuring the states’ Upper Houses India followed the Irish model of granting 
representation to ‘wiser groups’. In particular, India followed Ireland in granting grad­
uates from higher education a special right to elect representatives to the Upper House, 
and in an exceptional step granted the same privilege to teachers. Teachers were the 
only profession singled out for this special privilege. Article 171 of the constitution 
lays down the composition of the Upper House. According to the constitution, local 
bodies elect one third of the Upper House members. The Lower House elects another 
third. The governor appoints a further sixth of the members. University graduates 
elect one twelfth of the members, and teachers elect the final twelfth. Each member of 
the Upper House is elected for six years and every two years a third of the members 
are replaced. Therefore elections take place every other year.
A person is entitled to vote on teachers’ representatives in the Upper House provided 
that he is a resident of the state and has at some time within the previous six years been
12Tripathi (2002).
13Bihar, Bombay, Madras (later renamed Tamil-Nadu), Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
The basic rule was that states with Lower Houses with more than 160 members were also granted 
Upper Houses.
14 For a discussion of the reasons for abolition see section 4.4.1. Graph 1 shows the variation over 
time.
107
engaged in teaching in educational institutions within the state,15which axe deemed 
to  be not lower in level than secondary school. For this purpose the government 
specified with the election commission all educational institutions that are deemed to 
be not lower than secondary school. In practice, the statement about secondary school 
teachers has been interpreted to include also middle school teachers if they are teaching 
in a middle school attached to a secondary school16. As a result, it is mainly primary 
school teachers who are excluded from the political process.
Upper Houses affect public goods provision mainly through monetary legislation. 
The constitution makes a distinction between monetary bills and non-monetary bills. 
Since the Upper House is not an elected body in the regular sense it is granted less 
powers over legislation than the Lower House, and these powers are significantly re­
duced in respect of monetary bills. Article 198 of the constitution “Special Procedure 
in Respect of Money Bills” restricts the introduction of monetary bills to the Lower 
House. After the bill has been passed by the Lower House it is transferred to the Upper 
House for its recommendations, and the Upper House has a period of fourteen days to 
return the bill to the Lower House with its recommendations. The Lower House may 
either accept or reject any or all of the recommendations of the Upper House. If the 
Lower House accepts any of the recommendations of the Upper House, the monetary 
bill is deemed to have been passed by both Houses. If the Lower House does not accept 
any of the recommendations of the Upper House, the monetary bill is deemed to have 
been passed by both Houses in the form in which it was passed by the Lower House 
without any of the amendments recommended by the Upper House. Hence the influ­
ence of the Upper House is generated by two characteristics of the legislative process: 
first, the amendment rights granted to the Upper House, and second, the inability of 
the government to change its initial budget once it has been passed over to the Upper 
House. Accordingly the source of power of the Upper House is the government’s fear of 
reputational damage as a result of disagreement between the Houses. This fear causes 
the government to choose an allocation of public goods which is not too far from the 
preferred allocation of the Upper House.17
15 The candidates are not required to be teachers.
ieKingdon and Muzammil (2003).
17 An alternative source of political power, which I do not model, is that elements of the government 
coalition could side with the Upper House.
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4.3.2 D ata
I test the effect of bicameralism on the provision of education using both micro-level 
regressions and state-level regressions. Accordingly, I employ both household data and 
a state-panel dataset, combined with data on the existence of Upper Houses. The 
household data is the National Sample Survey (NSS) employment and unemployment 
round 55 conducted in 1999. After restricting the sample to the sixteen major states of 
India the data has around 150,000 observations for rural areas and 100,000 for urban 
areas. The state panel data was employed by Besley and Burgess (2000) and covers 
the sixteen major states of India over the period 1960-1992.18
For the micro-level regressions I employ the NSS data, retaining individual age and 
educational outcomes and all invariable individual characteristics such as gender, social 
group, and religion, and then merging the dataset with the state-panel data. In the 
merged data set individuals have their own characteristics but also all the relevant state 
information at the year of starting each school level, i.e. when the child was six years 
old for primary school, eleven years old for middle school and fourteen years old for 
secondary school. The NSS data does not include information about state of birth, but 
does include information about state of residency and migration. In cases of migration 
I take the previous state of residency as a proxy for state of birth.
I employ two different measures of Upper House existence. The first is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if on the year starting school there was an Upper House in the 
state. As a second measure I define a variable that measures how many years out of 
the potential maximum years of studies at each school level the individual lived in a 
state which had an Upper House. For example, for an individual born in 1960 in West 
Bengal this number in primary school regressions is 4, since he started school in 1966, 
and the Upper House was cancelled at the end of 1969.19
In the second part of my analysis I employ state-level regressions to study the effect 
of bicameralism on educational inputs and on state-level educational achievements. 
Owing to concerns over biases in the enrolment data I construct school completion 
rates based on the NSS data. For each cohort I construct variables measuring the 
percentage of people completing primary school, middle school and secondary school, 
out of the people who were at the age of starting each of these schools, and then merge
18 The Data Appendix describes the main data sources employed and various calculations and 
adjustments that have been made for the econometric analysis.
19 For full details see the Data Appendix.
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these cohort completion rates with the state panel data.20
Table 4.1 provides a statistical description of the data. Approximately 40% of the 
observation;- have an Upper House, with 4 states having an Upper House for ail of the 
specified peiiod and 4 states abolishing their Upper Houses at some point midway. The 
remaining 8 states did not have an Upper House at any time during the specified period. 
The data also reveals substantial variation in the political composition of various states, 
but in most of the states the Congress party is the dominant party. Educational inputs 
are relatively low. For example, the average number of teachers per 1000 children in the 
relevant age group is 16.42, 13.85 and 17.51 in primary, middle, and secondary schools 
respectively. The average number of schools per 1000 children in the relevant age 
group is 6.21, 1.82 and 1.03 for primary, middle, and secondary schooling respectively. 
Finally, the average real expenditure per child in the relevant age group is 48.9 Rs, 41.7 
Rs and 87.4 Rs in primary, middle, and secondary schools respectively. The enrolment 
data, as pointed out in the past by Dreze (1998), is clearly biased upwardly with an 
average of 98% of boys reportedly being enrolled in primary school and a maximum 
enrolment level supposedly exceeding 100%.21 School completion rates represent more 
accurately the true educational achievements in India, with 56%, 39% and 23% of the 
children completing primary, middle, and secondary schools respectively.
4.4 Empirical Estimation
4.4.1 Identification Strategy
The theoretical section generates a testable prediction regarding the effect of bicamer­
alism and teacher representation on the provision of education in India. Bicameralism 
is expected to shift resources away from the allocation which would be preferred by the 
government in the absence of an Upper House. Thus political representation of middle 
and secondary school teachers in the Upper House is expected to shift resources to­
ward the preferred allocation of these teachers.22In terms of the theory, the existence
20 The primary school completion rate of people born in year x is merged with state data for the 
year x+6, tae middle school completion rate of people born in year x is merged with state data for the 
year x+11, and the secondary school completion rate of people born in year x is merged with state 
data for the year x+14.
21A potential problem arises if there is a correlation between the bias in the enrolment data and 
the Upper House, for example if teachers over-report student enrolment as an alternative source of 
power in the absence of an Upper House.
22 Even though university teachers enjoy similar political power I limit my analysis to school teachers 
because higher education comes under the responsibility of the federal government rather than the
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of Upper Houses generates a smaller value x*, which represents a closer allocation to 
the ideal public goods allocation of the Upper House. Accordingly, the empirical sec­
tion employs various measures of educational achievements and educational inputs in 
different types of schools as the dependent variables.
The comparison in table 4.2 between states with and without an Upper House 
in the early Sixties reveals significant differences between the two. In general, states 
with a second chamber have more schools and teachers per 1000 children, and higher 
secondary school completion rates. However, the allocation of Upper Houses is not 
random. In. fact according to the constitution only states with Lower Houses exceeding 
160 members were assigned a bicameral parliament. Table 4.2 shows that states with 
Upper Houses also have significantly greater population sizes and higher GDP per 
capita. Therefore differences in educational inputs and educational outputs across 
those states cannot necessarily be attributed to the Upper House.
The source of variation comes from the fact that the Indian constitution allows 
states to abolish their Upper Houses. As a result there are three types of states: 
states which had Upper Houses during the entire period; states which never had Upper 
Houses; and finally states which abolished their Upper Houses. In what follows I refer 
to these three categories as ‘bicameral states’, ‘unicameral states’ and ‘transformed 
states’, respectively.
In the micro-level regressions it is possible to refer to a change in the parliamen­
tary regime as generating a treatment. The combination of date of birth and state of 
residency determines who is exposed to the treatment. Young cohorts in transformed 
states form the treatment group. The estimation compares the difference in the prob­
ability of school completion between young cohorts and older cohorts in transformed 
states against untransformed states.23
In the state-level regressions I examine the change in educational achievements and 
educational inputs of untransformed states and transformed states before and after 
each transformed state abolished its Upper House. Over time we expect an increase in 
educational achievements and educational inputs in both types of states. However, the 
difference in differences between the rates of improvements can be interpreted as the 
effect of Upper House abolition. For example, a smaller improvement in the number 
of middle school teachers in transformed states may indicate that the rate of increase 
in number of middle school teachers has been slowed down as a result of abolition of
state governments.
23 Untransformed states comprising unicameral states and bicameral states.
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the Upper House.
A non-trivial assumption of the differences in differences method is that in the ab­
sence of abolition the patterns of education in both types of states should be the same. 
However, if the increase in the number of teachers is positively correlated with their 
initial numbers, and states which abolished their Upper Houses had lower educational 
achievements in the early Sixties, then we would observe the same pattern even without 
any effect from the Upper House.
Therefore an interesting feature of bicameralism in India is that an implication of 
this identification assumption can be tested. States which had the same parliamentary 
regime during the entire period, i.e. bicameral states and unicameral states, should 
not be affected by the abolition of Upper Houses elsewhere. Therefore education in 
these two categories would be expected to evolve comparably across the period. In the 
following section I test this identification assumption.
Another key assumption is that the abolition of Upper Houses is exogenous to 
educational achievements. Unfortunately, the reasons for the abolition of the Upper 
Houses are not completely clear as there was no discussion recorded of the abolition 
decision in the parliaments of Punjab or Andhra-Pradesh. From the discussions in 
West Bengal and Tamil-Nadu it appears that the main flaw in those Upper Houses 
was that political parties used them as a default job granted to candidates who did 
not succeed in elections to the Lower House. A second argument was that the states’ 
Upper Houses had not served the purpose for which they had been created. Teachers’ 
political privilege was mentioned among the reasons to abolish the Upper Houses but 
was not the primary reason.24 Discussions in the Seventies between the federal gov­
ernment and state governments regarding the removal of teacher representation show 
that there is no clear correlation between states’ opinions regarding teacher represen­
tation and their decisions regarding the abolition of their Upper Houses. For example, 
while Tamil-Nadu recommended to the federal government to retain teacher represen­
tation and even suggested to extend teacher representation to include primary school 
teachers, it abolished its Upper House. Meanwhile Bihar and Karnataka recommended 
the removal of teacher representation but chose to retain their Upper Houses. By 
contrast, Maharashtra recommended to keep teacher representation and retained its 
Upper House, and Andra Pradesh recommended the removal of teacher representation 
and cancelled its Upper House. So although econometric issues concerning non-random 
abolition of Upper Houses are still present it seems reasonable to assume that there
24Kingdon and Muzammil (2003).
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is no reverse causality whereby educational achievements or educational inputs caused 
the abolition of Upper Houses.
A second concern is that there might be some underlying omitted factor, such 
as political change, driving both the abolition of Upper Houses and the allocation 
of educational inputs. In that case we would expect to find a correlation between 
bicameralism and various other government expenditures and policies, especially on the 
total education budget. However, this idea is not supported by the data.25Moreover, 
since fixed effects answer only the concerns over fixed unobserved state characteristics, 
each regression includes additional controls. In particular, the state domestic product 
and population separated into rural and urban areas account for the ability to invest 
in education and for the expected returns from education.26In addition, I use political 
variables to account for changes in preferences of the Lower House, which might be 
linked to other policies affecting education.27Finally I check the robustness of the results 
to inclusion of a state-specific linear time trend, to capture state-specific trends in 
attitudes toward education.
A general concern with the differences in differences method is that standard errors 
could be serially correlated. As Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2003) show, this 
would usually result in upwardly biased t-statistics, and in over-rejection of the null 
hypothesis. I employ the common solution and cluster the standard errors.28
4.4.2 M icro-Level R egressions
I begin by considering the effect of Upper Houses on educational outcomes. The theory 
section predicts an improvement in middle and secondary school achievements at the 
expense of primary schools.29To test this, I perform two types of regressions: individual
251 do not find an effect of bicameralism on government expenditures and taxes. The only correla­
tion which I do find is between bicameralism and land reforms.
26 Other controls such as roads, banks, and GINI coefficients for infrastructure, credit constraints, 
and inequality are also tried. While the results are robust the sample size is significantly reduced due 
to missing variables.
27 The political variables include a dummy for election year and a dummy if the leading political 
group in the Lower House is one of four main groups of parties: Janata parties, Hindu parties, hard- 
left parties, and regional parties, as classified in Besley and Burgess (2002), where the base group is 
Congress parties.
28 Concerns over serial correlation require clustering at the state level. However I present more 
conservative results clustering at the district level.
29 On the other hand Kingdon and Muzammil (2003) claim that teachers’ political power could 
have an adverse effect on teachers’ efforts, due to lack of appropriate supervision and accountability. 
Therefore, while the net effect of teachers’ representation in the Upper House on primary schools is 
expected to be negative the effect is ambiguous for middle and secondary schools.
113
data regressions and state panel data regressions.
Employing the NSS data I run the following linear probability regression for indi­
vidual i from cohort c and state s :
hstij — cx S C  +  j UHscij XjXscij  H- €sdj (4.1)
where hSdj is a dummy educational outcome variable, UHSdj is the variable of interest 
being either a dummy for the existence of an Upper House30 or a variable measuring 
how many years each individual was exposed to an Upper House, X Sdj is a vector of 
exogenous variables determining educational outcomes,31 S' is state fixed effect and C  is 
cohort fixed effect. The regressions are run separately for 3 different levels of education, 
indicated by the subscript j .  For primary schools j  =  p, for middle schools j  =  m  and 
for secondary schools j  =  h.
I expect differences in culture and attitudes toward education to be captured in 
the state fixed effects. In other words, the Upper House coefficient estimates the 
differences in differences of educational achievements between old individuals and young 
individuals in transformed states, against states which did not change the structure of 
parliament during the period.
As the theory predicts that bicameralism shifts the allocation of public goods in 
the direction of represented teachers, I expect to find contradicting effects on primary 
schools and higher level schools. For primary schools I expect bicameralism to be 
negatively associated with educational achievements (/3p <  0), whereas in the case of 
middle and secondary schools I expect bicameralism to be positively associated with 
educational achievements (/5m, (3h > 0).
Table 4.3 reports my key results on the effect of Upper House abolition on school 
completion employing a linear probability model. All the regressions include state and 
cohort fixed effects, child characteristics and state characteristics from the year the 
child was at the age of starting school j .  The standard errors are clustered at the 
sampling unit.32Columns 1 and 2 show that in line with the theory, the effect of Upper 
Houses is to reduce the probability of completing primary school. Columns 3-6 apply 
the same regressions to middle and secondary schools. In line with the theory the
30 Alternatively, we can interpret this variable as an interaction term between being old and living 
in a transformed state.
31 Controls include individual controls such as gender, social group, rural residency, and other state 
controls from the year when each individual started school j .
32 The district in most cases.
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coefficients are now positive and significant. The even columns report the results using 
Upper House years as the variable of interest instead of a dummy variable. The two 
different measures of Upper House existence generate consistent results. For example, 
the coefficient in column 3 is three times as large as that in column 4 and the coefficient 
in column 5 is twice as large as that in column 6, corresponding to three years of middle 
school and two years of secondary school. Therefore from now on I report only results 
with an Upper House dummy. These results show that having an Upper House with 
teacher representation increases the probability of completing secondary and middle 
schools but reduces the probability of completing primary school, indicating that the 
political structure results in a real effect on outcomes.
If Upper Houses lead to higher drop-out rates at the primary school level then fewer 
people start middle and secondary schools. As a result the effect of Upper Houses on 
middle and secondary schools in columns 3-6 is under-estimated. The right-hand side of 
the table presents estimations conditional on completing the previous educational level. 
For example, the regressions on middle school completion ask what the determinants of 
middle school completion are for people who completed primary school. The downside 
of the conditional results is that if Upper Houses lead to higher drop-out rates at the 
primary school level then the better achievements in middle and secondary schools may 
reflect the selection of better students attending middle and secondary school. In fact, 
the conditional results are larger and more significant than the non-conditional results.
I next perform a robustness check to compare transformed states with bicameral 
states and unicameral states separately. Specifically, I run regression (4.1) twice more, 
the first time limited to individuals born in transformed states and bicameral states, 
and the second time limited to individuals born in transformed states and unicameral 
states. The Upper House coefficient estimates the differences in differences between 
bicameral states or unicameral states and transformed states before and after abolition.
Table 4.4 reports the results of this robustness check. The upper part of the table 
shows the difference in differences between transformed states and bicameral states. All 
definitions are the same as before, with all regressions weighted and standard errors 
clustered at the sampling unit. In line with previous results, the coefficients for primary 
schools are negative and significant and the results for secondary schools are positive 
and significant, but the results for middle school limited to a sub-sample of states are 
no longer significant. The middle part of the table reports similar results for the subset 
of unicameral states and transformed states.
The identification rests on the assumption that in the absence of abolition education
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would have evolved similarly in both types of states. However, if improvement in 
educational achievements is negatively correlated with the initial level of education 
and transformed states had higher educational achievements in the Sixties, then we 
would observe the same pattern even without any effect from the Upper House.
To test the identification assumption I therefore run regression (4.1) one final time 
for individuals born in untransformed states (bicameral states or unicameral states). To 
estimate the differences in differences between bicameral states and unicameral states 
before and after abolition I replace the Upper House variable with a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the state is a bicameral state and the year is after 1970, being the year 
when two of the transformed states abolished their Upper Houses.33If the identification 
assumption is valid then the difference in differences between transformed states and 
untransformed states is expected to be significant, but the difference in differences 
between bicameral states and unicameral states is expected to be insignificant.
The lower part of table 4.4 shows the differences in differences between bicameral 
states and unicameral states before and after 1970. In line with the identification 
assumption all of the coefficients are now insignificant. These results suggest that the 
differences in differences estimations are not caused by an inappropriate identification 
assumption.
I perform an additional robustness check including a state-specific time trend to 
account for a state-specific trend toward education. The results are robust to this 
specification and have similar coefficients. The results are presented in table 4.5. As 
the table shows the results are robust to specific time-trend specification and have 
similar coefficients.
To conclude, my results are consistent with the theory, and demonstrate that polit­
ical structure affects educational outcomes. Upper Houses with special representation 
granted to middle school teachers and secondary school teachers improve educational 
achievements in those schools, to the disadvantage of primary schools which are ex­
cluded from the political process.
4.4.3 State-Level R egressions
For the state panel data regressions I run the following regression for state s at time t:
33 West Bengal and Punjab abolished their Upper Houses at the end of 1969 and the beginning of 
1970, respectively.
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Hstj — ol +  S  +  T  +  f3jUHstj -f XjXstj +  estj (4.2)
where H stj  is the completion rate of school j ,  UH stj  is the key explanatory variable 
of bicameralism, X stj  is a vector of exogenous variables affecting educational achieve­
ments,345  is a state fixed effect, and T  is a time fixed effect.
Table 4.6 reports the results for school completion rates and is provided as a test 
of whether bicameralism also has a substantial effect at the aggregated state level. 
Column 1 reveals a significant negative effect of Upper Houses on primary school com­
pletion rates. Specifically, an Upper House reduces primary school completion rates 
by between 3.4 and 3.9 percentage points. Column 3 reveals the opposite results for 
secondary schooling: Upper Houses increase the percentage of people completing sec­
ondary school by 2.9 percentage points. Column 4 reports the pooled regressions for all 
levels of school and indicates that Upper Houses create a bias against primary schools. 
Columns 5 and 6 provide the conditional results, with the dependent variables being 
the percentage of people completing middle school out of people who completed pri­
mary school and the percentage of people completing secondary school out of people 
who completed middle school. The conditional results are larger and more significant, 
but as explained earlier might reflect some selection bias. The lower part of table 4.6 
reports the control group regressions and as before the coefficients are not significant, 
providing additional support that the differences in differences estimation is not driven 
by an unsuitable identification assumption. Taken together, the results demonstrate 
that teachers’ political power in the Upper House affects educational achievements not 
only at the individual level but also at the state level.
Following the clear effect of political structure on educational achievements, I now 
try to identify the educational inputs which account for the differences. In particular, 
I ask whether bicameralism affects teachers’ employment, the number of schools, and 
educational expenditures. I run equation (4.2) again, but this time with the number of 
teachers, number of schools and real expenditure per child as the dependent variables. 
All other definitions are unchanged except that some of the control variables are no 
longer relevant.
Table 4.7 reports the results. The even columns report results for number of schools 
per 1000 children and the odd columns report results for the number of teachers per
34including state domestic product, rural and urban population, scheduled caste population, sched­
uled tribe population, and political variables.
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1000 children.35 The results are somewhat weaker, but remain consistent with previous 
results. Column 2 reveals a negative effect of bicameralism on the number of primary 
schools. The existence of an Upper House reduces the number of primary schools per 
1000 children by 0.4, which is around 6% of the average level in the sample. Columns 3 
and 4 demonstrate the opposite effect for middle school inputs. Bicameralism increases 
the number of middle school teachers per 1000 children by 1.91, which accounts for 
more than 13% of the average level in the sample. The number of middle schools is 
similarly increased and accounts for just under 20% of the average level in the sample. 
The results for secondary school teachers are less significant but in the same direction. 
Section B of the table reports results from a robustness check and compares between 
bicameral states and transformed states. Section C tests the identification assumption 
and shows that the differences in differences between bicameral states and unicameral 
states before and after 1970 are not significant.
An interesting feature of the results is that I do not find any effect on total ed­
ucational expenditure. In other words, my results show that Upper Houses have a 
significant effect on educational inputs consistent with the allocation of resources be­
ing shifted from schools with no political representation toward schools with political 
representation, but not a change of total resources.
4.5 Conclusion
Economists are far from clear about the role institutions play in the field of public 
policy. In particular, very little is known about bicameralism and public goods pro­
vision. Two unique features of the Indian legislature allow me to assess the effect of 
bicameralism on the provision of education. First, India chose to retain the bicameral 
system after independence both at the federal level and at the state level, but left the 
decision on whether to have a state Upper House for each individual state to make, 
resulting in a time-state variation in the existence of bicameralism. Second, teachers 
were granted a special representation in the Upper House in the belief that they are 
nobler than regular people and would provide a better judgment on political issues 
without grabbing rents for themselves. This allows me to generate predictions on a 
specific branch of public goods: education.
The chapter provides evidence that contrary to their intended purpose Upper
35 Since the expenditure results are insignificant I do not report them.
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Houses have served to shift the balance between different educational institutions. 
In fact, teachers have used their political power to transfer educational resources away 
from primary schools and toward higher levels of education. While this chapter cannot 
distinguish between teachers’ sincere concern about education and rent-seeking mo­
tives, it does provide evidence that political power has a significant effect on resource 
allocation and real outcomes even in the absence of power of veto. In that sense these 
results are valuable to the debate regarding the existence of Upper Houses.
Moreover, while India is a unique example of granting political power to teachers, 
the lesson is applicable to many other countries, which also have an Upper House with 
members selected by elitist criteria. For example, the British House of Lords has been 
the subject of much recent debate. The controversy centres on its composition and 
whether hereditary peers and appointments are the preferred methods for selecting its 
members. This chapter highlights the potential risks of granting political power to 
selected groups. However it does not consider potential positive contributions such as 
experience and professional knowledge.
Taken together these results also allow for a better understanding of the significant 
variation in educational outcomes across different Indian states. For example, they 
show that Upper Houses reduce the primary school completion rate by 3 percentage 
points which accounts for more than 15% of the state variation in primary school 
completion.
4.6 Data Appendix
This appendix describes the main data sources employed and the various calculations 
and adjustments which have been made for the econometric analysis. As I mention 
in the main text the data used in this chapter comes principally from two sources. 
The first is the 1999 employment and unemployment round of the National Sample 
Survey (NSS). This is a household-level dataset, which contains among other things 
information on the age and education of each individual in the household and their 
last state of residency if they came from another state. In all of my calculations I take 
the last state of residency as a proxy for the state of birth. The second data source is 
Indian state panel data, collected by Besley and Burgess (2000) from a wide variety 
of original sources. This data covers the main sixteen Indian states for the period 
1960-1992. Haryana split from the state of Punjab and enters the sample in 1965.
U p p e r H ouse V ariables: Based on Kingdon and Muzammil (2003) I construct a
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dummy variable UHj for each state and year with an Upper House. Using the National 
Sample Survey I construct an alternative variable UHj for each individual older than 
16,36which measures the number of schooling years out of the maximum potential 
years of school type j  during which an Upper House existed. So for individuals who 
were born in a state which still has an Upper House this number in primary school 
regressions is equal to 5, whereas for individuals living in a state which never had 
an Upper House this number is equal to 0. Otherwise, if z  defines the first calendar 
year after abolishing the Upper House, b defines individual birth year, rrij defines the 
potential number of years in school type j , 37and gj defines the age of starting school 
type j ,  then UHj — z  — (b-\-gj) subject to a maximum value of rrij and minimum value 
of 0.
E duca tiona l Variables: Data on educational variables is obtained from annual 
publications by the Department of Education in India: Education in India and Selected 
Educational Statistics. Number of schools per child and number of teachers per child 
are calculated employing the corresponding population information from the census.
If there are composite schools such as middle schools with primary classes, or sec­
ondary schools with middle classes, these have been included in the number of primary 
and middle schools respectively. For example, if in a town there are two primary 
schools and one middle school with primary classes, the number of primary schools in 
the town has been given as three and that of middle schools as one even though there 
are only three educational institutions. The same is the case with secondary or higher 
secondary schools.
The expenditure data is adjusted by a price index taken from Besley and Burgess 
(2002). This price index is a weighted average of the consumer price index for agricul­
tural labourers (CPIAL) and the consumer price index for industrial labourers. Ozler, 
Datt and Ravallion (1996) have further corrected these price indices to take account 
of inter-state differences in the cost of living and have also adjusted CPIAL to take 
account of rising firewood prices.
I also use the NSS data to construct a measure of the percentage of people in each 
cohort graduating from primary, middle and secondary schools out of the total cohort.
P o p u la tio n  Variables: The population estimates including scheduled caste pop­
ulations and scheduled tribe populations are constructed using the Census data for 
the years 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991. Between any of these years each sector of the
36 The age of completing lower secondary school.
37 5 for primary school, 3 for middle school and 2 for lower secondary school.
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population is assumed to grow at a constant rate of growth.
P o litical V ariables: Data on the number of seats won by each political party at 
each of the state elections is obtained from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) “India De­
cides: Elections 1952-1991” . Political margin is calculated as the gap in seats between 
the leading party and its nearest rival divided by the total number of seats. Following 
Besley and Burgess (2002) I construct five broad political groups: i) Congress Parties 
comprising the Indian National Congress, Indian National Congress Urs and Indian 
National Congress Socialist Parties; ii) Janata Parties comprising the Janata, Janata 
Dal and Lok Dal Parties; iii) Hard Left Parties comprising the Communist Party of 
India and Communist Party of India Marxist Parties; iv) Hindu Parties comprising the 
Bharatiya Janata Party; v) Regional parties comprising parties unique to each state.
Econom ic and  In fra s tru c tu re  V ariables: The primary source of state income 
is an annual publication by the Department of Statistics. The data is adjusted by the 
price index. The primary source of bank branch data is from the Reserve Bank of 
India (2000), collected by Burgess and Pande (2003). Data on poverty is constructed 
by Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) based on various rounds of the National Sample 
Survey.
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TABLE 4.1
DATA DESCRIPTION
Variable Mean SD SD Within Number of
States Observations
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
Upper House Existence 0.39 0.49 0 . 2 1 491
Enrolment Percentage
Boys’ Primary Schools (6-11) 97.98 16.77 13.03 380
Girls’ Primary Schools (6-11) 67.20 24.89 14.84 380
Boys’ Middle Schools (11-14) 52.76 16.53 11.33 395
Girls’ Middle Schools (11-14) 27.68 19.11 11.14 395
Boys’ Secondary Schools (14-17) 26.40 7.04 4.90 395
Girls’ Secondary Schools (14-17) 11.67 7.96 4.08 393
School Completion Rates
Primary Schools 0.56 0.17 0 . 1 2 491
Middle Schools 0.39 0.14 0 . 1 0 491
Secondary Schools 0.23 0.09 0.07 491
Real Expenditure per Child (Rupees)
Primary Schools 48.90 25.55 20.34 328
Middle Schools 41.65 34.43 26.87 328
Secondary Schools 87.43 46.31 35.43 328
Number of Schools per 1000 Children
Primary Schools 6 . 2 1 4.00 1.13 427
Middle Schools 1.82 1.37 0.62 424
Secondary Schools 1.03 0.64 0 . 1 2 425
Number of Teachers per 1000 Children
Primary Schools 16.42 12.26 4.46 425
Middle Schools 13.85 8.67 4.46 425
Secondary Schools 17.51 12.17 7.35 426
Controls
Real State Domestic Product Per Capita (Rs) 1069.67 545.67 261.45 452
Rural Population (‘000) 29774 20114 5818 491
Urban Population (‘000) 8204 6095 2925 491
Scheduled Caste Population % 14.56 5.98 1.27 491
Scheduled Tribe Population % 7.32 7.51 0.997 491
Gini Coefficient % 29.62 3.79 2 . 1 0 491
Highways (Km.) 1724.33 744.11 281.66 352
Banks Per 1000 People 0.04 0.03 0.03 491
Political Variables
Congress % 0.50 0.25 0 . 2 1 489
Hard Left % 0.07 0.13 0.06 489
Janata % 0.14 0.24 0.19 489
Hindu % 0.04 0.08 0.06 489
Political Margin % 0.42 0 . 2 0 0.18 486
Turnout % 61.32 1 0 . 2 1 5.63 489
Notes: The data is for the sixteen main states over the period 1960-1991. Haryana split from the state  of Punjab in 1965. 
From this date on, I include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana. I therefore have a  total of 491 possible 
observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. See the Data Appendix for details on the 
construction and sources of the variables.
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TABLE 4.2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY PARLIAMENTARY REGIME (1960-1964)
Parliamentary System Bicameral Unicameral Difference
(D-(2)
(1 ) (2 ) (3)
Primary School Teachers 15.80 7.80 7  9 9 ***
(1.07) (0.69) (1.27)
Middle School Teachers 10.45 6.05 4 4***
(0.74) (0.65) (0.98)
Secondary School Teachers 1 1 . 6 8 5.45 6.23***
(0.65) (0.57) (0 .8 6 )
Primary Schools 6.78 3.58 2 2 1 ***
(0.40) (0.34) (0.52)
Middle Schools 1.40 0.79 0.61***
(0.14) (0 .1 0 ) (0.17)
Secondary Schools 0.70 0.31 0.39***
(0.03) (0 .0 2 ) (0.04)
Primary School Completion Rate 0.42 0.45 -0.03
(0 .0 2 ) (0.03) (0.03)
Middle School Completion Rate 0.32 0.30 0.03
(0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0.03)
Secondary School Completion Rate 0 . 2 0 0.15 0.051***
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 2 )
Population ('000) 38062 18238 19824***
(2770) (1430) (3117)
Rural Population Proportion 0.79 0.85 -0.06***
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 2 )
Real State Domestic Product Per Capita (Rupees) 886.43 779.17 107.26***
(33.07) (15.30) (36.44)
Notes: * T-test is significant at 10%; ** T-test is significant at 5% ***T-test is significant at 1%. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. Column 1 is for all bicameral states in 1960 including those who chose to abolish the Upper House in later 
years. Column 3 reports the differences between bicameral sta tes and unicameral states. The data is for the sixteen main 
sta tes over the period 1960-1964, excluding Haryana. S ee the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources 
of the variables. Number of schools and number of teachers are per 1000 children.
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TABLE 4.3
BICAMERALISM AND SCHOOLING: INDIVIDUAL DATA (All States)
Unconditional Regressions Conditional Regressions
Primary School Middle School Secondary School Middle School Secondary School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Upper House - 0.025 - 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.024 0.012 0.032 0.009 0.037 0.021
( 2.30) * * ( 2. 80) * * * ( 2. 65) * * * ( 2. 16) * * ( 2.92) * * * ( 2.71) * * * ( 3.23) * * * ( 2. 45) * * ( 2. 50) * *  ( 2. 59) * * *
Economic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Political Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort and State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 253394 253394 222332 222332 199164 199164 120917 120917 81937 81937
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. The table reports the coefficients from linear probability regressions. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard 
errors clustered by sampling units (districts) are reported in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. The data is from the National 
Sample Survey 1999 for all individuals born between 1955 and 1984. Upper House variable in the even columns m easures the number of years out of the maximum potential schooling 
years during which an Upper House existed. In odd columns, Upper House is a  dummy equal to 1 if an Upper House existed when individual started school. The regressions in columns 
7-8 are conditional on primary school completion and the regressions in columns 9-10 are conditional on middle school completion. Economic controls include real state  domestic product 
per capita, rural and urban population, scheduled caste population and scheduled tribe population. Results are robust to the inclusion of Gini coefficient and banks per capita. Individual 
controls include dummies for gender, rural residency, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and dummies for various religions. Political variables include political margin, voter turnout, 
and a  dummy for the leading political group in the Lower House as defined in the Data Appendix. All regressions include state and cohort fixed effects and are weighted.
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TABLE 4.4
BICAMERALISM AND SCHOOLING: ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Primary
School
Middle
School
Secondary
School
(1) (2) (3)
A. Comparison of Interest: Bicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.031
(2.60)***
Observations 163286 
R-squared 0.26
0.005
(0.55)
144593
0.25
0.026
(2.85)***
129506
0.20
B. Comparison of Interest: Unicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.036
(3.15)***
Observations 155309 
R-squared 0.26
0.002
(0.20)
138187
0.25
0.023
(2.37)**
124838
0.20
C. Control Group: Bicameral States and Unicameral States
Upper House x After 1970 0.006
(0.58)
Observations 184501 
R-squared 0.28
0.01
(1.08)
163454
0.26
0.011
(1.53)
145984
0.2
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table reports the differences in differences 
from linear probability regressions. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by sampling units 
are reported in parentheses. S ee  the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. The 
data is from the National Sam ple Survey 1999 for all individuals born between 1955 and 1984. Upper House variable 
is a  dummy equal to 1 if an Upper House existed when individual started school. Economic controls include real sta te  
domestic product per capita, rural and urban population, scheduled cas te  population, and scheduled tribe population. 
Results are robust to the inclusion of Gini coefficient and banks per capita. Individual controls include dum mies for 
gender, rural residency, scheduled c as te s  and scheduled tribes, and dummies for various religions. Political 
variables include dummy for the leading political group in the Lower House a s  defined in the Data Appendix, political 
margin, and voter turnout. All regressions include sta te  and cohort fixed effects and are  weighted.
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TABLE 4.5
BICAMERALISM AND SCHOOLING: TIME TREND
Primary
School
Middle
School
Secondary
School
(1) (2) (3)
A. Comparison of Interest: All States
Upper House -0.024 0.028 0.021
(2.33)** (1.93)* (1.94)*
Observations 253394 222332 199164
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.2
B. Comparison of Interest: Bicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.028 0.002 0.021
(2.58)** (0.17) (2.00)**
Observations 163286 144593 129506
R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.2
C. Comparison of Interest: Unicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.025 0.001 0.02
(2.26)** (0.08) (1.87)*
Observations 155309 138187 124838
R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.2
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table reports the differences in differences 
from linear probability regressions. Absolute t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by sampling units 
are reported in parentheses. S ee  the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. The 
d a ta  is from the National Sam ple Survey 1999 for all individuals born betw een 1955 and 1984. Upper House variable 
is a  dummy equal to 1 if an Upper House existed when individual started school. Economic controls include real sta te  
dom estic product per capita, rural and urban population, scheduled cas te  population, and scheduled tribe population. 
Results are robust to the inclusion of Gini coefficient and banks per capita. Individual controls include dum mies for 
gender, rural residency, scheduled c as te s  and scheduled tribes, and dum m ies for various religions. Political 
variables include dummy for the leading political group in the Lower House a s  defined in the Data Appendix, political 
margin, and voter turnout. All regressions include s ta te  and cohort fixed effects and state  specific time trend and are 
weighted.
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TABLE 4.6
SCHOOL COMPLETION RATES: STATE-LEVEL
Primary
School
Middle
School
Secondary All 
School Schools
Middle
School
Secondary
School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Comparison of Interest: Bicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.034 0.018 0.029 0.023 0.031 0.029
(2.75)** (1.37) (2.32)** (1.38) (1.67) (2.27)*
Upper House x Primary School -0.068
(2.65)**
Observations 244 244 244 732 244 244
R-squared 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.64 0.85
P-value of test UH+UHxPrimary School=0 0.026
B. Comparison of Interest: Unicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.039 0.009 0.03 0.02 0.024 0.023
(2.42)** (0.75) (3.19)*** (1.11) (2.35)** (2.37)**
Upper House x Primary School -0.051
(1.14)
Observations 353 353 353 1059 353 353
R-squared 0.94 0.88 0.79 0.75 0.39 0.81
P-value of test UH+UHxPrimary School=0 0.301
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TABLE 4.6 CONTINUE
Primary
School
Middle
School
Secondary All 
School Schools
Middle
School
Secondary
School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C. Control States: Bicameral States and Unicameral States 
Upper House x After 1970 0.024 - 0.005 - 0.026 -0.009 - 0.012 - 0.02
( 1. 33) ( 0.24) ( 1.43) (0.48) ( 0. 64) ( 1. 16)
Upper House x After 1970 x Primary School 
Observations 368 368 368
0.02
( 0.92)
1104 368 368
R-squared 0.94 0.90 0.76 0.75 0.41 0.80
P-value of test UHxAfter 1970+UHxAfter 1970xPrimary School=0 0.434
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. The table reports the differences in differences from linear probability regressions. Absolute t-statistics are calculated 
using clustered standard errors. School completion rate is calculated using NSS round 55. Controls are as in table 4.4. Upper House is a  dummy variable for sta tes and years with an 
Upper House. Upper House interaction with primary school is a  dummy for primary school observations in states and years with an Upper House. All regressions include state  and time 
fixed effects and are weighted. Columns 5-6 are conditional on primary school completion and on middle school completion, respectively.
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TABLE 4.7
BICAMERALISM AND EDUCATIONAL INPUTS
Primary School Middle School Secondary School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Teachers Schools Teachers Schools Teachers Schools
A. Comparison of Interest: Transformed and Untransformed States
Upper House -0.355 -0.405 1.912 0.341 2.383 0.019
(0.42) (2.87)** (3.30)*** (2.93)** (1.15) (0.33)
Observations 411 413 411 410 412 411
R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97
B. Robustness Check: Bicameral States and Transformed States
Upper House -0.526 -0.581 1.54 0.251 2.629 -0.061
(0.52) (1.90)* (3.50)*** (1.42) (2.36)* (0.43)
Observations 219 219 219 220 218 218
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.97
C. Control States: Bicameral States and Unicameral States
Upper House x After 1970 -0.52 0.095 2.165 -1.162 -0.126 0.089
(0.16) (0.07) (0.73) (1.13) (0.70) (0.88)
Observations 318 318 319 320 319 318
R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% ""significant at 1%. The table reports the differences in differences 
from linear probability regressions. Absolute t-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors. S ee  the Data 
Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the variables. The dependent variable in the odd colum ns is 
teachers per 1000 children and in the even columns is schools per 1000 children. The data  is for the  sixteen main 
sta tes  including Jam m u and Kashmir for the period 1960-1991. For robustness purposes I checked the results also 
excluding Jam m u and Kashmir. Haryana split from the sta te  of Punjab in 1965. From this date on, I include separate  
observations for Punjab and Haryana. I therefore have a  total of 491 potential observations, of which 248 would be 
applicable to section B, and 367 to section C, but missing data  reduces the sam ple sizes to those noted. Political 
parties’ variables include dummy for the leading political groups in the Lower House, voter turnout, and a  dummy for 
election year. Political margin is defined a s  the gap in percentage of sea ts  in the Lower House betw een the leading 
party and its nearest rival. Upper House is a  dummy variable for sta tes  and years with an Upper House. All 
regressions include sta te  and time fixed effects.
137
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis analyses inefficiencies in India’s education system. It finds evidence that 
market failures and political considerations affect investment in education by house­
holds and government.
Chapter 2 assesses the influence of local education on individuals. The evidence 
strongly supports the existence of human capital externalities in India, implying that 
living in a region of higher average educational outcomes is highly beneficial to indi­
viduals. In line with theoretical predictions, the results turn out to be much more 
pronounced when they refer to a smaller local area, so the effect of local educational 
achievements is seen to diminish with size. The results also reveal that externalities 
are larger in non-primary industries, where education plays a more significant role in 
production than in primary industries.
I have employed the differences in differences method and paid special attention to 
characteristics which are potentially correlated with my measures of local educational 
achievements. Although I have not found a reliable instrument variable to account 
for endogeneity, if endogeneity and unobservable variables were the only driving force 
behind the results I should have found no difference between the primary and non­
primary sectors, and it is difficult to think of omitted variables that could be correlated 
with expenditures of people working in non-primary industries but not correlated with 
expenditures of people working in primary industries.
The chapter presents a theoretical model to explain the influence of externalities 
on wages. The model demonstrates the differences between the empirical predictions 
of general equilibrium models and the predictions of externalities models. In doing so 
the chapter offers a contribution to the empirical literature assessing human capital
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externalities. As the general equilibrium effect would cause skilled labour to be disad­
vantaged by an increase in total education, the size of the externality is likely to be 
even higher than the observed effect.
Most existing research on externalities studies the influence of education in countries 
where literacy rates and primary school completion rates are close to 100%, and the 
only significant variation is in high school and college education. By focusing on India 
I take advantage of substantial variation at low levels of education, and the magnitude 
of my results is considerably greater than those found in previous papers focusing on 
the USA.
From my results it seems that households in India do not fully internalise the social 
benefits of acquiring education. This implies that the government should be more 
active in reducing the direct and indirect costs of schooling in India. However, in 
generating policy recommendations it is important to consider a more complete cost- 
benefit analysis. For example it is essential to establish the level of education which 
is most important in generating social benefits. Future research is also required to 
measure the effect of average education on non-market outcomes, such as voting rates, 
crime and fertility decisions.
Chapter 3 analyses the effect of credit constraints on educational outcomes. The 
findings demonstrate a substantial effect of credit constraints on school attendance and 
on wealth inequality in educational outcomes. It also shows that temporary income 
shocks affect education negatively but that widely-available credit can mitigate their 
negative consequences. Finally the chapter reveals that credit constraints harm school 
completion rates.
These findings have important policy implications for India as well as for other 
developing countries. The first implication is that it is possible to promote educa­
tional outcomes by improving other markets in India such as credit markets. Deciding 
whether bank expansion should be implemented requires, of course, a full cost-benefit 
analysis and a comparison with other alternatives. But these results show that when 
examining the cost-benefits of credit market intervention the broader social affects of 
credit should be taken into account. Extending the research to study the effect of 
credit on other outcomes such as health and nutrition should be extremely interest­
ing in this context. The second implication is that income inequality could have a 
long-term effect on development and on the persistence of inequality when credit mar­
kets are constrained. Thus an important mechanism to promote social mobility and 
development is to provide access to credit and education.
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Existing research focusing on developed countries finds it difficult to identify any 
evidence of credit constraints affecting education, despite the fact that the nature of 
investment in education makes it difficult to obtain loans to finance education even in 
developed countries. One reason is the existing subsidies and loans provided in those 
countries. A second reason is that most research focuses on college education, and at 
this level it is very difficult to isolate unobserved ability from income. Focusing on 
India allows me to employ bank availability as a relatively exogenous source of credit 
availability. It also allows me to concentrate on low levels of education where ability is 
less likely to bias the results.
However, this chapter has a few limitations. Bank availability is likely to be rel­
atively exogenous but is also likely to be correlated with unobserved state variables. 
While the chapter offers a valuable improvement compared to the existing literature 
and does its best to account for other state features, it remains possible that these 
results are affected by unobserved variables.
Chapter 4 examines how a special representation of middle and secondary school 
teachers in the Indian state Upper Houses influences the provision of education in 
India. The main finding is that Upper Houses are associated with an increase in 
middle and secondary school completion rates and a corresponding drop in primary 
school completion rates. This is driven to some extent by a shift in resource allocation, 
where teacher representation increases teachers’ employment in represented schools and 
reduces employment in unrepresented schools.
These results reveal that political representation plays an important role in deter­
mining government actions. It is evident that teachers have used their power to affect 
resource allocation, but it remains unclear whether this was driven by rent-seeking 
motives or purely toward achievements in their schools. In addition, the chapter does 
not allow complete separation between the effect of teacher representation and the ex­
istence of an Upper House, although this concern is mitigated by showing that there 
Eire no effects on other public goods or other aspects of the economy. In spite of these 
limitations, the conclusion that political power matters is itself important, and gives 
support to a range of theoretical models and political arrangements.
The findings reported here are also important for political economy research because 
they empirically examine the role of a widespread political institution which is not 
fully understood. The effect of political institutions, and Upper Houses in particular, 
is usually difficult to address convincingly amid other reasons due to endogeneity and 
unobserved variables. This chapter employs the differences in differences method and
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takes advantage of India’s unique time-state variation in the existence of Upper Houses 
to overcome potential endogeneity and biases from omitted variables. The findings 
also provide some explanation for the substantial state-level variation in educational 
achievements in India. Furthermore, they offer a partial explanation for the weakness 
in the primary school sector compared with higher levels of education in India.
While India is a unique example of granting political power to teachers, I believe 
the lesson to be applicable to other countries, which also have Upper Houses with 
members selected through elitist criteria. The chapter highlights the potential risks of 
granting political power to selected groups in general, a lesson which is applicable to a 
wider set of countries.
Future research can implement the outlined methodology in other contexts. In 
particular it would be interesting to examine the effect of Upper Houses on corruption 
and on the length of the legislation process. In the context of teacher representation 
it could also be interesting to study the effect on absence of teachers and legislation 
regarding education.
Overall, the thesis provides a clear picture of under-investment in education in 
India. It demonstrates that private investment in education is unlikely to be optimal. 
High exposure to risk, especially in rural areas, without an appropriate mechanism to 
mitigate this risk, means that households sacrifice future income in favour of current 
child labour. Large externalities imply that the socially optimum level of education is 
higher than the existing one. Finally, government investment is affected by political 
considerations and is unlikely to be optimal. It seems that at least in some states 
secondary and middle schools receive relatively too many resources compared with 
primary schools.
To achieve the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education, more 
attention should be paid to household and government incentives. In particular, it is 
possible that by improving other markets such as credit markets and labour markets, 
educational achievements would also improve. From the evidence presented above it 
seems that households do not fully internalise the benefits from education, so more 
effort should be made by the government to reduce the direct and indirect costs of 
schooling borne by households. Some attention should also be devoted to institutional 
design, including government and teacher power.
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